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Summary 
‘Honour’-based violence (HBV) is defined as a form of crime, predominantly 
against women, committed by the agnates of the victim, often in collaboration, 
which are justified by the victims’ perceived violation of social norms, particularly 
those around sexuality and gender roles. While HBV is often considered as a 
cultural phenomenon, I argue that the cross-cultural distribution of crimes fitting 
this definition prohibits a purely cultural explanation. I advance an alternate 
explanation for HBV through a deployment of the cultural materialist strategy and 
the anthropological theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Claude Lévi-Strauss (as 
interpreted by Gayle Rubin) and Eric Wolf. I argue that HBV is an epiphenomenon 
of the ‘exchange of women’ model of marriage transactions occurring within the 
patrilinear kinship structures typical of Central Eurasia, and that this is 
particularly marked amongst peoples with a history of agrarian and pastoral 
modes of production, in which kinship underwrites relations of resource and 
labour sharing. Within these scenarios, marriage is an aspect of the political 
economy of the group, since it extends or consolidates kinship networks. In post-
agrarian neopatrimonial states, kinship relations remain salient to social status 
through nepotism and the intensification of subgroup identification. I argue that 
women’s embodiment of the standards of marriageability — their ‘honour’ — 
within their communities is a form of symbolic capital which inflects the status of 
their families, and their ability to participate in strategic marital exchanges. 
  
 
 
iii 
This theory is investigated through an extensive and historicised survey of kinship 
and marriage in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and through original survey data on 
marriage forms and attitudes and experiences of HBV in the region, suggesting that 
HBV and understandings of gender, marriage and kinship are intrinsically linked. 
Thus, this thesis argues that while HBV may appear to be enculturated, its 
aetiology may be material in nature.  Efforts to reduce HBV in the Middle East 
should encompass reform of personal status laws which posit the patrilinear, 
patricentric family as the ideal model, and that campaigns to reduce forced and 
child marriage should be considered as part of the process to reduce HBV.  
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To wash disgrace 
“Oh mother,” a rattle, tears and darkness 
Blood gushed out, and the stabbed body trembled. 
“Oh mother!” Heard only by the executioner 
Tomorrow the dawn will come and roses will wake up 
Youth and enchanted hopes will ask for her 
The meadows and the flowers will answer: 
She left to wash the disgrace. 
The brutal executioner returns 
And meets people 
“Disgrace!” He wipes his knife 
“We’ve torn it apart.” 
And returned virtuous with a white reputation. 
Nazik al-Malaika (1923-2007) 
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1. Introduction 
Honour is everything for me…. If I were married, in 
that case, the girl whom I married would be my 
honour. My sister is my honour too, so are my 
relatives, the daughter of my aunt and the daughter 
of my uncle are also my honour. That is, all of them 
are my honour. Everything happening around me 
and all my family line are my honour.  
24 year old Imam from Batman, Turkey (Kardam 2005, p. 17) 
It's easier to sacrifice a son or a daughter than it is to 
sacrifice a society or your extended family, who you 
are trying to please all the time. 
‘Neina’, survivor of ‘honour’ based violence (Corbin 2012) 
Honour killing is a tragedy in which fathers and 
brothers kill their most beloved, their daughters and 
sisters . . . Here, affection and brutality coexist in 
conflict and unity. 
Shahrzad Mojab, Kurdish writer and feminist (2002a p. 61) 
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Defining ‘honour’-based violence 
Coomaraswary (2005, p. xi), writing as the UN’s Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, describes honour-based violence (HBV) as follows: 
Honour is generally seen as residing in the bodies of women. 
Frameworks of ‘honour’ and its corollary, shame, operate to control, 
direct and regulate women’s sexuality and freedom of movement by 
male members of a family. Women who fall in love, engage in non-
marital relationships, seek a divorce or choose their own husbands 
are seen to transgress the boundaries of ‘appropriate’ (that is, 
socially sanctioned) behaviour. Regulation of such behaviour may in 
some cases involve horrific direct violence — including ‘honour 
killing’, perhaps the most brutal control of female sexuality — as 
well as indirect subtle control exercised through threats of force or 
the withdrawal of family benefits and security.  
Crimes often predicated upon a supposed ‘shaming’ act committed by the 
victim, which casts the patriline as a whole into disrepute within the 
community.  
Welchman and Hossain’s cardinal anthology on HBV (2005) cites Abu Odeh’s 
(1996) statement that the ‘paradigmatic example of a crime of honour is the 
killing of a woman by her father or brother for engaging in, or being 
suspected of engaging in, sexual practises before or after marriage.’ In this 
analysis, perpetration within HBV is agnatic, in that the perpetrator is a 
member of the same patriline as the victim, and the crimes are narrowly 
defined as murder justified by the breaking of sexual norms. For other 
writers (Baker et al. 1999; Salter 2014), HBV has continuities with intimate-
 INTRODUCTION 
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partner violence (IPV) and domestic violence occurring in gangs where the 
point of distinction is the collective nature of the aggressors, where ‘it falls to 
all male members [of the family] to enforce … compliance’ (Baker et al. 1999, 
p. 172).  
Yakin Ertürk, Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women, associates the 
language of ‘honour’ with both collectivity and agnation: 
[T]he family’s honour is presumed to be achieved through the 
conduct of its female members, founded upon their body and 
sexuality – which is directly related to shame and modesty. In this 
context, the building block of social relations is commonly the 
collective entity – i.e. family, tribe, kinship groups etc. – as opposed 
to the individual. Consequently, shame and modesty codes embody 
the entire group, not just the individual who is perceived to have 
violated the honour code. In this respect, preserving the honour of 
the collective group requires women to exercise modesty and 
obedience and men to exercise control over women to ensure their 
compliance with group norms. (2009, p. 64) 
In related research I conducted in connection with this thesis (Payton 2014), 
definitional attributes which distinguish HBV from other forms of violence 
against women and domestic violence, are agnation (the perpetrators are 
members of the same patriline as the victim), collectivity (the active or tacit 
collaboration of members of a patriline and the wider community in 
perpetration) and the deployment of a discourse of ‘honour’ to justify 
violence. This research was used due to its use of empirical methods to 
explore the definitional attributes of HBV for Middle Eastern women who had 
experienced violence, rather than extracting a definition from theoretical or 
INTRODUCTION  
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policy-related work, so that I could be sure of using a definition which was 
close to native understandings. 
Women’s ‘honour’, then, seems to be a property pertaining to an agnatic 
collective — who share a common responsibility both for safeguarding their 
collective reputation, which is dependent upon the socialisation of female 
members to normative standards for female behaviour, and for applying 
metanormative sanctions when kinswomen are perceived to have violated 
such norms.  
‘Honour’ killings have attracted the most attention of all forms of ‘honour’-
based violence1, yet these are just the most extreme forms of a continuum of 
violence which can be enacted, including: 
 Forced marriage; 
 Beatings; 
 Imprisonment; 
 Forced hymenoplasty and abortion; 
 Public humiliation, including facial mutilation, shaving the head, 
parading in public on the back of a donkey amongst others 
(Hassanpour 2001). 
According to Pew (2013, p. 190), only 22% of Iraqi citizens believed that 
‘honour’ crimes were never justified against women; only 33% believed they 
were never justified against men. Iraq showed the highest support for HBV 
                                                        
1 Due to the high visibility of murder in terms of the media and criminal justice system, many 
of the examples in this thesis will relate to this crime. Many of the lesser crimes enumerated 
above are invisible due to the ability of families to coerce their victims into silence. Also, 
victims who seek protection and support due to fears of HBV have an extreme need for 
confidentiality due to the escalation patterns of HBV, the potential for collusion and the 
longitudinal nature of HBV risk. The responsibility for victim protection means that sub-
lethal cases are rarely available for analysis. 
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 5 
across the whole survey, which was limited through solely addressing 
predominantly Muslim nations, reflecting the general but contentious 
popular association of ‘honour’ crimes with Islamic identities. In Iraq, Pew 
found that 44% of respondents believed that the ‘honour’ killings of women 
were ‘often acceptable’, whereas 5% or fewer participants in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Indonesia 
agreed with this proposition. From the entire MENA region, only in two 
countries — Morocco and Tunisia — did a majority agree that women should 
never be killed on the basis of ‘honour’ (2013, p. 90). 
While the UN’s Country Team for Iraq identify that family violence against 
women and girls in the KRI is extremely high, it appears to be higher still in 
South/Central Iraq (Iraq Women Integrated Social and Health Survey 2011), 
implying that the prominence of the issue in the Kurdish region is not 
necessarily an indication of greater incidence, but of greater attention, partly 
due to the efforts of the indigenous feminist movement.  
Since the 1990s, through such events as Das’s (1995) study of the murders of 
Bangladeshi women who had been raped during the war with Pakistan, 
Jordanian women’s activism against discriminatory laws in the late 1990s 
(Husseini 2009), the publicity surrounding the murder of Samia Sarwar in 
1999, Asma Jahangir’s (1999) decision to include ‘honour’ crimes within her 
brief as Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings to the UN, various 
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reports by the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, and the murder of Fadime Şahindal in Sweden in 2002, ‘honour’ 
crimes have emerged as an issue of contemporary feminist concern in the 
21st Century.  
Within Kurdish regions, activist women were forerunners in recognising the 
nature of ‘honour’ in terms of violence against women, making it a key part of 
their campaigning from 1993 (Fischer-Tahir 2009, p. 66), since when it has 
become a predominant focus of a well-developed and active local women’s 
movement (Mohammed 2009; al-Ali and Pratt 2011). It is also an issue of 
prime concern within diasporic Kurdish women’s organisations in the West, 
where several similar murders of Kurdish women by their fathers and 
families have been recorded after Fadime Şahindal. Fadime herself was an 
activist against HBV, to the extent of delivering testimony to the Swedish 
Government about the family pressures upon her, a year before she was 
murdered by her Turkish-Kurdish father (Wikan 2008). She is amongst many 
Kurdish feminists who have been at the forefront of drawing attention to 
crimes such as these and defining them in relationship to ‘honour’ in the 
diaspora and the Kurdish homelands. 
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History and extent of HBV in the KRI 
 
Figure 1.1: A journalist takes a call beside a graveyard receiving unclaimed women's bodies, Rania, KRI. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: She views a photograph of an unclaimed body of a 17-year old girl dredged from the Darband River in Rania.  
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Captain Rupert Hay, a contemporary of TE Lawrence, recorded several 
murders of women while serving under the British Mandate for Iraq (1914-
1932) in Arbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region, within his personal 
journal: 
With regard to a woman’s honour the law is most strict. A woman of 
any social standing who misconducts herself, or who is suspected on 
reasonable grounds of misconducting herself, must surely die; and 
the husband, brother, or whoever is responsible for her, who fails to 
put her out of the way, is considered to have lost his honour; and a 
Kurd’s nāmūs or honour is one of his most precious possessions. 
Many women must have been murdered in this way while I was at 
Arbil, but very few cases came to my ears, and then usually a long 
time after the event. I know of one fair lady who was tied up in a 
sack and thrown into the river. Even when I did get wind of such 
affairs it was out of the question to take any action, seeing that the 
entire tribal opinion supported the murderer, and it was impossible 
to obtain evidence. With regard to the man who is the cause of a 
woman’s downfall the law is not so severe. In some cases he, too, is 
murdered, but more usually he escapes by paying the price of the 
woman’s blood. (Hay 1920/2008, p. 56) 
Historically, there are references to similar violence in Kurdish regions as 
early as the 1850s. 
They even kill their own wives, daughters, mothers and sisters. And 
to [punish] such bad deeds women also kill; for instance mothers 
also strangle their daughters in the night or poison and kill them 
and mothers-in-law do it to their daughters-in-law and sisters to 
sisters. No chief [agha2] and no village elder [rî şpî3] will ask why 
                                                        
2 This can mean a tribal leader or landowning quasi-feudal ‘nobleman’ (Natali 2005 p.143) 
3 Rî şpî literally means ‘white beard,’ demonstrating that age and masculinity are considered 
signs of authority within Kurdish society. 
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you have killed [this woman]4.  
(Mela Mehmud Bayezidi (1858-9) cited in Mojab 2004a, p. 112) 
The Kurds are a people who claim ancestry from the Medes, and inhabit the 
Taurus and Zagros mountains5. Conquest and domination have been an 
overriding theme of Kurdish history, from the 7th Century Arab conquest to 
attacks by the Seljuks, Safavids and Mongols. After the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) promised Kurdish independence, a 
promise which was shattered in the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne (1922) 
wherein Kurdish regions were divided between the new nation states of Iraq, 
Iran, Turkey and Syria. This exercise in imperial boundary creation 
effectively meant that in Iraq, a state which was not a nation partitioned a 
nation which was not a state. In each of these states, Kurds faced 
discrimination as minorities. This took its crudest form in Iraq, through an 
attempted genocide, enacted to further the violent suppression of emergent 
nationalist activism under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party. For around 22 
years after the establishment of the no-fly zones in 1991, the Kurdish region 
was controlled by the two most significant political parties — the Partîya 
Demokrata Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)) and the Yeketî 
                                                        
4 Bird (2005 p. 12) notes that by the 1800s, Kurdish ‘high culture’ had all but collapsed, due 
to the decline of the Silk Routes, internal warfare, plague and imperial suppression. Thus 
Bayezidi’s statement should be historically located in a period of ‘a chaotic tribal order, with 
an economy based on raiding’ which may have led to increases in the prominence of 
interpersonal violence underpinning Bayezidi’s observations. 
5 A map is included in the Appendix (p. A) 
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Niştîmanî Kurdistan (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)). Their relationship 
has been both peaceful and bloody by turns, from to a violent civil war 
known as the birakužî (fratricide) in the 1990s, followed by a power-sharing 
pact in 1998, although the influence of the PUK seems to be waning. 
Subsequent to the second Gulf War, the Kurdistan region has achieved a 
degree of federal independence within Iraq, and boasts a comparatively 
peaceful state with a booming oil economy, although this is currently 
threatened by the proximity to the territory controlled by Sunni Arab 
militants known as the Islamic State, which has led to a refugee crisis within 
the region. Violence against women remains a severe social problem in the 
KRI6. 
Within the present-day Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), ‘honour’-based 
violence such as that described by Hay and Bayezidi across history remains 
endemic and well-attested (Begikhani 1998; Mojab 2002a, b; Begikhani 
2005; Taysi 2009; UNAMI 2009; Begikhani et al. 2010; Danish Immigration 
Service 2010; Alinia 2013), where there is a general consensus that these 
crimes have been increasing since the 1990s (Mojab 2004b).  
There were a reported 25 ‘honour’ killings in the KRI in the month of 
September 2011 (Kurdish Globe 2011); the UN estimates that at least 255 
                                                        
6 Dirik (2014) identifies the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as the only Kurdish region to have 
achieved quasi-statehood, as ‘the worst for women’ of all the Kurdish regions. She 
particularly contrasts the progressive gender politics instantiated by Syrian Kurdish 
nationalists in cantonships carved out during the civil war which started in 2011, with the 
masculinist, feudal politics governing Kurds in Iraq. 
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women died in ‘honour’  killings in the first six months of 2007 (Cockburn 
2008). The Kurdistan region has a population slightly less than that of 
Scotland, where just 18 adult women were murdered between 2010-2011 in 
total (The Scottish Government 2011). Although a significant proportion of 
victims of ‘honour’ killings are female adolescents under 18 (Begikhani 
1998), patterns of fatal child abuse in the UK are also radically different — of 
between 45-55 non-accidental killings collected over decades, almost all 
were infants, and there was no distinction by gender (Reder and Duncan 
2000).   
An epidemic of murders of young women in Guatemala was reported as a 
‘femicide’ on the basis of figures such as 362 deaths in 2006 (Center for 
Gender and Refugee Studies 2006, p. 9), which term Guatemalan feminist 
group MuJER (2012) defined as ‘the systematic murder of women’. The level 
of ‘honour’ killings in the KRI undoubtedly could also be considered in terms 
of a femicide; assuming that the second six months of 2007 saw similar 
figures to those cited above, the comparative ratio of deaths per million head 
of population in 2007 is that for every four victims of the Guatemalan 
femicide, 15 Kurdish women and girls died in ‘honour’ killings.  
Legal status 
Crimes described as being motivated by ‘honour’ enjoy a mitigating legal 
status in many Arab countries (Zuhur 2005), including Iraq. While legally, the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) removed the statute of Iraqi law that 
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allowed for reduced sentencing for crimes of ‘honour’ in 2003 (Begikhani 
2005), it was not until American forces were present in the region that this 
began to be extended into practice (Mohammed 2009), and a culture of 
impunity remains (Greiff 2010). Al-Ali and Pratt (2008, p. 144) note that 
Kurdish women’s rights activists remain frustrated by the failure of this 
federal legal code to be brought into practice, where there is a preference for 
using family and tribal mediation, particularly when political and economic 
interests are at stake. As, technically, Iraqi law is sovereign over the semi-
autonomous Kurdish region, the KRG’s reforms have no sound legal basis for 
enforcement (al-Ali and Pratt 2011). Furthermore, research by the Kurdish 
Human Rights Project in 2008 (Yıldız et al., pp. 39-40) found that the older 
Iraqi law unquestionably remained in use, despite the 2003 reform, implying 
that where this applies, the maximum jail sentence in a case of honour killing 
is just a few years — which may be commutable if the defendant has no 
criminal history.  
Kurdish media also report convicted killers being freed in general amnesties, 
along with failures to pursue and prosecute offenders (Bahaddin 2010a; Iraqi 
Civil Solidarity Initiative 2013) within an environment where politicians 
deny the extent of honour-based violence (Salih 2007). It may also be difficult 
to prosecute even if there is willingness to do so: in Urfa (in the Kurdish 
region of Turkey), over a third of cases of ‘honour’ killings resulted in 
acquittal due to an inability to penetrate family solidarities in order to gain 
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sufficient evidence for a conviction (Belge 2011, p. 103). Due to family 
complicity, murders can be readily presented as suicides or accidental 
deaths. 
There is a tendency for victim-blaming within this culture of impunity: Tavqa 
Rasheed, in a 2007 interview, gave three reasons for the high levels of honour 
killings and female suicide in the KRI — mobile phone technology, modern 
television programmes, and women’s ‘lack of social awareness.’ Rasheed was 
speaking as the KRG’s Director of the Ministry for Human Rights (in Mason 
2010, p. 14). Nevertheless, according to a Kurdish informant, the police 
forces do have lines of referral to deal with women in need of protection, and 
Kurdish women in Iraq certainly have greater faith in the police’s ability to 
address domestic violence than women in the South/Central region (Iraq 
Women Integrated Social and Health Survey 2012, pp. 49-50). The Kurdish 
polity have made commitments to reducing violence against women which 
often exceed those of their neighbours (Natali 2010, pp. 91-92), and certainly 
some perpetrators (often those of low social status) are sentenced 
commensurately with the offence of murder, regardless of their claims of an 
‘honourable’ motivation — much to their chagrin (Alinia 2013, p. Chapter 4). 
This shows an increasing, if uneven, determination to tackle issues of 
violence against women within the KRI. 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 14 
Gendered crimes 
Victims of HBV are normally, but not exclusively, women (Danish 
Immigration Service 2010), with one very significant, gendered distinction: 
women are almost always killed by their own families, whereas men tend to 
killed by the families of women they are accused of ‘dishonouring’. The killing 
of a man by non-kin may tend to institute family feuding, leading to reprisal 
killings from his own relatives; whereas the contained nature of the family 
means that a woman can be killed without any such ramifications.  
There may be little sympathy for a girl or woman who has endangered the 
lives of her male agnates through providing a provocation for inter-familial 
feuding, and subverting the interests of the group (Schneider and Schneider 
1976). It could be considered then, that a decision to kill a woman rather 
than a man operates like the duelling culture of Early Modern Europe: it 
provides a way of maintaining ‘honour’ without leading to prolonged and 
damaging blood feuds (see King 2008b, p. 328). On the other hand, pressure 
from Kurdish tribal leaders attempting to reach an agreement may require a 
family to kill their own son in preference to instituting a feud (Begikhani 
2005; Danish Immigration Service 2010, p. 7), particularly where a family is 
lacking in political influence to withstand communal pressure.  
In more practical terms, a family may kill a co-resident female first due to 
proximity, giving her ‘accomplice’ advance warning to flee, initiate 
negotiations, raise supporters to mount a counter-attack, or raise blood-
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money to ransom his life. Males suspected of homosexuality, however, may 
be targeted for ‘honour’ killings and violence by their own families and 
vigilantes (Copestake 2006), since ‘male homosexuality threatens male 
solidarity and superordination’ (Caplan 1987, p. 2) through transgressing 
foundational gendered dualities. That the discussion of HBV against males is 
limited within this work is not meant to dismiss or ignore male victims: it is a 
recognition that within most cases of HBV — those which do not involve male 
homosexuality — whether the victim is male or female, the crimes tend to 
pivot on the presumed ‘dishonouring’ of a girl or woman as a primary 
motivation for violence. 
‘Honour’ crimes are by no means perpetrated solely by men, as women may 
both participate in violence, and play an active role in policing women’s 
behaviour (Glazer and Abu Ras 1994; Awwad 2001; Nelson 2003; Sen 2005) 
although according to Sır’s research, male relatives are predominantly 
considered to bear executive responsibility for safeguarding family honour: 
 Frequency % 
No response 12 2.8 
Fathers and brothers 101 23.1 
All the men in the family 89 21 
All the women in the family 8 1.9 
The agha (local headman) 1 0.2 
The grandfather 1 0.2 
Husband 31 7.3 
Self 65 20.1 
The men and women of the family 64 15.1 
Everyone 31 7.3 
Totals 423 100 
Table 1.1: Whose duty is it to defend ‘honour’ (Sır 2005) 
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Similar to Charrad’s findings in the Maghreb (2001, p. 63), a husband appears 
to hold less responsibility for the behaviour of his wife than her agnatic 
kinsmen. 
Popular attitudes and community pressure 
Taysi (2009) and Sır’s (2005) examinations of attitudes to honour amongst 
predominantly Kurdish populations in Iraq and Turkey respectively show 
varying levels of support for HBV. Sır investigated the attitudes of 423 
respondents in predominantly Kurdish villages in Turkey (2005). In a 
vignette describing an unhappily married woman’s adultery, over 37% of 
Sır’s respondents agreed that the woman should be killed, and many other 
suggestions also proposed violent ‘correction’. Only 16% did not believe she 
should be punished (p. 232). Taysi’s interview-based research in the 
Sulaymaniyah region of the KRI found that 30% of respondents felt violence 
against ‘dishonourable’ behaviour was justified on at least some occasions (p. 
34) and that 90% understood the word ‘honour’ to relate to the control of 
women’s sexuality. 
A study of 180 perpetrators of ‘honour’ killings in Turkey (within a region 
with a high Kurdish population), observed that the perpetrators may be 
lauded by their families and community (Gezer 2008). The favourable 
treatment of ‘honour’ killers by the forces of social control ranges from 
reduced sentences and sympathetic treatment in custody, to lacklustre 
investigation of ‘honour’ crimes. This legitimation of honour crimes at several 
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levels seems to position the honour killer as an altruist — one who is 
prepared to make their children burnt offerings upon the altar of normative 
morality.  
However, to assume that this implies that families have a Spartan disregard 
for their female kin, or that they are entirely motivated by misogyny would 
be an act of callous condescension.  Onal’s sensitive journalistic investigation 
into sentenced ‘honour’ killers in Turkey (2008) found deep wells of regret 
expressed by some perpetrators, along with evidence of extreme social 
pressure. She touchingly describes the case of Ilyas, a Thracian man living in 
the squatter settlements of Turkey, who endured months of public abuse 
from his Kurdish neighbours, including broken windows, spitting, and 
children pelting him with stones in the street until he ‘reclaimed his 
“honour”’ through killing his sister who was suspected of ‘misbehaviour’ (pp. 
134-139).  
Such communal pressure has also been indicated in British murder cases, 
where the fathers of Banaz Mahmod  and Heshu Yones (Bedell 2004), 
indicated harassment within the Kurdish communities in which they lived, 
engineered to compel them to ‘correct’ the ‘deviant’ behaviours of their 
daughters. In the Yones case, as Mojab (2004b, p. 16) notes, the harassment 
of Abdallah Yones, Heshu’s father, was reconfigured into shows of support 
after he killed her. As Abu-Rabia (2011, p. 38) observes, the perpetration of 
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an ‘honour’ killing may be considered ‘an organized social act by the family, 
not a matter of personal preference.’ 
A ‘dishonoured’ family thus could be described as being in a condition of 
stigma, in Goffman’s (1963) term, in having a spoiled and discredited 
identity, separating them from the community as a whole, which persists 
until they restore their status through reasserting control over ‘deviant’ 
women, regardless of the cost to the family. ‘Neighbours won’t say hello, they 
won’t trade with members of the group and they won’t marry their other 
daughters until the deed has been done,’ according to Turkish author 
Mehmet Faraç (interviewed by Pope 2012, p. 201). An imprisoned 
perpetrator of a crime he described as an ‘honour’ killing identified 
community exclusion as a major motivation behind his murder:  
[S]he took my honour…Now I prefer to die here than live outside 
and be ridiculed. Now I can hold my head up. I did not dare to go to 
a funeral or to go out in public because people were ridiculing me. 
(in Alinia 2013, p. 66) 
Withdrawal of such reciprocal relations can be ‘the most salient sanction’ 
available within a Gemeinschaft type of social ordering (Collier 1988, p. 224). 
Those who do not redeem their ‘honour’, therefore, may become excluded 
from the social and economic life of the community, including the all-
important ability to transact marriages for their children. 
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The sense of erasing humiliation that characterises Katz’s (1988, Chapter 1) 
description of the ‘righteous slaughter’ is meshed with the collective basis of 
Tilly’s (2003, Chapter 4) ‘violent rituals’, which ‘ordinarily reflect and 
reinforce existing systems of inequality,’ (p. 87). Honour killings may thus be 
performative acts, carried out for the benefit of a wider collective, an act of 
purification through sacrifice, which leads to reintegration into the 
community. Syrian ‘honour’ killers, for instance, mark the performative 
nature of ‘honour’ killings through slitting the victim’s throat. They take pains 
to describe the act in specific terms in front of the judge —making an analogy 
to the sacrifice of an Eid lamb — to situate the crime as ‘honour’-based 
without explicitly using the language of ‘honour’, and thus make a tacit claim 
for juridical sympathy (Ghazzal 2011). 
Honour violence can thus be seen as a metanorm (Horne 2004), in being a 
normative response to norm violation. In the case of ‘honour’ crimes, then, it 
appears that the socialisation of the family to kill an ‘errant’ member is non-
deviant; it is the victim who is seen as deviant, within a contentious politics 
based on the custodianship of women’s bodies. Violence as a means of re-
establishing social control is a phenomenon well described by Black (1983) 
who identifies that many violent aggressors perceive and justify their actions 
in this light. This motivation may be particularly significant in discussing 
collective violence such as stonings or lynchings (de la Roche 1996), in which 
collectives enforce and enact community norms. 
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In the neighbourhood7, the social boundary shrinks to houses, 
courtyards, or blocks at most for women…People passing through 
the neighbourhood and downtown can be neighbours, co-villagers 
or neighbouring villagers of her husband's family. Any one of them 
can observe her wherever she goes and warn or humiliate her 
husband and his family for her ‘misconduct’ which risks their 
honour. She can go out without fearing disciplinary gossip and 
rebuke only when she has a legitimate companion and her 
husband's permission. Yet the husband's permission is not always 
easy to obtain because most husbands are sensitive to gossip which 
can endanger their honour. (Him and Hoşgör 2011, p. 338)  
Gossip, as a means of generating, enforcing and policing social norms, has 
been identified as a foundational aspect of human distinctiveness (Dunbar 
1998). ‘Kurds constantly worry about falling victim to gossip,’ Brenneman 
(2007, p. 117) tells us, ‘whether or not the subject of gossip is true.’ As 
‘honour’ is defined in practice by the collective, reputation can become a 
point of vulnerability. To allege sexual misconduct on the part of a wife, 
daughter or niece is a method of indirectly attacking a rival; in fact, 
discussion of a person’s female relatives may be normatively circumlocutory 
in order to avoid implications which might be considered to disparage the 
reputation of a family’s womenfolk (Sweetman 1994, p. 96). 
This vulnerability to gossip is imbricated in a regime of constant surveillance 
by family and community, where interfamilial conflicts can be expressed 
through identifying failures to comply with the community-generated 
ideation of ‘honour.’  
                                                        
7 The authors are describing Doluca, a rural–urban migrant neighbourhood in the 
predominantly Kurdish city of Van in Turkey. 
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The interdependencies of communal life equip it to function as a veritable 
panopticon. Sır’s examination found that over 12% of respondents stated 
that the primary duty of the community was ‘to keep a watch on women 
living on one’s street and in one’s neighbourhood’8. Wolf’s (2010) short 
documentary on ‘honour’ crimes in south-eastern Turkey shows elderly men 
apparently occupied playing card games outside their homes; closer viewing 
shows that these men are simultaneously monitoring women’s excursions 
outside the domestic realm with close attention. Fischer-Tahir (2009) 
observes that women of the urban middle classes in Sulaymaniyah in the KRI, 
are aware of being under surveillance by their families and neighbours, 
meaning that they felt they could not, for instance, use a taxi service to leave 
or return to their own neighbourhood, lest they be criticised for sharing a car 
with an unrelated man. Thus the community assumes the role of defining 
female deviance, and of policing it through a regime of constant surveillance 
(Glazer and Abu Ras 1994; Awwad 2001). The eyes and ears of the 
community may create just as effective a surveillance culture as any CCTV 
network.  
To be ‘dishonoured’, then, is to be perceived as being ‘dishonoured’ within the 
mutable interpretations of ‘honour’ operating within the wider community. 
Therefore it is quite mistaken to conceptualise the complex nature of 
                                                        
8 Bozarslan (2004, p. 88) notes that junior males may also be subjected to this kind of street 
discipline by their elders. 
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‘honour’ in the sense of a quasi-religious law, under which punishments are 
meted out for non-conformity to a pre-determined code of conduct.  
VanEck (2003) characterises ‘honour’ as being normative and contingent 
rather than prescriptive, describing ‘honour’ as existing in a state of constant 
definition and redefinition within those collectives which claim a stake in the 
control of women, wherein the most significant stakeholders are their 
agnates and potential affines. A woman’s violation of ‘honour’ may pass 
without any repercussions, so long as knowledge of the ‘shaming act’ can be 
confined within the household or lineage (see Payton 2014). According to 
VanEck, families frequently do make efforts to contain any knowledge of a 
transgression from the community at large, in order to avoid any escalation 
to violence (p. 43)9.  
The ‘Eleventh Commandment’ may hold primacy over all the other directives 
of ‘honour’ culture. An advocate working with survivors of HBV in the KRI 
told Alinia (2013, p. 97) that ‘[f]amilies do not like their problems to become 
public knowledge and, therefore, a precondition for the possibility of 
reconciliation [i.e. of a ‘dishourable’ girl or woman with her family] is that the 
community does not know about the case.’  
Reconciliation is considered impossible, then, where knowledge of ‘shame’ 
cannot be contained. ‘Honour’, then, operates above the level of the 
                                                        
9 For an example of containment attempts see also Glazer and Abu Ras’s (1994) meticulous 
single case-study. 
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household, despite being imbricated within its identity and status. ‘Honour’ 
and ‘shame’ are defined at the level of the community — even to the extent of 
allowing ‘vigilante’ honour crimes, as the following apalogue exemplifies: 
A shepherd, while grazing his sheep one day, came across a boy and 
girl doing something sherim (shameful)… [T]he shepherd 
immediately took his long dagger and killed them both with one 
stab. The villagers considered him as a man concerned with the 
honour of the village, and even the parents of the boy and girl were 
more ashamed of their children than angry at the shepherd. 
(Brenneman 2007, pp. 59-60) 
Thesis outline and research questions 
The thesis will attempt to develop an aetiological exploration of HBV using a 
two phased approach, in which a theoretical, model-building phase based in a 
programme of synthetic reading, will be expanded upon and tested by an 
empirical phase, based in survey analysis. The intent is to develop an 
explanatory model of HBV which is not over-determined by conceptions of 
culture, but located instead within particular structurings of kinship. The 
research questions for each phase are as follows:  
Theoretical research questions 
1. Can family ‘honour’ be described as relating to particular geographies and 
organisations of the family rather than specific cultures or religions? 
2. How is ‘honour’ understood and expressed within domestic gender 
relations? 
3. How do various traditional forms of marriage express relationships 
within and between families; and how does this impact upon the ‘honour’ 
of women and families? 
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4. How have traditional forms and understandings of marriage altered over 
the KRI’s recent history of political and economic changes?  
Empirical research questions 
1. What are the structures of marriage and kinship within the sample? 
a. How many marriages within the sample were arranged, and who 
was involved in their arrangement? 
b. How common are the ‘traditional’ forms of marriage — i.e., those 
between cousins, direct exchange and elopements — and what are 
their characteristics?  
c. What can be determined from the differing levels of consent to 
marriage arrangement? 
2. Do these familial structures correlate with an individual’s likelihood to 
approve of HBV? 
3. Are there common factors within families in which HBV has been 
experienced? 
The methodology and epistemology behind these phases will be outlined in 
chapter two. Chapter three establishes an ecosociological basis for the model, 
where kinship is identified as being a primary method for organising 
relations of labour and resource sharing, which places particular importance 
upon marriage arrangement as the method by which kinship identifications 
are extended or consolidated. It also discusses the relevance of patrilinearity 
within Middle Eastern understandings of kinship which construct the 
political economy of marriage. The Kurdish understanding of ‘honour’ 
(namûs) is explored, and related to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital, 
where it is described as a precondition for participation in marital strategies. 
Chapter four develops this understanding into a politics of the domestic 
realm, identifying how the logics of patrilinear kinship structure and the 
expectation of patrilocal residence lead to inequalities of power on the bases 
of gender and seniority within the household. This conditions a particular 
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vulnerability for young women, who are predominantly the victims of HBV. It 
also discusses the anxieties around the physical manifestation of virginity 
which is central to the understanding of namûs as a precondition for 
participation within marriage exchanges. 
Chapter five comprises a microsociology of marriage forms found the KRI 
(cousin marriage, direct exchange marriage, which have been analysed in 
detail to provide an understanding of how each form can be understood as a 
particular strategy operating within an overall political economy, and how 
each form reinforces the understandings of women’s honour within the 
wider system of marriage.   
Chapter six tracks developments in marriage arising through modernity, 
including the proletarianisation of the region and the growth of 
companionate marriage as ‘modern’. This also describes the development of 
neopatrimonial politics in which sub-national identities, including those of 
kinship, remain salient in the distribution of oil revenue. While marriage is 
identified as undergoing transformation towards a neolocal, nuclear form, 
there remains an impetus for the instrumentalisation of marriage to maintain 
identity groups within a Balkanised democracy. This chapter completes the 
theoretical phase of the thesis. 
Chapter seven provides the results of the quantitative analysis of survey data 
and comprises the empirical phase. Descriptive data outlines the structures 
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of respondent’s families, including their marriages and those of their siblings. 
Findings suggests that attitudes supportive of HBV are correlated with other 
values which support male dominance in marriage; however, experiences of 
HBV have a different profile, having a higher correlation to acceptance of 
parental marriage arrangement and higher levels of cousin marriage which 
can be related to patrilinear identities.  
These findings are discussed in the conclusion, along with the research and 
political implications of the thesis as a whole. 
The next chapter will outline the theoretical, methodological and 
epistemological aspects of the research. It outlines and discusses 
explanations of HBV based in ‘culture’ and patriarchy, and introduces the 
conceptualisation of ‘particularity and difference’ taken from Ertürk (2009) 
which is key to the epistemology of the thesis as a whole. It includes a 
methodology of both the theoretical and analytic phases. 
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2. Theoretical and 
methodological 
approach 
This thesis addresses the issue of ‘honour’-based violence against women 
within the KRI from a materialist perspective, taking a mixed methods 
approach which combines a theorised account of local structures of marriage 
and the family discerned from various ethnographic and cross-disciplinary 
sources, and the quantitative analysis of original survey data. This chapter 
outlines the theoretical and methodological considerations which have 
underpinned the development of research questions. 
My own interest in ‘honour’ developed in 2000 when I moved into a 
predominantly Kurdish neighbourhood in the UK, where some of my Kurdish 
friends and neighbours candidly, and in some cases eagerly, shared both their 
experiences and their feelings around ‘honour’ and the violence committed in 
its name. Their candour, I felt, was in some part due to my status as a cultural 
outsider, lacking the ability to share damaging information within their 
networks; and as a person from a culture which they considered to be liberal, 
particularly upon sexual matters, and therefore unlikely to pass judgement 
upon any supposed ‘transgressions’. Due to personal experiences, I had direct 
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knowledge of violence against women, often extremely severe, within my 
own family and community which formed a basis for shared experiences. 
However, the less familiar concept of ‘honour’ deeply permeated their 
accounts of their lives and experiences —which appeared to be very different 
from the South-Welsh, working class attitudes with which I was raised, 
where it is quite normal for most people have a succession of several long- 
and short-term sexual relationships over their lives, particularly in late 
adolescence and early adulthood. From this point on, the idea of sexual 
‘honour’ was, for me, no longer an abstract phenomenon associated with 
horrific (but rare) murders in sensationalised media accounts, but as a real 
and quotidian aspect determining the lives of people I counted as my friends.  
This led to an obsession to understand the phenomenon which initially 
propelled me towards volunteering for IKWRO (an NGO providing services to 
Kurdish and other Middle Eastern women) in 2005, and ultimately to a 
belated entrance into academia in order to develop and test the 
understandings developed through these experiences. 
The key problematic to address in theorising HBV is its distinctive 
perpetration patterns and the varying understandings attached to violence 
across regions outlined in the introduction. 
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Exploring theories 
As Ertürk (2009) identifies, the most significant challenge in working in the 
field of violence against women is in accounting both for its universality, and 
for its particularity: in this instance, of negotiating the universality of murder 
with the particularity of ‘honour’ as a justification (cf. Mojab 2004b) and its 
characteristic patterns of perpetration. Violence against women, and against 
children, is a universal phenomenon, and therefore it can appear invidious to 
provide a distinct terminology to any particular form of violence within this 
category. This is particularly the case where this form of violence is 
overwhelmingly — and inaccurately — associated with Muslims. This 
misapprehension occurs within a toxic contemporary discourse drenched 
with xenophobia, exceptionalism and prejudice (Spruyt and Elchardus 2012). 
The existence of HBV is casually used as evidence for the presumed 
superiority of ‘Western’ social norms (Reed 2014)  — which tendency 
extends beyond the West, since the supposed Kurdish tendency to commit 
‘honour’ crimes is an aspect of ethnicised Turkish discourse (Pervizat 2006; 
Koğacioğlu 2011). 
However, any temptation to Western cultural chauvinism on this point may 
be misplaced: justifying violence in the name of ‘honour’ abuts and intersects 
a similarly longstanding practice of justifying violence in the name of 
‘passion’ — a rubric which, in fact, often provides the basis for mitigatory 
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sentencing for ‘honour’ crimes in those Arab states with a heritage of 
Napoleonic law (Zuhur 2005), wherein killers motivated by ‘honour’ will 
often represent their crimes as being committed as an unpremeditated crime 
passionnel10.  
The legal defence of ‘provocation’ as it relates to murder in Europe and the 
Anglophone world is also frequently used in gendered terms to position male 
violence as a disciplinary response to ‘deviant’ female behaviour — often 
conceptualised as ‘nagging and shagging’ — which challenges hegemonic 
constructions of masculinity (Veleanu 2012). These justifications may be 
used to exonerate violence against, and the murder of, female intimate 
partners even where ‘provocation’ is removed as a legitimate defence (Fitz-
Gibbon 2009). Whether crimes are related to ‘honour’ or to ‘passion’, the 
reversal of focus from the perpetrator’s violence to the ‘provocation’ of the 
victim is identical, whether the murder in question is uxoricide, filiacide, 
sororicide, neptiscide, or any other kind of murder within a kinship grouping. 
Nevertheless, the existence of specific laws which stipulate lenient 
sentencing for ‘honour’-related crimes (Zuhur 2005) indicates that ‘honour’ 
has an emic presence within Middle Eastern understandings of violence. 
Moreover, perpetration patterns vary, indicating structural differences 
                                                        
10 Crimes passionnels are a category under Napoleonic law which is understood in the sense 
of a crime being committed a brief period of quasi-insanity due to heightened emotions. This 
allows for reduced sentencing without a full insanity plea. The paradigmatic example is a 
husband who catches his wife in adultery and slays both parties in a fit of rage. 
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between these forms of gendered violence. To take Israel as a case in point, as 
a country where different attitudes to sexuality and gender coexist, historic 
homicide data reveal that 18.2% of murders within the non-Jewish (i.e. 
predominantly Arab) category were committed by an agnatic relative, 
predominantly a sibling11. For Jews who had immigrated from Western 
countries, there were no agnatic murders at all (Landau et al. 1974) — 
although the levels of homicide committed by Jews were overall slightly 
higher.  
As ‘honour’ based violence is a current, severe, and on-going phenomenon, a 
great deal of current literature prioritises exposure and description rather 
than explanation, with the pressing aim of critiquing and improving policy 
and practice (Gill 2009; Bano 2010; Begikhani et al. 2010); and of critiquing 
the discriminatory nature of legal codes which may permit ‘honour’ killers 
reduced sentences (Faqir 2001; Abu Hassan and Welchman 2005; Hoyek et 
al. 2005; Warraich 2005; Warrick 2005). Another trend in current 
scholarship into HBV within diasporic communities is to examine the effects 
of the growing awareness of honour crimes in Europe and the Anglophone 
world, often through inaccurate and stigmatising media reportage, in terms 
of the effects this has upon attitudes to minority communities within a 
                                                        
11 Touma-Sliman (2005) states that amongst Israeli Arabs the most common perpetrator of 
‘honour’ killings is the younger brother of the victim. 
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climate of anti-Muslimism (Bredström 2003; Pratt Ewing 2008; Korteweg 
and Yurdakul 2009; Gill and Brah 2014).  
Thus, a majority of feminist writings critique responses to ‘honour’ crime, 
whether these are legal, organisational, or cultural, rather than the aetiology, 
structure or processes of ‘honour’ crimes themselves.  A detailed and 
systematic literature review (Kulczycki and Windle 2011) finds that most 
studies of ‘honour’ killings in the MENA region are flawed by poor 
generalizability, few have original data and those which do suffer from 
inevitable methodological difficulties, such as poorly verified data, due to the 
secrecy surrounding the topic, and the uncertainties of informants’ accounts 
(p. 1445).  Kulczycki and Windle also raise the areas which have been 
scrutinised: characteristics of perpetrators and victims; the legal status of 
honour crimes and public opinion and socio-structural determinants. In the 
main, explanations of the phenomenon itself are either absent or tacit and 
unexplored, where the writers’ aims are to provide better services and to 
identify mechanisms for crime reduction.  
Ultimately, most attempts to provide explanations of the ‘honour’ complex 
itself, and its relationship to violence, terminate in one or another of a pair of 
grand abstractions: ‘culture’ (Hirsi Ali 2007; Chesler 2010), or ‘patriarchy’ 
(Sev'er and Yurdakul 2001; Gill 2006; Reddy 2008). This polarised 
identification partially addresses Ertürk’s problematic by suggesting that 
such crimes either cannot be generalised beyond the specific ethno-religio-
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cultural identities of their perpetrators and victims, or, alternately, that they 
can be generalised more broadly to all male-dominant societies.  
Certainly the latter explanation is more persuasive: the collective 
‘punishment’ of women’s sexual ‘deviance’ in order to police collective 
norms, is, or has been, a widespread feature of many human societies, from 
the ‘Skimmington Ride’ episode in Hardy’s (1886/2007) Mayor of 
Casterbridge to the public head-shaving of French women considered to have 
collaborated with the Nazis at the end of WWII. However, HBV with a 
collective and familial basis, where violence is not merely considered 
expressive or instrumental, but is seen as a duty which the victim’s agnates 
owe to the wider community has a distinct distribution (Kressel et al. 1981).  
Arguments based in ‘culture’ however, have clear flaws: Hirsi Ali’s account 
over-associates HBV with Islam, ignoring the prevalence of such crimes 
outside the Muslim world, such as in contemporary India which, in raw 
figures, is no less a producer of corpses for ‘honour’ than neighbouring 
Pakistan. She also overlooks the large Muslim communities within South-East 
Asia where ‘honour’ crimes have not been identified, and there is little 
evidence of agnatic supervision of women’s sexual behaviour (Dube 1997, 
Chapters 4-5). 
Chesler’s (2010) study is flawed, firstly through acquiring all her data from 
English-language media sources, thus delimiting the nature of cases she 
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addresses through making allocations on a basis of media-led definitions. 
Neither the publications used nor the timeframe over which they were 
collected are provided. Her widely-repeated statement that 91% of killings 
defined in this way are committed by Muslims (with the implication that this 
is sufficient to relate them to Islam) is thus rendered questionable: it is likely 
that the Anglophone press over-attributes crimes as being based in ‘honour’ 
to Muslim communities due to common stereotypes, and fails to recognise 
‘honour’ crimes in populations which are not currently associated with 
‘honour culture’. It is particularly unclear to what extent, for example, Indian 
publications were used to develop the data, because honour crimes are 
reported regularly in Sikh and Hindu communities in India, particularly in 
Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. To pick a period at random, there were 
four separate murders described as ‘honour’ killings12 in the Times of India, 
the Hindustan Times and the Daily Bhaskar between 10-17 September 2012, 
far more than were reported in any other national presses over the same 
period.  
Furthermore, it appears her definitions of what kind of crimes are, and are 
not, HBV lack precision. To take up a specific case: Chesler takes Kim Gandy, 
President of the National Organisation of Women, to task for describing the 
murder of Aasiya Zubair by her husband in New York, in 2011, as domestic 
                                                        
12 The Indian NGO Prajnya (2009) states that the majority of Indian ‘honour’ killings are 
violent, agnatic responses to contact between caste Hindu girls/women with Dalit (i.e. 
untouchable) boys/men. 
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violence. Chesler insists that the murder was an ‘honour’ killing, and that by 
categorising it as domestic violence, Gandy is misrepresenting violence 
against women in minoritised communities. Yet while the murder of Zubair 
was unusually violent — she was decapitated — there were no indications of 
any distinctive patterns of ‘honour’ motivation, nor of the collective agnatic 
perpetration and community pressures associated with HBV. Zubair planned 
to divorce her husband Muzzammil Hassan: if she had lived to do so, she 
would have been the third wife to divorce him on the basis of his violent 
behaviour; the first that he went on to murder. Hassan then, appears as a 
serial domestic abuser, following a recognisable and well-established pattern 
of killing his victim at the point of separation (Stolzenberg and D'Alessio 
2007). It appears as if the Hassan case has been bundled into Chesler’s 
‘honour’ category merely because the perpetrator and victim had Pakistani 
origins, and because the method was associated with the murder of Daniel 
Pearl in 2002. In this sense, it is only Chesler’s racialisation of Zubair’s 
identity, and of the method by which she was murdered, which places her in 
the ‘honour’ category — which otherwise would include Eastenders star 
Gemma McCluskie, beheaded by her brother in 2012.  
Most significantly, cultural arguments tend to lack historicity: situating HBV 
as a Muslim or Middle Eastern/South Asian phenomenon ignores the broader 
patterns of distribution across Eurasia, both current and historical. Recent 
history suggests that similar honour-based acts of violence have occurred in 
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European regions within living memory (Peristiany 1966; Tillion 
1966/2007), including Italy (Bettiga-Boukerbout 2005), Greece (Campbell 
1964; Safilios-Rothschild 1969), Spain (Pérez-Molina 2001; Shiba 2003), and 
the Balkans (Denich 1974) including the former Yugoslavia (Puhar 1997). 
Honour crimes are currently recorded in Albania, where they are 
predominantly associated with Catholic communities (Mangalakova 2003; 
Mustafa and Young 2008). Other Central Asian countries, particularly those 
with Turkic and Indo-Iranian linguistic heritages also show strong 
continuities with honour culture: in Chechnya, President Kadyrov expressed 
support for the principle of killing for honour (Markosian 2012), and 
literature from Uzbekistan (Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights 2000), 
Azerbaijan (International Rescue Committee 2004) and Tajikistan (Haarr 
2010), although primarily discussing other forms of violence against women, 
indicate some instances of agnatic HBV.  
Historically, China could also arguably be related to ‘honour’ culture, since 
there was an expectation that ‘dishonoured’ females commit suicide (Hsieh 
and Spence 1981; Elvin 1984; Tien 1997; Theiss 2004). Outside Eurasia, the 
complex of agnatic ‘honour’ appears as a Spanish colonial importation to 
Latin America (Gutiérrez 1985; Lipsett-Rivera and Johnson 1998), although it 
has vastly declined in significance (Caulfield 2000; González-López 2004; 
Mayblin 2011), particularly given its incompatibility the pre-colonial practice 
of informal male/female cohabitation, which has become greatly more 
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prominent from the early twentieth century (Esteve et al. 2012). One might 
also consider that many ‘fallen women’ within the Catholic world may have 
been dispatched to lives of penitence within convents and ‘Magdalen’ 
asylums, which provided a non-violent means of disposing of unmarriageable 
women. Also, within majority Muslim communities, there is no indication 
that religious minorities are not equally compliant to the directives of the 
‘honour’ system.  
It is difficult to discern how large a potential ‘honour’ zone may be: since the 
crimes are by nature clandestine, and since areas outside the Middle East and 
South Asia have not been subjected to the same level of intense scrutiny and 
may not have a sufficiently developed civil society in order to be flagged by 
local activists, prevalence could be far wider than currently assumed.  
This wide dispersal prohibits a purely ethnocultural explanation through the 
sheer overwhelming fact of the enormous religious, ethnic and linguistic 
diversity of peoples practising HBV. Subsuming various faith groups — 
Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, Yezidi, Hindus and so forth — and various 
language groups — Indo-Iranian, Turkic, Romance and Arabic —into the 
same cultural category is to extend the Geertzian (1965) definition of 
‘culture’ as a semiotic collective well beyond breaking point.  
And yet — even taking into account the historic prevalence of HBV, this does 
not translate to a pan-Eurasian phenomenon: in the north-west, while the 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
 
 38 
sexual control of women remains a salient aspect of male reputation — as 
could be shown, for example, in Fontane’s Effi Breist (1894) — this does not 
appear to imply a license for familial collectives to apply violent correctives 
to their daughters, sisters, nieces and cousins. Such a licence appears to 
remain with the husband, and to be manifested through individual 
male/male duelling (Appiah 2010) or intimate partner violence (Beard 
2002), rather than being a required duty of a woman’s agnates13. Nor is there 
much evidence of ‘honour’ culture in the south-east, in Indonesia, Malaysia or 
the Philippines14(Dube 1997).} 
The problem posed by Ertürk — that of accounting for the universality of 
violence against women while acknowledging particularities within its forms 
and structures  — remains unanswered by cultural explanations.  
This is only one aspect of their problematic nature. 
                                                        
13 One interesting exception to this is found in Margaret Cavendish’s Orations, where she 
argues both for and against clemency in the case of two brothers condemned for the murder 
of a ‘dishonoured’ sister: however this might best be understood as a thought experiment, 
typical of her style of philosophy (Hursh, 2001). 
14 While Dube suggests that Filipina women were not subject to agnatic supervision, Article 
247 of the law of the Philippines specified that if a woman were caught in flagrante delicto 
and either or both parties were killed by her husband, or a co-resident parent (if she were 
under 18), the sentence was temporary banishment (destierro) rather a punishment 
appropriate to homicide. The use of a Spanish term here suggests colonial influences, and for 
Brewer (1999), there was no particular fixation with virginity or women’s adultery in pre-
colonial Philippino culture. This exemption was repealed in 2006 following a motion by 
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago who strengthened her case by making a direct 
comparison to HBV (Defensor-Santiago, 2006). 
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Culturalist arguments 
Culturalist readings of violence against women chime with the rise of identity 
politics since the 1980s (Moghissi 1999), leading to a trend to identify 
delimited social phenomena closely with the identities of the groups wherein 
they occur: a form of cultural constructionism which evades addressing the 
materiality of hierarchical power (Jackson 2001, p. 289). This tends to build 
upon a conceptualisation of ‘cultures’ as discrete and static units, which fails 
to capture either the heterogeneity within any group or the porosity between 
collectives (Sewell Jr 1997) — an increasingly prominent failing in an age of 
mass media in which symbols are generated and proliferate transculturally.  
The concept of ‘culture’, as Moghadam argues,  
is ambiguous in the assumption that ‘cultures’ are shared rather 
than multiple, often associated with ‘traditional’ societies which are 
considered inert; masking more than it reveals and making claims 
on people (especially women) rather than for them. (1994, p. 7) 
Trouillot (2003), in a chapter entitled ‘Adieu Culture’, even argues for the 
rejection of the concept of ‘culture’ which he says has become ‘irredeemably 
tainted’ by the politics of identity and blame. ‘Culture’, then, may have 
become a licence for outsiders to wring their hands at the presumed 
‘barbarity’ of othered persons (while congratulating themselves on their own 
refinement) within a framing which combines cultural essentialism with 
cultural relativism. The attribution of violence to ‘culture’ not only 
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concretises a particular practice within a particular vision of alterity; it also 
raises the potential for a ‘cultural’ defence, where perpetrators of crimes may 
claim that the crime was ‘normal’ for their culture and thereby appeal for 
reduced punishments (Torry 2001; Song 2007; Ballard 2011). This may be 
depicted as ‘tolerance’ of alternate value systems on the part of a state which 
indulges minorities. In fact, the ‘cultural’ defence can be seen as a cultural 
intervention in itself.  
For instance, when Abdallah Yones pled guilty to killing his daughter Heshu, 
his tariff was reduced upon the basis of his Kurdish ‘culture’ and the 
provocations of his ‘dishonourable’ daughter. This positions Abdallah Yones 
as echt Kurdish, at the core of Kurdish tradition. Correspondingly Heshu 
Yones becomes deracinated; rendered peripheral to her own ethnicity. Such 
interventions tend to reify diasporic masculinities as the representation of 
diasporic communities as a whole — in which the vibrancy of Kurdish 
feminism and the differing and hybrid worldviews of younger generations 
are amongst the many identities located as external to an elemental, male-
defined ‘Kurdishness’ (Alinia 2013), in which ‘respect’ for the presumed 
values of ‘othered’ cultures quickly devolves into a disrespect for the rights of 
women subordinated within those groupings (Mojab 2004b, p. 27). The 
efforts of Kurdish feminists and other dissidents against the patriarchal order 
are thus disparaged through being framed as being exterior to their own 
culture, ‘contaminated’ by Westernised or colonial influence — despite the 
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fact that Kurdish women have been independently organising for their rights 
for almost a century15.  
As Koğacıoğlu (2004) points out, framing the problem of HBV as one of 
‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ is a mechanism which exculpates the state and other 
institutions from potential complicity in its continuance, as we can see, 
perhaps, as far back as Hay’s laissez faire attitude to the murders of Kurdish 
women under the Mandate (p. 1). Such ‘cultural’ defences have a strong 
intersection with Third-Worldism: anthropological expertise only intrudes 
into Euro-American judicial science when it relates to ‘cultures that in our 
ignorance we can imagine as stable, timeless, ancient, lacking in internal 
conflict, premodern’ (Pollit 1999, p. 29). A member of an urban street gang is 
unlikely to be able to make an appeal to the culture of his group as a 
mitigatory circumstance, although this is no doubt a significant part of his or 
her identity.   
While it is increasingly identified that aspects of many venerable belief 
systems buttress social inequalities, the social sciences retain a tendency to 
‘confuse structural violence with cultural difference’ (Farmer 2006, p. 287). 
In an essay on HBV, Mojab states: 
 [M]any academics are concerned that if they even discuss, let alone 
critique oppressive traditions in other (for example Middle Eastern) 
                                                        
15 According to Mojab (2004b, p. 31) the first Kurdish women’s organisation was founded in 
1919. 
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cultures, they would be accused of racism, neo-colonialism, or 
Orientalism. (2004b, p. 26) 
Culturalist arguments interplay with the narrative of the ‘Clash of 
Civilisations’ (Huntingdon 1993) the toxic combination of Orientalism and 
Occidentalism which attempts to draw a crude binary between the ‘modern 
West’ and the ‘Muslim East’, creating a chasm which effectively swallows up 
the recent history of European HBV, which does not fit into the binaristic 
narrative. In tune with this, ‘honour’ crimes are frequently located within a 
discourse of scriptural determinism16, where Islam is identified as the 
differencia specifica between the (supposedly) HBV-free ‘West’ and the 
(supposedly) honour-obsessed ‘Muslim World’. This position is both over-
deterministic, and not consonant with current and historical data as outlined 
above. 
Narayan, (1997 Chapter 3) in a discussion of dowry murders in India, 
describes similar readings as insinuating the idea of ‘death by culture’, for 
their susceptibility to position othered peoples as arational and non-agentic 
subjects of ‘culture’ — as ‘traditional creature[s] of habit and violence’, as 
Abu-Lughod describes it (1997, p. 110). Disputing such readings, Narayan 
constructs an explanation of bride-burning which focusses upon the 
                                                        
16 ‘Is there a fatwa on your head?’ demanded bus adverts in Edmonton, Alberta, paid for by 
the American Freedom Defence Initiative, with the stated intention of raising awareness of 
‘honour’-based violence, accompanied by photographs of young murder victims. This 
represents a careless conflation of the mechanisms of Islamic legal authority with 
manifestations of familial violence (Sohi and Afsar 2013). 
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economic exploitation of the powerlessness and isolation of young brides 
within normative marriage expectations of exogamous patrilocality and the 
dowry tradition. None of these can be considered distinctively Indian 
practices. Thus Narayan locates violence within domestic economies and 
kinship structure, exposing motivations which are banally instrumental, 
rooted in political and economic exploitation and the affordances by which 
loose dress and domestic gas stoves allow a perpetrator to disguise a 
deliberate murder as a kitchen accident, rather than in a mystifying 
Orientalised conception of Hindu culture. The easy availability of firearms 
and gendered inequalities inflect violence against women in the United 
States, she notes, yet discussions of American expressions of violence against 
women are qualitatively different in addressing these aspects of American 
‘culture’. 
Narayan’s approach exposes the nebulosity of ‘cultural’ explanations in 
comparison with the concrete affordances and motivations for violence 
which any particular social configuration may present. Describing HBV as 
‘cultural’ without examining how it fits into the material interests and goals 
of an individual or a collective becomes a tautological method for attributing 
difference to alterity.  
A frequent flaw in the cultural argument is ontological: it appears to 
commence from a position that HBV is arational, and thus must be examined 
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in terms of other phenomena which are similarly considered arational — 
‘culture’ and religion. To those influenced by evolutionary theories, there are 
few practices more self-defeating than killing one’s own offspring. Sam Harris 
thus attributes ‘honour’ crimes directly to religion in a Washington Post 
article (2007) entitled ‘God’s Hostages’. While cultures may certainly adopt 
practices which are maladaptive for their survival (Edgerton 1992), such 
practices are rarely so widely cross-culturally diffused and longitudinally 
maintained as HBV.  
So I argue, within this thesis, that HBV is neither arational nor maladaptive in 
any immediate sense: that perpetrators are not blindly following the dictates 
of their ‘culture’, nor of their religion, but acting in their own embedded 
interests as social beings within particular social formations.  
This leads to the second great abstraction: patriarchy. While patriarchy has 
been identified by a majority of writers as being intrinsic to ‘honour’, there 
have been surprisingly few attempts to answer the core question of 
universality and particularity; of how differing configurations of male 
dominance may explain the curious distribution of crimes of this nature. A 
specific analysis of HBV may need to be entwined with a re-analysis of 
patriarchy which considers differences in the construction and rationales 
behind male power between regions (Joseph 1996). However, explorations in 
this area have had a limited success in providing an aetiology for HBV. 
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Khan (2006, pp. ix-xxiii) provides a compelling rationale for advancing 
understandings of HBV using a materialist methodology; however her 
historical materialist framing is insufficiently sensitive to intergroup 
variations and fails to explain why the areas she studies (Pakistan and 
Turkey) have high levels of HBV in contradistinction to other regions. While 
she identifies the continued undervaluation of women’s labour in these 
regions, this phenomenon is found very widely in human societies with 
differing patterns of violence. As Sev’er and Yurdakul (2001, pp. 978-979) 
identify, increased entrance into the workforce has not relieved women of 
any of the burdens of representing family ‘honour’, and may indeed have 
made ‘honour’ all the more fragile. They themselves claim that an approach 
based in radical feminist ideas around male power may be more explanatory: 
however this again confronts the near-universality of male power and the 
delimited appearance of HBV, which they do not attempt to unravel.  
King (2008b), drawing from a detailed and sympathetic ethnographic study 
of the KRI, very usefully describes women’s honour as operating as a barrier 
around ‘patrilinear sovereignty’, suggesting that norms and metanorms 
around female sexual behaviour may have a linkage to particular orientations 
of kinship. Alinia’s (2013) intersectional position, combining the gendered 
aspects of these crimes with a wider political focus on broader power-
structures and group identities, provides a valuable synthesis of the problem 
at hand. 
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While these generative and illuminating attempts do not provide an acultural 
explanation why HBV is predominantly identified within Eurasia, but not 
universally across Eurasia, these will form the starting assumptions of this 
work which uses a combination of these insights: taking a materialist, 
anthropological approach, focussing upon the hierarchical relations of gender 
and kinship at the level of the household, and in interactions between 
households, and then positioning this within the external power structures of 
the state and other power-holders.  
An anthropological approach 
Encounters between anthropology and criminology have been minimal since 
César Lombroso hung up his callipers, at a point in history when criminology 
was in its nonage, and mainstream anthropology appeared more concerned 
with the mensuration of the human form than the exploration of the human 
experience. Early anthropological attempts to create a Linnaean taxonomy of 
humanity were closely linked to the racist construction of ‘moral’ hierarchies 
based on race, and in overall effect were often little more than prejudice and 
negative stereotyping of non-Whites dressed in an ugly pseudo-scientific 
discourse of ‘degeneracy’ and ‘atavism’. The subsequent diversion into 
cultural anthropology has tended to compensate for these offences by 
exhibiting a Rousseauian romanticism of the supposedly simple life of pre-
modern societies (Edgerton 1992) drawing a discreet veil over criminality, 
exploitation and violence which tends to elide the most problematic, 
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exploitative and conflictual features of societies (Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois 2006, p. 6), which, naturally, tend to be those of most interest to 
scholars with an interest in violence.  
The complex of honour-and-shame was first associated with the 
Mediterranean region in the late 1950s (e.g. Peristiany 1966) and although 
these studies are insightful, they are also distinctly pre-feminist in their focus 
upon male experiences. Attempts to revisit the heritage of mid-twentieth 
century anthropological learnings on ‘honour’ from a feminist perspective 
have been limited (e.g. Coombe 1990; Lindisfarne 1994), both of which date 
prior to the reinvigoration of interest in ‘honour’ from either feminist, 
criminological or international human rights perspectives. Studies which 
have a determined focus upon kinship number even fewer (e.g. King 2008b). 
Although ‘honour’ has been a preoccupation of anthropology since the 1960s, 
the discipline as a whole has historically tended to overlook expressions of 
ambivalence and conflict within the family (Peletz 2001), mirroring the 
general exemption from critical scrutiny which the family has long been 
accorded across a great deal of scholarship (Okin 1991).  
Since HBV is emically defined by agnatic perpetration, then a determined 
focus on the family, using the anthropology of kinship, presents the greatest 
promise for explication, given that gender roles are largely inculcated, 
performed and policed within the family (Collier and Yanagisako 1987).  
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In the Middle East, according to Joseph (2000b, p. 16), patriarchy cannot be 
disarticulated from kinship structures. Charrad (2000, p. 71) asserts that if a 
differencia specifica is to be sought, it should be investigated through an 
analysis based in kinship rather than religion or ‘culture’. Joseph further 
argues that western feminism has long concentrated on the conjugal bond as 
a producer of gendered inequalities, to the neglect of the extended family 
(2000a, p. 117) which produces these just as readily, often complicating 
gendered inequalities with other intersections of privilege, such as seniority. 
For Sacks (1982, p. 111) this lacuna results from the pervasive influence of 
the capitalist ideation of the nuclearized domestic realm, within a scholarship 
which neglects the nature of extended kinship relations in favour of analysing 
the functionality (or otherwise) of the conjugal bread-winner/home-maker 
dyad, which is falsely presumed to be normative and universal.  
Etymologically, ‘patriarchy’ is itself a kinship relationship, situating 
dominance in the figure of the father/pater, after the Roman paterfamilias 
who possesses patria potestas, to the extent of the power of life or death over 
all his dependents, including his wife, children and slaves. Second-wave 
feminism extended the term ‘patriarchy’ to apply far more widely to systems 
of male dominance, regardless of the nature of male power within those 
systems. Male dominance has a wide variety of forms, not all of which are 
located within the family, but which may relate to attitudes within states, 
religious institutions, male dominated work environments and so forth.  
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Research methodologies 
In this thesis I develop and then test a model of ‘honour’ based violence 
which based in a materialist explanation using a phased approach, where the 
model built in phase one is subsequently scrutinised through an analysis of 
original data which forms phase two of the research. 
Theoretical phase: Model building 
I take the dynamics of universality/particularity not just as foundational to 
defining the problem at hand, but also for the development of the 
epistemology — through the development of a scrutinising gaze which 
oscillates between micro- and macro-sociology, which pans and scans across 
and between cultures and historical periods. Like a pupil which dilates and 
contracts to gain a depth of visual field, the theorisation occurs within a 
shifting focus: interactions within a specific ethnie are repeatedly 
contextualised within a panoramic, comparative, transdisciplinary and 
historicised framing. My intention here is to avoid the underexamined 
assumptions of the cultural premise with to ensure that the description of 
how ‘honour’ operates in the KRI which I present is neither exceptionalised, 
over-reliant upon ideas of cultural difference, nor incongruous with 
understandings applicable across wider territories and periods. The purpose 
is to deploy the central problematic identified by Ertürk (2009) — that of 
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universality and particularity mentioned above (p. 24) in development of a 
method of analysis. 
The cultural materialist perception forms the starting point for the 
development of a raft of research questions, which were addressed through 
an intensive programme of synthetic reading, intended to clarify the 
phenomenon and to develop a theoretical model. This involved an intense 
and focussed programme of reading, evaluating and synthesising various 
sources which I conceptualise as ‘a creative activity that produces a new 
model, conceptual framework, or other unique conception’ (Torraco 2005, p. 
362). My reading  encompassed a wide variety of sources and benefitted from 
a willingness to traverse various disciplines and genres — my records 
indicate I have read almost 300 books during the research period, ranging in 
substance from folklore and literature to colonial travelogues; from the 
anthropology of kinship to the politics of state formation; from 
Mediterranean ethnographies to histories of marriage; from NGO reports to 
local news-sources, and naturally, innumerable articles drawn from searches 
across every database of academic journals to which I had access. It involved 
several visits to the British Library to secure rare texts — and browse the 
shelves for inspiration — and extensive use of the online library provided by 
the Fondation-Institut Kurde de Paris17, which provides documents in several 
languages, of which I was able to read those which were in English and 
                                                        
17 http://bnk.institutkurde.org 
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French. It also built upon personal explorations of the subject, professional 
contact with women who had experienced HBV, and in interactions with 
Kurdish friends and co-workers at IKWRO with whom I discussed my 
thoughts and theories long before I gained the confidence to articulate them 
in the academic genre.  
This has been supplemented with a mapping exercise which is used 
heuristically in order to provide a starting point for conceptualisation of the 
relationships between ecology and kinship. The map used kinship data from 
Jones’ (2003a) geographical distributions of kinship organisation (developed 
using Burton et al’s (1996) work with the Ethnographic Database) and 
superimposes current patterns of HBV onto Jones’s kinship structures using 
the graphic design programme Adobe Illustrator, and shading various areas. 
The methodology behind identifying areas in relation to ‘honour’-based 
violence (reckoned from 2000) used in Figure 3.3 (p. 57) originates from 
several sources which are identified in a table which can be found in 
Appendix C (page E) along with the dates of publication of the sources used.  
The map data should not be considered in any way authoritative, but more in 
terms of an impressionistic, heuristic starting point for considering the 
geographical/ecological patterns underlying acceptance of HBV, for several 
reasons enumerated here:  
1. The recognition of HBV may be inconsistent – documentary evidence 
may focus disproportionately upon areas which have a pre-existing 
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notoriety for ‘honour’ killings and thus leave other areas 
unscrutinised, particularly those which lack a free press and an 
independent civil society; 
2. The Pew data used was not collected across non-Muslim populations 
and significant areas were not researched; 
3. The mapping project assumes a stasis which is not justified – for 
instance, while the UK’s Country of Origin report identifies HBV as ‘not 
common’ in Libya (Home Office 2012, p. 147), however, media reports 
suggest an eruption of various forms of violence against women in the 
aftermath of the uprisings and civil war of 2011, including HBV (BBC 
2011). Last, mapping country wide regions misrepresents more 
granular patterns. Landinfo’s report on Iran (2009a), for instance, 
suggests far higher occurrence in the Kurdish, Lori, Arab, Baluchi and 
Turkic peoples living in Iran than in the majority Persian population 
(p. 7);   
4. Combining approval of HBV (from Pew) with occurrences of HBV 
(from NGO and state data sources) creates an unwarranted equation 
between attitudes and experiences. 
The mapping exercise is thus intended to provide a broader canvas for the 
ascription of custodial attitudes towards women to patrilinear 
understandings of kinship found in King (2008b) and Dube (1997) to 
commence addressing the phase one questions. 
Any attempt at holistic reading and model building will inevitably have its 
own holes. Even the most voracious reader cannot hope to read more than a 
small proportion of the literature relevant to her interests. Furthermore, a 
solely theoretical model without analytic testing lacks substantiation.  
My model is built through a synthesis of anthropological, political, historical 
and sociological texts which seek to locate ‘honour’ in a way which is 
dependent upon social structure — relations of resource-sharing and labour 
within and between families are organised by marriage. Within these 
structures, it is in a family’s interest to keep control over marriage. Given the 
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patriarchal nature of Kurdish society, this is particularly expressed through 
the custodianship of young women which becomes a point of 
masculine/familial reputation. This situates ‘honour’ in the interactions 
between individuals and families, rather than within any particular culture. 
The second, empirical, phase was designed to test some of the model’s 
principles, to analyse the approval of HBV against the experience of HBV and 
to gain an impression of contemporary Kurdish family structures, and what 
relationships these had to the experiences of HBV.  
Empirical phase: Analytic testing 
In order to provide the most robust test of the model, I decided to use a 
quantitative methodology that could provide insights into family structure 
and marriage, in order to see if there were correlations between differing 
family structures and forms of marriage in terms of the acceptance and 
experiences of HBV within the family.   
I developed an online survey into marriage, family forms and attitudes to 
marriage, ‘honour’ and gender roles, initially drafted in English.  
With the assistance of the Kurdish IT Group and volunteers from the Kurdish 
community, the open source LimeSurvey programme, an alternative to 
survey programmes like Surveymonkey or Qualtrics which has the 
advantages of being free, and allowing for the alteration of core code. This 
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facility was used to adapt the programme to display Kurdish script (which, 
like other Middle Eastern languages, is read from right to left, whereas most 
software assumes that text runs from left to right). I compiled a list of 
phrases necessary for the front-end translation: these were mostly short 
phrases necessary for navigation of the survey, such as ‘click for next page,’ 
and supplied this to the Kurd IT Group volunteers who created the necessary 
translation package for installation into LimeSurvey. The benefits of 
arranging this through the Kurdish open source community was that this 
allowed the translation package to became available to everyone 
downloading LimeSurvey subsequently, providing a free tool to all 
researchers wishing to use the Kurdish language in surveys in the future. 
I installed this software, configured it with the Kurdish language pack, and 
hosted this upon my own personal web domain to make it accessible through 
a browser. The English language questionnaire was beta-tested by five 
bilingual Kurdish volunteers and the questions adjusted according to their 
comments, which involved the removal of a one question which had a 
possibility of causing negative reactions in respondents. 
All the questions and available multiple choice responses translated into the 
Sorani dialect of Kurdish by a Kurdish academic with a PhD in Kurdish 
linguistics. He is fully bilingual in English and Sorani Kurdish, having studied 
for his PhD in the UK. He used the more commonly used scripted 
orthography of the language, which resembles Farsi and Arabic, which was 
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input into a translation matrix that formed part of the software package. This 
presented him with each phrase to be translated individually in English, 
along with a box into which he could type directly in Kurdish, which was then 
saved into the database directly so that the text elements were linked.  
While the highest standards of questionnaire interpretation require a 
complex and demanding back-and-forth translation in order to gain 
equivalence between questionnaire tools (Forsyth et al. 2006), these are 
frequently related to contrastive cross-cultural studies between different 
language groups to provide a level of assurance that the responses can be 
compared across groups. This research did not feature comparisons between 
languages: the English version was not disseminated, and only served as a 
draft for the Kurdish version (cf. Harkness and Shoua-Glusberg 1998) which 
was produced simultaneously. I collaborated closely with the translator, 
providing him with a full explanation of the ideas behind the thesis and what 
the questions were intended to achieve, treating him effectively as a co-
researcher. We discussed the translation of several significant terms in detail 
during the process. This was read through by another Kurdish speaking 
volunteer (again, a person to whom the theory of the thesis had been 
explained at length) to check for errors before dissemination.  
This was then publicised through Kurdish universities and the Awene 
newspaper, on a Kurdish-language job site, and with the generous help from 
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my personal networks, and also through the social networking sites 
Facebook and Twitter (using the popular hashtag #Twitterkurds) with short 
invitations to participate written in Sorani Kurdish (in both script and ‘Latin’ 
forms). The translator also tracked social media responses to the survey as it 
was disseminated and fed them back to me, so that I could be aware of the 
public response (which was overall positive and welcoming of the research). 
The intent of the survey was to capture family relations and patterns of 
marriage as well as attitudes. Respondents were asked to indicate not only 
practices in relation to their own marriage, where appropriate, but also those 
of their siblings, in order to extend the reach of the data — both numerically, 
and in the hope of gaining greater variation within the sample, rather than 
relying on solely upon the experiences of those with access to the internet.  
The results of this survey are outlined in Chapter 7.  
The next chapter commences this exegesis through addressing the ecological 
aspects of the KRI with reference to the environment, the development of the 
mode of subsistence and its characteristic kinship patterns. 
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3. Ecosociology 
 
Figure 3.1: Kurdish pastoralist (2013) 
 
 
When Allah was creating these 
mountains, the mountains cried … 
They said, ‘Who’s going to take care 
of us? You are making us so snowy 
and so void.’ …Then Allah showed 
the Kurds to them.  
Dialogue from the Kurdish movie 
 ‘A Season in Hakkari’ (Dirik, 2011) 
 
 
[S]exuality is lived primarily as a relation of 
antagonism between groups, within groups, and at 
the level of the subject. Relations between 
communities are basically antagonistic involving 
power struggles over land, pasture and labour 
power. These antagonisms mean that other 
communities are cast as immoral and weak and that 
relations between them (including marriage 
alliances) are fraught with danger and deep-seated 
hostility. 
(Sirman 2004, p. 41)  
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This chapter addresses the question of whether family ‘honour’ can be 
described as relating to particular geographies and organisations of the 
family rather than specific cultures or religions.  
The cultural materialist strategy developed by Harris (2001) seemed 
particularly relevant to the exploration of aspects of human life which inhabit 
culture at a deep level, but where it appears untenable to posit a cultural 
point of origin. Harris places humanity’s endeavours to achieve basic 
biological survival as core to the development of social structures and models 
of thought. The materialist strategy prioritises the etic — observed 
behaviours and practises over emic native understandings — a vast contrast 
to the cultural approaches of such significant figures in cultural anthropology 
as Geertz, Boas and Malinowski. I do not seek to place semiotic and 
materialist understandings into conflict through this choice of approach (cf. 
Sewell Jr 1992), nor to disavow the fact that ‘honour’ operates discursively 
through enculturated processes. Rather, I am seeking to focus upon the 
materialist aspects in order to locate the reasons why a society would choose 
to adopt such a costly and restrictive system — in terms of the labour 
demands of constant surveillance of female kinfolk, and the human costs of 
murder and violence — to such an extent that it has been reproduced over 
centuries.  
This involves a full consideration of how such a code may play a role in 
political and economic interactions between individuals and collectives. 
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The key insight of the cultural materialist strategy is derived from Marx’s 
(1859) proposition that ‘[t]he mode of production in material life determines 
the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.’  
The cultural materialist position argues that aspects of human behaviour 
which have been related to ‘culture’ may have deep aetiologies based in the 
strategies developed by individuals and collectives in order to achieve 
subsistence. These, in turn, are inflected by the affordances and delimitations 
of the environment: 
Traditional tundra societies are more likely to share cultural 
patterns with each other than with tropical rain forest societies, 
regardless of whether some descended from a common ancestral 
culture. High-altitude plateau cultures differ in systematic ways 
from fishing cultures in island archipelagos. (Sapolsky 2005)  
Infrastructure (such as ecology, technology and the mode of production) may 
supervene societal structures (such as kinship and power hierarchies) given 
that similar infrastructures appear to generate societal structures within 
similar constraints, in order to address similar challenges.  
If HBV is considered as a combination of the normative control of women by 
their agnates, along with the metanorm of violent enforcement of control, 
then a cross-cultural analysis must consider that many societies are sexually 
liberal, or may be repressive without licensing violent mechanisms of control. 
In the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, fewer cultures are sexually restrictive 
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than the converse (Schlegel 1995). This is probably due to the high 
representation of hunter-gatherer societies within the dataset, since these 
tend to be sexually permissive (Konner 2010, p. 523).  
As Meillassoux (1981) suggests, there is less impetus for the control of 
filiation within hunter-gatherer societies due to a lack of proprietary interest 
in the land. A Kiowa wife, for instance, who was facing a beating for infidelity 
would be protected by her brothers rather than censured by them; if she 
were killed, her brothers would enact bloody vengeance upon the husband 
(Collier 1988, p. 188). Even where cultures are violently punitive of women’s 
sexual autonomy, this is not necessarily expressed through a communal 
requirement to agnatic murder (Sanday 1981, p. 151). 
Introducing ecosociology 
Given the countries enumerated in my first chapter, HBV appears to be 
loosely associated with a belt formation across the Eurasian continent 
(Figure 3.3 below). The crispness of the ‘honour’ zone is striking, and 
reminiscent of the ‘patriarchal belt’ terminology used by Kandiyoti (1988) 
and Caldwell (1982). While the Eurasian areas where honour crimes are 
culturally heterogeneous, they share geographical similarities.  
Most of the countries in which HBV has been identified as a current practice 
fall between the Tropic of Cancer and φ 45°N. Other countries with 
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suspected, historic connections with this type of violence —Southern Europe, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia — are contiguous with this region, extending 
in a northerly direction, possibly terminating in southern France (Goody 
1983, p. 17). This addition makes interpretation even more curious since 
such a distribution does not accord with any historic empire, state or other 
collective.  
The specific patterns of 
male dominance  which 
exist in central Eurasia can 
be related to the 
geographical zone which Kandiyoti (1988) identifies as ‘classical patriarchy’, 
in tune with Rubin’s (1975) narrow, anthropological sense of the term, 
related to the lifestyles of pastoral nomads, structured by patrilinearity18 —a 
formation which has deep continuities with the foundational structures and 
ideologies of the earliest Eurasian civilisations: the Urkultur of agrarian life 
within the continent. The ‘patriarchal belt’ formation encompasses part of the 
Alpides (Figure 3.2), a particularly mountainous region, formed due to the 
collision of the Indian, Eurasian, Arabian and African tectonic plates in the 
late Mesozoic period, including the Zagros and Taurus Mountain ranges — 
                                                        
18 For an explanation of patrilinearity, see the diagrams in Appendix B. 
Figure 3.2: The Alpides 
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the Kurdish homeland. Diamond (2007) suggests that the pre-modern 
transmission of technology, animals and knowledge occur more readily along 
lines of latitude because similar climatic and ecological conditions are more 
suitable for the spread of livestock and agriculture.   
Thus the ‘belt’ formation may suggest an ecosociological explanation, where 
similar modes of adaptation to the environment were shared across lines of 
latitude, an odyssey in which patterns of power and authority within the 
family were transmitted along with plough technology, livestock, seed-crops 
and the myriad other innovations and adaptations of the Neolithic revolution, 
which tended to be demically and culturally transferred along mountain 
ranges.  
The transmission of agrarian technologies, as evidenced by genetic, linguistic 
and archaeological evidence (Zilhāo 1993; Cavalli-Sforza 1996; Renfrew 
1996), suggests a primary wave reaching Southern Europe around 4800-
4400 BCE, which then spread to the rest of the continent in 4000-3500 BCE. 
While accounts of the foundational period of human civilisation develop over 
time with new archaeological findings, there is little doubt that the Neolithic 
revolution occurred in the Near and Middle East, and that this formed the 
epicentre for the diffusion of wheat, barley, sheep, goats and probably cattle 
and pigs to Europe, Egypt and South Asia (Cavalli-Sforza 1996, p. 51).  Cereal 
production commenced in the Middle Euphrates valley, reaching the foothills 
of the Zagros mountains in the 7th millennium; around the same period goat 
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and sheep-herding was developed in the lower regions of the Zagros-Taurus 
mountains (Harris 1996, p. 554); craggy terrain which only the most nimble 
beasts can navigate.  
Pastoralism has the longest established history in a region extending from 
the Mediterranean to the Indus; and can be found also in the Caucasus and 
Northern Eurasia (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 1968) — 
a region which coincides with the ‘patriarchal belt’ formation. 
Excavations of such ‘deep history’ have, until very recently, confronted the 
limitations of human knowledge and the difficulties of describing societies at 
such temporal distance from our own.  Yet recent developments within 
archaeology, genetics, linguistics and anthropology tend to suggest large pre-
historic macro-cultural blocs, often transmitted along mountain ranges, with 
broad but non-identical patterns of intersection between linguistic 
groupings, genetic similarities and — most importantly for my purposes — 
kinship patterns (Burton et al. 1996; Jones 2003a).  
Kinship patterns are cross-mapped against the occurrence of HBV and 
support for it in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3: Cross mapping of 
HBV with kinship 
macrocultures 
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Within these groupings, the largest geographical area — the ‘Middle Old 
World’ — occupying the majority of central Eurasia, but excluding the 
peripheries of the continent, comprises the patriarchal belt.  
For Jones (2003a), North Eurasia and the Circumpolar regions originated in 
distinct political economies based in foraging and horticulture with bilateral 
kinship structures, developed during a period of post-glacial settlement; the 
Middle Old World, on the other hand, was historically dominated by 
pastoralism coexisting with intensive agriculture, patrilinearity as the basis 
of political power, and rule by pastoral nomadic tribes (Jones 2003a, p. 507 
Table 2). With very few exceptions19, pastoralist societies are patrilinear, 
clannish, and male-dominated, with sharp gendered divisions of labour (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation 2001, p. 36). There may be, then, linkages 
between ecology and kinship orientations. 
Kinship structures can be paradigmatic of social and political organisation 
(Todd 1985).  Jones’ delineation of the cross-cultural dimensions of kinship 
assumes two vectors: matricentricity/patricentricity; and 
unilinearity/bilaterality which have profound ramifications for the 
organisation of the family. 
Traits characterising patricentric societies include brideprice, 
sororal polygyny, patrilocal residence, exogamous or clan 
                                                        
19 I.e., the Maasai of Tanzania and the Tuareg of North Africa, both of which are plains-
dwelling societies. 
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communities and transhumance or nomadism, while matricentric 
traits include matrilocal residence, segmented communities, 
nonextended families and the absence of marriage exchange…Traits 
characterising unilineal societies include clan communities, 
unilineal kin groups, nonsororal polygyny and cousin marriage 
while bilateral (non-unilineal) traits include bilateral descent 
groups, ego-centred kindreds, bi-local or neolocal residence.  
(Jones 2003a, p. 503) 
This provides a vital clue to unravelling the riddle of HBV distribution across 
Eurasian regions, through placing the societies of the Middle Old World as 
particularly likely to have patricentric structurations of the family, frequently 
accompanied by unilinearity — meaning that kinship is overwhelmingly 
patrilinear in form. This has impacts upon the organisation of the family and 
domestic life. For instance, Dyson and Moore (1983) attribute the greater 
autonomy, more balanced gender ratios and lower fertility found in the 
southern states of India to their matrilineal kinship structures, in comparison 
to the firmly patrilineal north (which encompasses the regions which are 
most notorious for HBV).  
Dube (1997) poses a key question based on her comparative studies within 
South Asia, where she finds the agnatic control of women’s sexuality is 
pronounced in southwest Asia, but comparatively weak in the southeast: 
Can it be a coincidence that women in bilateral and matrilineal 
Muslim communities do not observe seclusion20 whereas for women 
                                                        
20 By ‘seclusion’ Dube is referring to an expectation of the physical segregation of the sexes in 
order to protect female ‘honour’, which is assumed to be compromised through contact with 
non-agnatic males. 
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in patrilineal and patri-virilocal kinship organisation it has become 
a mark of identity? (1997, p. 67) 
King (2008b) answers Dube’s question by arguing for a very direct 
relationship between HBV and patrilinearity in the KRI, asserting that 
patrilinear structures place a heightened symbolic value upon chastity and 
virginity, seen as a barrier against agnatic outsiders, which places female 
reproductive capacities under the control of agnatic groups. 
HBV then, might be associated with unilineal, patricentric 
(patrilocal/patrifocal) structures of kinship occurring within the central 
landmass of Eurasia, which also applies, at least at an ideological level, to the 
clannish Roman and Greek empires (Hodge 2007, p. 22). Its absence or 
earlier demise from other Eurasian regions and the ‘New World’ may be 
attributed to the bilateral and matrilineal kinship structures found there.  
Attempts to schematise kinship relations have stumbled between Lévi-
Strauss’s so-called ‘universal’ structures to looser, social constructivist 
readings in which relationships are defined in emic terms. Jallinoja (2011) 
makes a graceful synthesis of these contestations, locating a common ground 
between Lévi-Strauss, Bourdieu, Schneider and Carsten, in distinguishing 
between ‘official’ kin (using Carsten’s term) and ‘practical’ kin (using 
Bourdieu’s), recognising the discrepancies with which persons represent 
their relationships. To provide a simple example, an uncle and nephew of 
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similar age may present themselves as cousins, feeling that a fictive 
attribution is a better expression of their lived relationship than the formal 
degrees of relatedness to be found on a kinship chart. 
Bilateral relations thus always exist at a practical level, even if kinship is 
officially reckoned in a unilinear sense. However, ‘official’ kinship has a great 
deal of cross-cultural variance due to these differentiations: in English, a 
father’s brother, and a mother’s brother are both designated by the term 
uncle, due to the bilateral system of kinship, where each individual claims 
their heritage from both their paternal and maternal lineages on an equal 
basis. In Kurdish however, a paternal/agnatic uncle is called mam21, whereas 
a maternal/affinal uncle is called khal. In traditional agricultural corporatism 
with diffusive inheritance patterns, a man is expected to co-labour and share 
the resources of the patrimony with his brothers, making the agnatic/affinal 
differentiation a proxy for specific economic and labour relationships.  
The attribution of a specific kinship term, then, may denote ‘how that person 
stands in relation to the means of production and therefore to other people in 
the same and different relationships to these means,’ (Sacks 1982, p. 110) — 
and these vary widely across cultures . Kinship based collectives have 
historically performed most of the social, economic and political functions of 
rural communities across the world, including providing mutual support and 
conducting the various tasks of pastoral life, including digging wells, 
                                                        
21 Tellingly Kurds may use mam and kak (elder brother) as honorific terms to show respect. 
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regulating access to grazing lands, burning off surface vegetation, the 
selective grazing of herds and so forth (Bonte 1981, pp. 23-24), and in the 
absence of a developed state and welfare system they continue to maintain 
this function.  
Thus, the patriline is the primary lineage in terms of patrimonial inheritance 
and labour, whereas matrilateral relations are comparatively peripheral, and 
may, for this reason be less afflicted by conflict. Official relationships may 
also be somewhat flexible however, where, for instance, a tribe22 with an 
exclusive identification that wishes to arrange a valuable marriage alliance 
outside the collective may find a method of mythologizing the relations 
between them to smooth over the ambiguities between the systems of official 
kinship with the realpolitik of practical kinship. 
The organisation of labour and 
resources 
The family is an association if you like, a corporation or a clan. It is 
something more than the sum of the individuals, with their human 
and fallible complexities, that compose it; to ensure its safety, it has 
a supreme and primordial right to the devotion of all its members. 
Barret Wendell, La france d’aujourd'hui, 1910 (in Nye 1993, p. 98) 
                                                        
22 I am using Charrad’s definition of tribes (2001, p.9) ‘a political entity bound by shared 
conceptions of patrilineal kinship serving as a basis for solidarity, and oriented to the 
collective defence of itself as a group.’ 
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‘Human beings,’ says Haidt (2012), ‘are the world champions of cooperation 
beyond kinship, and we do it in a large part by creating systems of formal and 
informal accountability,’ which are used to negotiate interactions, 
particularly those operating across social boundaries. Cooperation beyond 
kinship is a particular point of interest in marriage, which can either extend 
or consolidate a kinship group.  
This chapter argues that a fixation upon women’s ‘honour’ is just such a 
system of accountability, and further, that it has been generated due to the 
ways in which marriage is used to organise social relations within 
patricentric agrarian-pastoralist societies.  
Wolf’s (1982) magisterial ecosociological history describes how kinship can 
be viewed as a distinct mode of production, particularly predominant 
amongst those people upon the peripheries of ‘tributary’ empires — which 
would include the mountainous and inaccessible terrain of the Kurdish 
regions, which has historically been the location where successive Middle 
Eastern civilisations and empires peter out (Houston 2008, p. 10). The 
historic defensibility of the Zagros mountains, and the suitability of the 
terrain for guerrilla warfare, has often led to the Kurds being considered 
uncontrollable by imperial powers, from the Achaemenid Empire of 550–330 
BCE (Wiesehöfer 2009), to the time of the British Mandate and beyond 
(Fieldhouse 2006, p. 108). These regions, perduring just beyond the grasp of 
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Leviathan, were described as ‘Lands of Lions’ by the Arabs who attempted to 
subdue them (Bird 2005, p. 14). 
According to Goldstone and Haldon (2009), early Middle Eastern empires 
initially based their administration and executive powers upon kin-based 
modes, which were then gradually replaced by other bureaucratic systems 
involving a separate social class of functionaries, such as the eunuchs of the 
Byzantine Empire (Ringrose 2007), although lineage tended to remain 
salient. It can be deduced then, that within peripheral areas which were not 
fully integrated into an overarching state or empire, access to power is likely 
to remain mediated by kinship to a significant degree. As Batutu says (1993, 
p. 511), ‘the existence of powerful tribes [in Iraq] was, as a rule, a 
concomitance of weak cities.’  
Following Engels (1884/2010), Wolf addresses kinship, property claims, and 
the status of women as linked phenomena. He describes the kinship-ordered 
mode of production as ‘a way of committing social labour to the 
transformation of nature through appeals to filiation and marriage, and to 
consanguinity and affinity’ (1982, p. 91) — in short, a politics built around 
heredity and reproduction. Where resources are finite in nature — i.e. based 
in the control of particular tracts of land — there is a crucial need to 
negotiate access to resources such as farmland, pastures and water, 
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particularly in the absence of exclusive or juridically-defined rights (Bonte 
1981, pp. 28-29).  
Kinship performs this function where access to resources is restricted or 
allocated via a kinship licence (Wolf 1982, p. 91). According to Meillassoux 
(1981), the frangible but intense bonds of sexual partnership formed by 
individual choice were sufficient for adhesion within foraging societies where 
there is less proprietary interest in the land, being viewed as common 
property; but the development of forms of subsistence such as intensive 
agriculture place a higher stake on kinship claims to resources, which 
become allocated by lineage. Where resources fall under control mediated by 
kinship rather than common ownership, more permanent marital 
relationships were sought through organising relationships on the basis of 
filiation rather than individual preference. Marriage thus becomes a 
collective transfer event, allocating rights and responsibilities to both parties, 
and to their kin. It may therefore become a subject of collective strategizing 
by kin groups, as has been observed by Bourdieu (1962, 1972) in France and 
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) in India. 
Where pressure on the land is particularly intense, approaching ‘ecological 
closure’, such as in the desiccated landscape of the former Fertile Crescent 
(Wolf 1996), ecologically depleted during Islam’s ‘Golden Age’, and the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ which is particularly pertinent to pastoral life 
(Hardin 1968), relations around resources become increasingly 
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circumscribed and exclusive, and ‘the idiom of filiation and marriage is used 
to construct transgenerational pedigrees, real or fictitious’ (Wolf 1982, p. 91) 
in order to provide more compelling symbolic narratives of ownership to 
mythologize and justify control over land and water. King and Stone (2010) 
found just such an intense preoccupation with lineage in their studies of 
Kurdish families, with a strong patrilinear bias, which tended to erase or 
subsume female histories into phallocentric narratives of descent.  
Prior to WWI — which led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
subsequent division of Kurdish territories into the new nation-states of the 
Middle East created by the Allied powers under the Treaty of Lausanne — 
transhumant pastoralism was the predominant economic mode; since when 
sedentary agriculturalism increased (Head 1974), followed by the 
development of industry, and the exploitation of native oil wealth in the KRI 
since the fall of Saddam Hussein, leading to a rapidly modernising economy.  
Kurdish regions are predominantly mountainous, creating moral 
microclimates with a tendency towards conservatism with intense, if 
agonistic and unstable, local loyalties, and an ethos of individualism and self-
reliance (Izady 1992, p. 187). Such attitudes are indeed typical of pastoral 
life, where pastoralists face the difficulties of maintaining control and 
possession over pasture-land in the absence of standardising bureaucratic 
and legal ownership (Campbell 1964; Schneider 1971) which did not exist 
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until the colonial period in Iraq. ‘In the mountains,’ says McDowall (1996, p. 
8), ‘land was traditionally controlled by the tribe, and the agha was 
responsible for the equitable allocation of pastoral rights,’ while Kurdish 
farmers were subject to a quasi-feudal control by their landlords. 
In transhumant arrangements, pastoralists are sporadically absent from the 
pastures they wish to possess; furthermore their livelihood is ambulant and 
can be driven away by a rival. Pastoralism is thus an insecure means of 
subsistence, vulnerable to conflict; it is also one which obliges pastoralists 
who do not wish to subsist entirely on milk, meat and butter (see Masson 
Smith Jr. 2000) into contact with other groupings to obtain cereals, 
vegetables, legumes and manufactured goods, which must be acquired 
through trade with, or exploitation of, settled communities; or through the 
raiding which is common to pastoral life (Lindner 1983, p. 11).  
Successful individuals in pastoral societies need to express the personal 
characteristics which address these vulnerabilities, which includes self-
reliance and aggression (Goldschmidt 1971; Moritz 2008). There is a 
tendency towards the formulation of tribal links as a metastasis and 
mystification of kinship, in order to increase numeric power in the face of 
potential conflict. For McDowall, despite being in a period of disintegration, 
tribalism remained strong, if heterogeneous and difficult to classify in the late 
1990s in the KRI. It was also was deeply factional: 
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Loyalties of one group to another are not immutable, and can be 
severed and different ones negotiated, in response to tribal or 
economic situations. When an ambitious chief tries to extend his 
territory or the number of loyal groups under his control, there will 
almost certainly be a counter-move and shift of alliances as others 
endeavour to contain his ambition. This counter-move may be 
inspired by central government, or by neighbouring tribal groups 
who do not wish the ‘equilibrium’ to be disturbed. (1996, p. 9) 
Van Bruinessen (1978) states that nomadic and transhumant tribes 
historically used their military power to negotiate with farming communities, 
which could range from the provision of protection from other tribes in 
exchange for tribute, to the extraction of protection money to escape attacks, 
in a complex web of asymmetric interdependency and might. It is, indeed, 
typical of pastoralists in general to subordinate farming communities 
(Cavalli-Sforza 1996, p. 56). Much of Middle Eastern history features waves 
of conquest by successive nomadic pastoralist groups, using their greater 
mobility to plunder and subordinate other civilisations (Ibn Khaldūn 
1377/2005; Richerson et al. 2001, p. 76). Hence, pastoral norms and values 
may be considered high status, since they have frequently been associated 
with the prestige of powerful social groups. 
If relations between tribal nomads and settled farmers were characterised by 
exploitation, then intertribal relations could be characterised by intense 
hostilities: Van Bruinessen’s classic ethnology of the Kurds (1978) found that 
every respondent who was questioned regarding the functions of kinship 
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structures — tribe, clan, village, lineage — gave the same response: that such 
structurations were necessary for participating in intertribal wars, disputes 
and blood-feuds, provoked by claims over territory, or over women. 
Sedentary and nomadic lifestyles differ markedly: 
Kurdish society on the plains and in the foothills differs so markedly 
from that of mountain Kurds that in many respects they can be 
treated as a separate culture. The plain economy was and is 
sedentary, combining pastoralism with the more important business 
of growing barley, rice, tobacco and wheat. Blood ties frequently 
exist but they are not as all-embracing as among tribes with a 
nomadic tradition, and even those who might call themselves a tribe 
are usually subject to a wholly unrelated landlord family that has 
title to the land by the government. (McDowall 1996, p. 10) 
Schneider finds a pattern of coexisting/competing pastoralism and 
agriculture in the Mediterranean region led to the development of an internal 
social code, where groups were: 
…competing for the same resources23 in a way which fragmented 
the social organisation of each community and blurred the 
boundary between them. In the absence of a state, pastoral 
communities and agricultural communities in their midst, 
developed their own means of social control — the codes of honour 
and shame — which were adapted to the intense conflict that 
external pressures had created within them and between them 
(1971, p. 3). 
                                                        
23 It should be noted that Schneider considers access to women as one of these contested 
resources, since child-bearing is essential for labour, economic security of the elderly and for 
the continued defence of corporate holdings against aggressors. 
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The pastoral mode has a tendency to lead to resource shortage, through 
encouraging population and herd expansion as strategies which benefit the 
individual (Szkult 1981) whilst depleting natural resources. This is 
particularly the case for societies reliant upon sheep, which have a 
particularly heavy impact upon the environment. This is a recipe for 
ecological closure rather than an Arcadian harmony with nature.  
Agriculture is no less expansionist, tending to encourage high fertility and 
therefore running the risk of falling into the Malthusian trap. According to 
Wolf (1982), the impact of socioecological pressures upon the family is for 
each patriline to treat marriage in the manner of the European aristocracy: 
that is, as a method for forming political alliances, and for negotiating 
territorial claims: 
[T]hey organise the exchange of persons between pedigrees through 
their definition of ties of affinity; marriage, instead of being a 
relationship between a bride and a groom and their immediate 
relatives only, becomes a tie of political alliance between 
groups…On the level of filiation and marriage, kinship sets up 
individuated linkages among shareholders in social labour.  
(Wolf 1982, p. 92) 
Thus the kin-ordered mode sources the maintenance of power in control 
over parentage and the reproductive powers of women. According to Wolf, 
this grants ‘rights over the social labour embodied in females, offspring, and 
affines: the second defines not only descent, but also collaterality — the 
genealogical range of movable allies’ (p. 93), such as the ‘vengeance group’, 
ECOSOCIOLOGY  
 
 
 78 
who can be called on to support the family in feuds and small-scale wars, or, 
less dramatically, able bodies who can help bring in a harvest, supply dishes 
for a funeral feast, and so forth. The licence for sharing in a patrilineal 
resource entails a reciprocal requirement to participate in patrilinear labour.  
There are therefore constant tensions between patrilinear exclusivity — the 
need to retain control of resources within the kinship group — and 
inclusivity, through the need to gain allies, supporters and labourers. Such an 
ordering of society has two direct results: first, instability and antagonism 
between patrilines; and second, the delimitation of women’s sexual 
autonomy. 
Instability and antagonism 
‘Within the Kurdish nation,’ states Prince Sharaf al-Dîn Bitlîsî, the first 
historian of the Kurdish peoples, (1597/2005, p. 18, verse 42), ‘none follows 
nor concurs with the other, nor is there solidarity among them.’  
A patrilinear kinship-ordered society is vulnerable to fission and internal and 
external conflicts, between original settlers and interlopers, between junior 
and senior lines, and between prospering and declining patrilines: a pattern 
which can be associated with segmentary agnation24.  This fissile nature may 
be exacerbated by resource shortage, and ‘contradictions between 
individual-household-corporate subgroup centrality in production and 
                                                        
24 See Appendix B for a diagrammatic representation of segmentary agnation. 
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corporate ownership of productive means’ (Sacks 1982, p. 117). Versions of 
the Bedouin proverb ‘Me against my brother, my brothers and me against my 
cousins, then my cousins and me against strangers,’ which occur widely 
across the Arab world, clearly express both the strengths — and the internal 
contestations — of the segmentary mode of organisation within patrilinear 
societies.  
Ibn Khaldūn (1377/2005), drawing on the experiences of the Arab conquests, 
suggests that there is a natural lifecycle of a society, which is hardy in 
adversity during its progress towards power, but becomes decadent once 
success is attained; patrilines are in constant contestation with rivals to 
maintain their position in order to escape subordination or absorption by a 
stronger patriline, and to maintain continuities through producing sons. For 
Ibn Khaldūn, successful patrilines need to express asabiyaa — deep kinship 
solidarities to provide cohesion and display collective strength. 
In the Pashtun context any explicit vulnerability may imperil the future of the 
family: 
Households which demonstrate weakness, by failing to control 
either women's behaviour or their independence in the 
arrangement and completion of a marriage, lose honour and 
credibility and find themselves on a downward spiral and extremely 
vulnerable. They are likely to become economically and politically 
dependent on a stronger (and more honourable) household, and 
may suffer outright exploitation and oppression.  
(Tapper 1981, p. 393) 
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The power of any individual or collective relates to the number of followers 
one can attract, and the political support one can muster — and therefore, 
power accrues to those who can foster strategic marriages and thereby place 
other persons and families in positions of obligation. Yet any one man’s 
attempt to gain supremacy within this system is ultimately constrained by 
the limitations of his own fertility and that of his wife (or wives), based in 
how many sons he can claim to his own lineage, and how many daughters he 
can deploy to gain or reinforce allegiance from others. Even where polygyny 
is practised, there are natural limitations to this method of advancement. It is 
also delimited by challenges from within the kinship group, where 
relationships between brothers are egalitarian, and hence often competitive 
— more brothers may mean more potential allies, but they also mean more 
potential antagonists, leading men to locate social preferment in their 
‘honour’. Reputation and reciprocity are the bases of normative ethics, and 
can well become an aspect of individual and group-based competition (Van 
Vugt et al. 2007). 
The combination of potential antagonism with practical interdependence 
within an agonistic society liable to blood-feuds (Belge 2011) means that the 
necessary evil of extra-familial interactions is conducted with an extreme 
sensitivity to any exterior encroachments upon male/familial status. 
Schneider outlines the operations of such an agonistic environment within 
the hybrid pastoralist/agrarian zones of the Mediterranean region: 
 ECOSOCIOLOGY 
 
 
 81 
As a political phenomenon, honour can attach to any human group 
from the nuclear family to the nation state. The problem of honour 
becomes salient when the group is threatened with competition 
from equivalent groups. It is especially salient when small, 
particularistic groups, such as families, clans or gangs are the 
principal units of power, sovereign, or nearly so over the territories 
they control. Concern for honour also grows when contested 
resources are subject to redivision along changing lines, when there 
is no stable relationship between units of power and precisely 
defined patrimonies, i.e., when the determination of boundary lines 
is subject to continual human intervention. Finally, concern for 
honour arises when the definition of the group is problematic; when 
social boundaries are difficult to maintain, and internal loyalties are 
questionable. (1971, p. 2) 
The most significant aspect of this form of honour is that it requires assertive, 
even choleric, response to status challenges. ‘Honour’ can be a carapace of 
machismo intended to mask any vulnerability through displaying a readiness 
to use violence against any slights to their status. It is in this sense that Cohen 
and Nisbett (1996) relate the higher levels of violence recorded in the 
southern United States to an American version of ‘honour’ culture. They point 
out that the emergence of southern ‘honour’-based codes, based in self-
reliance and self-assertion, arose within frontier communities of 
sharecroppers, prospectors and ranchers which were both territorially 
vulnerable and lacking in social order. Thus men and groups sought to 
portray a reputation of being formidable foes to discourage challenges to 
their position and property, through cultivating a sensitivity to perceived 
slights; to ‘greatly to find quarrel in a straw / When honour’s at the stake,’ 
(Hamlet, Act 4, Scene 4). Certainly, Cohen and Nisbett’s description of 
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‘honour’ has been shown to correlate with heightened levels of interpersonal 
violence (Altheimer 2012).  
Tensions between the individual and the group, suggests Cottino, lead to ‘the 
centrality of trust’ as an aspect of ‘honour’ — a reputation for fair-dealing and 
reciprocity — which relates to the apparently paradoxical coexistence of 
rugged individualism with collective interdependence. Within this paradox, 
cultures can simultaneously appear as agonistic and highly integrated, due to 
the development of a social order poised between the horns of a dilemma: 
…an endemic situation of uncertainty, an existential condition 
where two conflicting basic demands coexist: an urge to compete for 
limited goods on the one hand; a need for reciprocal dependence 
and mutual aid on the other. (Cottino 1999, p. 106) 
It is precisely because there is so much reason for families to be suspicious 
and mistrustful that a reputation for trustworthiness and honesty becomes a 
preeminent aspect of ‘honour.’ From Evans-Pritchard’s studies of the Nuer in 
the 1940s onwards, ‘honour’ has been understood within anthropology as a 
means of developing an interactional social order in communities which lack 
external regulation. However, as Bates (2010, p. 30) and Collins (2008, 
Chapter 6) identify, the order which develops in this way is likely to be 
fragile, unforgiving and violent. Collins (2008, p. 230) notes ‘societies with an 
honour culture are notorious for…their pervasive atmosphere of threat and 
insecurity.’ Peace, within an order poised upon such competing tensions, is 
founded upon a tense and volatile state of stalemate. This is evident in many 
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situations where external agencies of social control are lacking or unreliable, 
or where the actors are marginalised and unlikely to have their concerns 
treated seriously (Black 1983, p. 41). For Collins (2008, p. 231), ‘honour’ 
codes tend towards a stratification by violence: ‘the community is palpably 
divided into an elite of tough guys and tough groups (whether they are called 
gangs, families, clans, aristocrats etc.) and those who are subject to them.’ 
The deterrent effect of threatened violent reprisal is not equally available to 
smaller groups, particularly those lacking in the capacity for violence.  
The discourse of ‘honour’ may be used as a justification for displays of 
dominance by a violent elite as part of the cultivation of an asymmetric 
power-dynamic in which slights are given freely, but not suffered, by those 
with the greatest capacity to make violent reprisals. ‘Interactions thus take 
place in a volatile ambience of honour and impudence,’ observes Bates (2010, 
p. 30), in which ‘young hotheads move to the fore; and a culture of machismo 
permeates the society.’ This can include the humiliation and exploitation of 
female members as proxy attacks upon less powerful groupings. 
As Collier (1988) suggests, within classless societies, a major source of 
inequalities is the ability to claim ‘rights’ over women’s bodies through 
kinship statuses, such as parenthood or marriage. Three basic aspects of 
‘honour’ can be seen to interlock here: violence as a normative response to 
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status challenges, interactional group norms around reciprocity and 
repuatation, and a collective stake in the control over women’s bodies.  
I now consider the nature of agnatic ‘rights’ over women’s bodies in greater 
detail. 
Marriage within kinship networks 
By restricting the interaction of men and women and by assigning 
men the dominant role … it becomes possible for both men and 
women to view the female as an object, a part of the capital goods of 
the patrilineage to be kept for itself or exchanged. 
(Rassam 1980, p. 173) 
That marriage alliances have the function of gaining social connections is the 
foundational insight of Lévi-Strauss’s notion of the ‘exchange of women’, 
(1949/1969), influenced by Maussian mechanics of gift exchange, in which 
he describes women as the ‘supreme gift’, transitioned from one family to 
another through marital arrangements in order to forge alliances. The 
‘exchange of women’, for Lévi-Strauss, was the basis of human civilisation — 
and universally discernible. The claimed universality of Lévi-Strauss’s 
application of the ‘exchange of women’ has been redoubtably challenged 
(Harris 2001, Chapter 7), along with his androcentricism in effecting one of 
the most thorough erasures of female agency in anthropological history 
(Weiner 1992) in his unquestioned presumption of male ownership of female 
bodies. 
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However, the kernel of his theory has been productively re-examined by 
Rubin (1975).  She recognises that the ‘exchange of women’ (or perhaps, 
more accurately, interfamilial transferences of rights over women and girls) 
is by no means universal. In fact, that there may be situations, such as 
amongst the Nuer, Minangkabau and Hopi societies, where a more 
appropriate description might be the exchange of men (Singer 1973, p. 43; 
Peletz 1987; Krier 2000). There are many societies with a completely 
different orientation to marriage entirely, including some where it may be 
entirely absent (Hua 2008). However, Rubin identifies the exchange of 
women as a significant organisational principle within many societies. Males 
select their partners in only 31% of the world’s societies, whereas females do 
so in only 8% (Broude and Greene 1983). Rubin says: 
If women are the gifts, then it is men who are the exchange 
partners. And it is the partners, not the presents, upon whom 
reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-mythical power of social 
linkage. The relations of such a system are such that women are in 
no position to realise the benefits of their own circulation  
(1975, p. 174) 
She redefines the ‘exchange of women’ as: 
…a shorthand for expressing that the social relations of a kinship 
system specify that men have certain rights over their female kin, 
and that women do not have the same rights either to themselves or 
to their male kin. In this sense, the exchange of women is a profound 
perception of a system in which women do not have full rights to 
themselves. (p. 177) 
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If, by exchanging women, men and families are brought into alliance, then 
women are the conduits by which that alliance is effected. As conduits, 
women’s roles as wives are simultaneously an extension or reaffirmation of 
kinship relations, a constant enactment of the alliance between families. 
Rubin does not take this to mean that women are objectified in any literal 
sense of the word, but does point up the intrinsically asymmetric nature of 
the arrangement. 
Rubin’s statement may, for my purposes, be creating an overdualistic model 
of the gendered nature of the asymmetries of the system of exchange, which 
may itself be rooted in Lévi-Strauss’s original androcentric framing. Women 
are, in fact, far more active participants in the negotiation of marital 
exchanges than her formulation allows. Within patrilinear societies, It is not 
merely men as men who have these rights over their female kin but a wider 
kin network, including both parents and other members of the kingroup who 
hold these ‘rights’ as members of the patriline, rather than deriving them 
from their gender. Nor are junior males immune from parental pressure and 
some may themselves be forced into marriage unwillingly.  
Nevertheless, as a way for expressing the inequities of those forms of 
marriage arrangement in relation to Wolf’s kinship-oriented mode of 
production, Rubin’s feminist reclamation of Lévi-Straussian theory appears 
to be very apt for the discussion of patricentric, patrilinear societies where 
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marriage represents a woman’s transition from parental to marital 
household.  
Naziha al-Dulaymi, of the League for the Defence of Women’s Rights in Iraq, 
and who also served a brief tenure as a cabinet minister (1959-60), wrote a 
scathing attack on Iraqi marriage practices in the 1950s. 
She claimed that women of ‘the peasant class’ were treated as a 
means of production by their fathers and later their husbands. At an 
early age, they start working for their fathers, who hope to profit 
further from their daughter’s mahr25 as soon as they reach 
puberty…They are traded for livestock or other women, their prices 
influenced by market conditions. Child marriages, more prevalent in 
years of drought and grave economic need, have seen fathers 
offering their daughters at very young ages for paltry sums, or even 
without a mahr so as to be absolved of the burden of supporting 
them…Moreover they could be offered as compensation for murder, 
theft, humiliation and as debt payment. (Efrati 2005, pp. 581-582) 
Ertem and Kocturk (2008), conducting focus groups with Kurdish-speaking 
women in Turkey found similar patterns of marriage transactions, along with 
a pattern of endogamous cousin marriage, which is so far considered normal 
in the Middle East that it is likely that al-Dulaymi did not identify it as worthy 
of particular comment.   
                                                        
25 Mahr is an Islamic requirement for marriage, which could most accurately be described as 
an indirect dowry. However, the context of al-Dulaymi’s statement suggests that she is 
referring to a prestation which I will refer to as brideprice (see p. 187). 
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Topic Opinion 
 Most frequent (>75%) Common (25-75%) Less frequent (<25%) 
Arranged 
marriage 
 In this region 
marriage decisions 
are made by the 
family. 
 Parents do not have 
to inform a girl 
about marital 
arrangements or ask 
for her opinion. 
 Nowadays, girls 
decide, because they 
are more intelligent. 
Cradle 
betrothal 
 This is rare 
nowadays. 
 This is good because 
families know each 
other and the bride 
is well received by 
her in-laws. 
 
Cousin 
marriage 
 A girl is the right of 
the (paternal) 
uncle’s son. If he 
doesn’t want her, 
the girl’s family can 
accept proposals 
from other family 
men or outsiders. 
 It is easier to take a 
bride from relatives. 
Relative brides 
easily understand 
the family rules and 
adapt. 
 It is more 
economical. Fathers 
know the economic 
situation of their 
relatives and do not 
demand a high 
bride-price. 
 Marriage between 
cousins is better. He 
cannot divorce the 
bride if she is a 
relative. 
 Girls who are homely 
in appearance and lazy 
at housework are given 
away to outsiders. 
Good girls remain 
inside, bad girls go out. 
Direct 
exchange 
 This is an option for 
poor people. 
  This is a reason for 
early marriage. 
Choice 
marriage, 
elopement 
  If a girl falls in love 
and elopes with a 
boy against the 
wishes of her 
parents, this will 
damage her family 
honour. 
 Nowadays girls refuse 
marriage before 
meeting their suitors. 
They want to make 
their own decisions. 
 It is necessary to be in 
love. Marriage is 
impossible if there is 
no love. 
 Youngsters should 
meet and get 
acquainted before 
getting married. 
Table 3.1: Summarised content analysis of group discussions conducted by Ertem and Kocturk (2008) 
Ertem and Kocturk’s respondents appeared very aware of the political and 
economic factors of marriage while remaining respectful of the presumed 
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legitimacy of parental power. According to Hassanpour (2001), the patterns 
referred to by al-Dulaymi and Ertem and Kocturk occur within both rural and 
urban regions of the KRI.  
Rubin’s notion of the role of women in marriage as conduits, expressing 
relationships between men and families takes a central position in the 
conceptualisation of ‘honour’ within a local political economy. Women quite 
literally embody marriage alliances within patrilinear societies: their 
transmission from one household to another, their provision of domestic 
labour, and their ability to reproduce their recipient patriline is the 
embodiment and enactment of the kinship alliance which the respective 
families have forged through marriage. Women’s compliance to the demands 
of their affines —their ability to embody normative wifehood — is the very 
substance of the inter/intra-familial link, jeopardised by the wife’s failure to 
live up to the overt and tacit standards of the interfamilial marriage contract.  
As ‘partible aspects of patrilinear identity’ (Strathern 1990, p. 229), women 
serve as representatives of their own family’s commitment to collective 
norms in front of their affines and the community at large. Should a woman 
or girl fail to satisfy the interactively-generated terms of the transaction 
involved in her transference from her natal household to that of her 
affines/husband, and their/his ability to command her labour, sexual 
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functions and reproductive capacity, she fails to maintain the alliance 
between the families by the same token.  
Bonds forged through marriage are expected to be permanent, because the 
breaking of a marriage alliance  means the jettisoning of social capital and the 
potential for alliances to dissolve into resentment and potential conflict, 
which would lead to the renegotiation of unstable ‘kinship licences’ providing 
access to resources and kinship based labour. In one case identified by Alinia 
(2013, p. 71), for instance, the men involved considered the relationship 
formed by marriage to have long-term obligations beyond the life of the wife. 
A wife-killer described the attitude of his father-in-law: ‘Her father is a very 
good man. He said that it is your right to do as you did. He even said that he 
would bring me a new wife.’ 
Therefore women bear the responsibility of maintaining this relationship 
through conforming to the normative ideals of wifehood in such a way as to 
place themselves beyond reproach. The families’ ‘rights’ over the women 
they ‘exchange’, in Rubin’s sense, map on to their ‘responsibilities’ to control 
them, to ensure that they meet the societal standards of marriageability 
generated within the collective as a whole, in order to underwrite the 
delicate political and economic connectivities that marriage creates.  
Through placing women as ‘tokens of alliance’ the kinship licence delimits 
their autonomy, as young women cannot be trusted to understand or 
subscribe to the delicate politics and vested interests of the family, patriline 
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and tribe, and to take them into consideration when they engage in 
relationships, nor to allow these to occlude their personal preferences. 
According to Horne (2004, p. 1038): ‘[t]he desires of self-interested 
individuals for collective benefits produced at the group level create social 
dilemmas; their interests in interpersonal exchange create a distinct but 
related set of dynamics.’ In keeping with this characterisation, the locus of 
the creation of these dynamics is neither the individual nor the group, but in 
an interim, structurated position. Thus the norms of ‘honour’ are socially 
constructed through the interactions between the individual and the group 
(Awwad 2001), all of whom are current or potential stake-holders, 
participants and competitors in the political economy of marriage alliances. 
Namûs as symbolic capital 
For Bourdieu (2001, p. 45), women’s reputations are an aspect of symbolic 
capital26 — which he identified within systems based in the exchange of 
women in Kabylia. This symbolic capital is a prerequisite of their circulation, 
and the benefits, in terms of social capital, which accrue to their patrilines 
through their marriages: 
[W]omen are assets which must be protected from offence and 
suspicion and which, when invested in exchanges can produce 
alliances, in other words social capital, and prestigious allies, in 
other words symbolic capital… [T]he value of these alliances, and 
                                                        
26 Bourdieu (1977) defines symbolic capital as the ‘prestige and renown attached to a family 
or a name’, and as the ‘most valuable form of accumulation’ in societies based in collective 
labour (p 179). 
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therefore the symbolic profit they can yield, partly depends on the 
symbolic value of the women available for exchange, that is their 
reputation and especially their chastity — constituted as a 
fetishised measure of masculine reputation, and therefore of the 
symbolic capital of the whole lineage — the honour of the brothers 
and fathers, which induces a vigilance as attentive, and even 
paranoid, as that of the husbands, is a form of enlightened self-
interest.  
Women’s ‘honour’, then, is the symbolic capital of a woman’s reputation, 
expressed in terms of conformity to normative modes of female sexual 
behaviour, which conditions her acceptance into the category of 
‘marriageable’, occurring where marriages are intended to bring her family 
social capital and connectivity — both in Wolf’s sense of the ability to 
mobilise social labour, and in the Bourdieusien sense of interpersonal 
connections. Bourdieu’s description of the collective guardianship of honour 
as a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’, (i.e. as a form of custodianship in 
order to reap higher rewards through marriage connectivities, and in terms 
of gaining esteem in the community), does not imply that such guardians of  
‘honour’ are ‘rational fools’, the Homo economicus of classical economics (Sen 
1977). Neither rational fool nor cultural dupe, the Bourdieusien individual is 
a canny strategist, whose methods of self-advancement are developed and 
shaped within the inherited structures and conceptions of his society, 
although they may certainly challenge and reform them.  
The English word ‘honour’ (which is the usual gloss for symbolic capital) is 
an imprecise placeholder for a complex lexicon in Kurdish of which 
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normative femininity of which the control of women is merely one aspect; 
‘honour’ also regulates masculinity and interpersonal relations in general. 
‘Honour’ requires that both males and females be generous, courageous, 
honest, loyal to their ingroups, respectful of norms of hospitality and actively 
concerned for the reputation of their collective, but thereafter the qualities 
associated with ‘honour’ and ‘dishonour’ begin to break down into gendered 
modes (Pitt-Rivers 1965). For Tapper (1991, p. 15), the first, non-gendered 
sense is seen as a transcendental morality; whereas the second is competitive 
and secular (cf. Wolf 2001, p. 173). 
In the Kurdish language, there is a complex lexicon relating to matters of 
reputation, honour, shame, pride (Hassanpour 2001) including bext, meaning 
a reputation for fair dealing, and qedir, meaning reputation or prestige 
(Sweetman 1994, p. 94). Of most significance to ‘honour’ as a system of 
male/familial control of women, and a justification for violence are the 
interlocking concepts of şeref, which is also used in Arabic, and namûs, which 
has a Persian derivation. The two terms are mutually constitutive (Bourdieu 
1965, 2001; Baron 2006) as shown in Table 3.2 (which synthesises these 
articles with the foregoing discussion in this section): 
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Şeref Namûs 
Collective: şeref belongs to the patriline.  Individual: namûs is embodied within the 
person 
Masculine/public Feminine/private 
Active: assertive responses to status 
challenges, generosity, social networking 
capacity, dominance 
Passive: conformity to communal norms, 
acquiescence to requests, subordination to 
family 
Infinite: şeref can be restored through 
vengeance, blood feuds and ‘honour’ killings 
Finite: namûs cannot be regained once lost 
Table 3.2: Comparison of şeref and namûs 
While şeref and namûs are coded on a gender axis, this should not be taken to 
mean that only men have şeref and only women have namûs, as aspects of the 
reputation of either gender can be described with either term. Yet a male’s 
violations of namûs are not catastrophic to his status within the family in the 
way that a woman’s would be. As Kandiyoti (1988) observes, masculinity is 
an achieved status, which is dynamic; whereas femininity is an ascribed 
status, which is commensurately passive. Men have a greater ability to 
restore lost status through active means, which are less available for women, 
whose value is often conceptualised in terms of restraint. Pre-marital 
virginity is essential of women’s requirement to conform to the requirements 
of namûs. 
The categories are interdependent: the şeref of the patriline is founded upon 
the namûs of the women associated to the patriline. A woman who has 
become bênamûs, i.e. dishonoured in the eyes of the community, cannot 
restore her status herself. If her agnates do not respond assertively to her 
behaviour, it undermines their self-presentation and self-conceptualisation 
as an honourable ‘şerefi’ family within the community. 
 ECOSOCIOLOGY 
 
 
 95 
Men’s honour is thus dependent upon the behaviour of women. A language of 
contamination may be used: dishonour is described as rûreş – a black face, 
whereas rûyê xwe sipî kirin – making one’s face white – is a phrase used to 
denote the restoration of ‘honour’ (Sweetman 1994, p. 94). 
King (2008b) identifies namûs as a symbolic boundary, which is used to 
exclude agnatic outsiders within a patrilinear society. While this is a strong 
component, Fischer-Tahir’s summarisation of 150 respondents’ opinions in 
Sulaymaniyah found the following emic associations of namûs, with telling 
gendered distinctions: 
 Male respondents Female respondents 
Related to jin, afret, mê (woman) 
perde (hymen) 
mal, xêzan (house, family) 
nîştîman (homeland) 
perde (hymen) 
pak-u xawênî (chastity) 
Acts parastin (protection) 
toļe (revenge) 
şerim (shame) 
xoperestin (self-protection) 
aramî (calmness, patience) 
cil-u berg (clothing) 
Function pêwist (necessary) 
ŗez (respect) 
pêwist (necessary) 
Interpretation pîrozî (sacredness) 
pakî (purity) 
pîrozî (sacredness) 
ciwanî (beauty) 
Criticism bê mane (unreasonable) deselatdar (authoritative) 
zordar (tyrant) 
Context keltûr (culture) 
dab u-nerît (tradition) 
rewşt/exļaq (moral, ethics) 
be agayî (unconsciousness) 
 
Table 3.3: Meanings of namûs (Fischer-Tahir 2009) 
In contrast to the complex, measured and ambivalent associations around 
namûs within Fischer-Tahir’s educated middle class population reproduced 
in Table 3.3 above, Alinia (2013, p. 64) notes that convicted murderers in the 
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KRI who claim an ‘honourable’ motivation are very invested in şeref and 
namûs as terms, but are unable to describe their meanings, which they take 
to be self-evident.  
Alinia describes this as ‘internalised discourse’ — as deep-founded, 
unconscious beliefs, and values, taken as apparent universals, they appear as 
doxa27 for these perpetrators: ineffable but foundational. ‘For us sharaf is the 
greatest thing. For us, I mean, the most important and greatest thing is sharaf. 
It is like that. It is above everything else,’ stated one perpetrator (2013, p. 
63).  
As heterodoxy within the concepts of şeref and namûs becomes more evident, 
particularly differing across rural/urban and class lines, the decreasing 
acceptance of such crimes within the KRI means that these perpetrators are 
finding themselves increasingly out of tune with the changing values of their 
society. Alinia observed that three of the four perpetrators she interviewed 
expressed a keen sense of injustice over being punished for the murders they 
had committed. One said: 
I think it is unfair. If I had killed innocent people, I mean if I had 
killed two persons without any reason or if I had attacked people 
and robbed them, it would be justified to punish me and even kill 
me. But unfortunately now I have been sitting here for two years for 
my sharaf and my namus. (p. 63) 
                                                        
27 Doxa is a Bourdieusien term, meaning the experience by which “the natural and social 
world appears as self-evident” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164). 
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But while there has been a shift in the acceptability of violence as a form of 
reputation management, the expectations of women’s conduct remain slower 
to change. 79% of respondents in the KRI identified the following behaviours 
as ‘dishonourable’ when engaged in by women: 
1. Marital infidelity 
2. Pre-marital (‘illegal’) sexual relationships 
3. Romantic relationships (i.e. non-sexual, but affective, relationships 
with a male, whether the woman is married or unmarried) 
4. Disobeying parents 
5. Sexual misbehaviour28 
6. Other behaviour deemed inappropriate, including violations of 
normative dress codes. (Taysi 2009, p. 21) 
 
These factors relate to marriage as a locus for the constraint of female 
sexuality, particularly when one bears in mind that the majority of ‘honour’ 
crimes related to Taysi’s fourth point, ‘disobeying parents’ are directly 
related to the refusal of an arranged marriage. These findings echo those of 
Sır (2005) in Turkey.  
In Sen’s theorisation, ‘honourable’ behaviour for a woman connotes: 
Modest sexual behaviour, fidelity in marriage, no pre- or 
extramarital relationships with men, no unchaperoned rendezvous 
with men outside the family, meeting motherly obligations to 
children, meeting wifely obligations to husband, meeting daughter’s 
obligations to parents, meeting daughter-in-law obligations to 
parents-in-law and so on. 
                                                        
28 Taysi’s actual term is ‘prostitution’: however, amongst Kurds this term often does not have 
the Western definition of commercial sex, but a more general sense of promiscuity or sexual 
misconduct. As this appears a more likely interpretation of her respondents’ statements, I 
have rephrased it for clarity. (cf. Kreiger, 1984). 
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Women who request divorce, and divorcées who claim child custody, are also 
frequently considered to have offended ‘honour,’ even though these are 
transgressions against the gender/kinship order rather than against 
normative sexual behaviour. Through synthesising Sen, Sır and Taysi’s 
accounts, women’s ‘honour’ seems to rest on three conditions: 
1. Acceptance of parental marriage arrangement; 
2. Protection and maintenance of marriageability by conforming to 
communal social norms related to gender relations and sexuality 
before marriage; 
3. Meeting the standards of normative wifehood after marriage, 
through subordinacy to her affines; fidelity and persistence in the 
relationship even if this is to her detriment. 
 
A woman’s honour then, appears to be a valuation of her utility within the 
political economic systems of marriage, built upon her compliance with 
instrumental marriage and her conformity to the normative role of wifehood, 
both before and after marriage.  
I suggest that individual households and patrilines within the kinship mode 
of production, have mutually, catallactically29, developed a requirement for 
women to display namûs as a precondition for participation in the marriage 
                                                        
29 Hayek describes exchange relations as catallactic. The Greek-derived term means ‘to 
exchange’ but also ‘to admit in the community’ and ‘to make friends’ — a term which thus 
encompasses transactions related to social capital alongside those related to exchanges of 
goods and services. As for Polanyi (1957, p. 243), ‘the substantive meaning of economic 
derives from man’s dependence for his livelihood upon nature and his fellows.’. Catallaxy, for 
Hayek, describes the spontaneous order brought about by the mutual adjustment and 
interactions of many individual economies in a market (Espers 2011, p. 150). 
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market, which is deeply integrated into the socioeconomic life of the 
community.  
Namûs also represents a point of vulnerability. Ginat (1981, p. 153), states 
that his field research into ‘honour’ killings in Israel and Palestine indicates 
that ‘political and economic reasons underlie any accusation [of immorality] 
made at the value level.’ Women, as weak points in an agonistic network of 
interrelations, can provide a means for a proxy attack on the family: alleging 
sexual impropriety upon the part of a female can bring a family into 
disrepute and internal dissent — which may result in violence30.  
It is important then, that a woman’s ‘honour’ be such as to pre-emptively 
rebut any disparagement of her character. Allegations do not have to be 
evidenced, because the central ‘crime’ against honour is less a violation of a 
moral code, than of provoking gossip. Many, if not most, of the corpses for 
‘honour’ on the coroner’s examining tables of the KRI have intact hymens 
(Begikhani 1998). It becomes incumbent upon a woman or girl to behave in 
such a manner where her ‘honour’ is not just maintained, but is completely 
beyond challenge, because it reflects not only upon herself, but upon her 
entire lineage. 
                                                        
30 It is in this sense that husbands have been observed to deploy threats of ‘dishonouring’ as 
part of a campaign of domestic abuse. Dr Hawkar Ibrahim at Koya University, KRI found that 
of 47 women who experienced domestic violence, around 40% reported that their husbands 
had threatened to raise allegations against their ‘honour’ (personal communication). See also 
Payton, 2014. 
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Having outlined the role of kinship in terms of the organisation of kinship 
and labour in broader social organisation, I will now take the discussion of 
these relations into the domestic setting. 
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4. Power and the family 
The patriarchal privileging of males and seniors 
combined with patrilineality enhances the power of 
male elders within the kingroup, particularly their 
power over women of the lineage. A father’s 
brothers can have authority over their nieces and 
nephews, and male cousins can have authority over 
their female counterparts. The intersection of 
patriarchy and patrilineality increases the range of 
men with authority over women — an authority 
nested in kinship terms. 
(Joseph and Slyomovic 2001, p. 3) 
The restrictions on sexual freedom came…as a 
dictate to the young that they not obey their hearts’ 
desires lest confidences be broken, assets divided, 
and boundaries of the group weakened. 
(Kressel 1992, pp. 167-168) 
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This chapter will consider how ‘honour’ is understood and expressed within 
domestic gender relations. In Triandis’s (1995) delineation of individualism 
and collectivism as opposing ends of a continuum, he identifies ‘honour’ 
crimes as a feature of collectivist societies, where an individual’s detachment 
from the family is minimal, and where people identify themselves as parts of 
their collectives and are expected to subordinate their personal goals to 
those of the group. This is particularly apparent in the approach to the 
socialisation of children in collectivist communities, which tends to support 
interdependence, continuity and familial obligations (Kağitçibaşi 1989). More 
individualistic cultures tend towards childrearing methods designed to 
develop a child’s independence and self-esteem, in preparation for an 
eventual separation from their natal homes.  
Within unilineal descent patterns, according to Triandis, the ‘moral’ 
conformity of a collectivist society reaches exaggerated proportions, since 
even the potential synthesis of norms through marriage connections is 
stratified to favour the norms of the recipient family. The implication this 
raises is that, within collectives, certain groups have a greater power to direct 
and define the goals of the family — in short, that following a patrilinear 
descent pattern will prioritise value systems which are favourable to 
patricentricity. Indeed, patrilocal families in Turkey have been found to be 
more ‘traditional’ in their values than neolocal units (Aykan and Wolf 2000).  
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Where people are encouraged to sacrifice their personal goals for the good of 
the collective, or are not allowed the psychic space to explore their own 
desires, then they become vulnerable to instrumentalisation, to being used by 
their parents and other kin to serve their own interests. It is of course not the 
case that all marriage arrangements are self-serving on the part of the 
parents, who may well have the very best of intentions for their children, 
particularly where the interests of the collective may align very closely with 
those of the individual (see Shaw and Charsley 2006). However, blithely 
treating parental marriage arrangement as a purely altruistic act, which, for 
instance Batabyal (2005) manages to achieve for the length of an entire book, 
is deceptive. Even the conservative Edmund Burke (1729-1797), a stalwart 
supporter of the patriarchal family and parental marriage arrangement, 
admitted that fathers were often motivated by ‘avarice’ in their dealings on 
behalf of their children (Hunt Botting 2007, pp. 78-79). More subtle 
expressions of self-interest, such as those for social preferment, may be less 
easily recognised, particularly where the interest of the collective is 
considered to encapsulate those of the individual.  
However, the desires of parents and children in relation to marriage are 
certainly non-identical. Buunk et al. find that diasporic Kurdish parents and 
children have very different priorities in marital choice: young Kurds express 
a preference for partners who are intelligent, not overweight and who have 
good personal hygiene, whereas their parents are far more concerned with 
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maintaining group identities, finding non-Kurdishness the most unattractive 
characteristic in a potential son or daughter-in-law (2008, p. 57, Table 3).  
Wherever persons identify themselves as being permitted to make choices on 
behalf of another person it is inevitable that self-interest will creep in, 
whether this is identified as such, or as being for the ‘greater good’ of the 
collective. This is how abuses such as those adumbrated by al-Dulaymi above 
become possible. In fact, pressures upon young people to accept marriages 
which have been arranged may be intense, and the younger generation may 
be driven to express resistance in extreme forms (Abu-Lughod 1990; 
Batsleer et al. 2003). There is no bright boundary between forced and 
arranged marriages (Gangoli et al. 2006); notions of consent and duress 
which form the basis of attempted distinctions are slippery in practice, both 
in current times (Deveaux 2006) and throughout history (Laiou 1993), hard 
to define or prove in any community, let alone one which prioritises the 
collective will over the desires of the individual.  
Domestic politics of the family 
The vectors of a gender-hierarchy intersect with vectors of a gerontocratic 
age-hierarchy, where youth is expected to defer to age, and females are 
expected to defer to males (Joseph 1996). The asymmetries of a system with 
dual axes of privilege: of age, and of gender, creates a situation wherein the 
subjects of marital translocations — girls and young women — who have the 
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greatest stake in their own future also have the least ability to influence any 
transactions made upon their behalves, or share in the benefits of their 
circulation. Rather these benefits accrue to the patrilinear group from which 
they are distanced through marital relocation. Elder males gain social and 
political capital, and access to collateral relatives through the extension of 
family ties; in patrilocal/patrifocal societies, mothers-in-law gain a domestic 
under-labourer; husbands gain an admittance to adulthood and the pleasures 
of licit sex and parentage; brothers see their own prospects for marriage 
improve, either through the payment of brideprice or the prospect of 
receiving a bride in exchange — whereas brides leave their natal home to 
face a potentially hostile environment, in which they are at the bottom of the 
domestic pecking order, and where any burgeoning affection between the 
couple may be perceived as a threat to the husband’s existing family relations 
with his own mother, brothers and unmarried sisters. The Kurdish proverb 
bûme bûk; bûme pepûk expresses the trauma of marital translocation bluntly: 
‘I became a bride; I became miserable.’ 
It is in the interest of the extended family to inhibit pair-bonding in order to 
lock the labour value of the couple into the household, rather than allowing 
for the formation of deep emotional bonds, which could lead to them 
nuclearizing, and becoming separated from the rest of the family (Charrad 
2001, Chapter 3). This is achieved, says Lesthaeghe (1980), through making 
the expression of marital affection shameful. This is certainly the case 
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amongst Kurds where uxorious husbands are described as alî, which 
suggests emasculation (Hassanpour 2001), and who may be teased on this 
account (Yalçın-Heckman 1991, p. 142). Couples are expected to hide any 
affection they have in public (Stephens 1963, p. 421), since such displays are 
considered shameful (Neurink 2013). To cite an extreme example, within the 
nomadic Azeri-Turkish speaking Shahseven tribes of Iran, it was considered 
taboo for a husband and wife to hold any private conversations at all for the 
entirety of their first year of marriage (Tapper 1980).  
Morsy (1990) provides a revealing history of women’s progression through 
the lifecycle. While a young bride is subjected to great stresses, including 
frequent threats of divorce during early marriage, subordinacy to her affines, 
possible violence, and the trauma of estrangement from her natal family, 
elder women accrue domestic power with increasing age and numbers of 
children. Being usually significantly younger than their husbands due to the 
requirements for a compliant and virginal bride, they are able to command 
the household once their husband reaches senescence, through their close 
relationships with their sons, and through having a position of dominance 
over their daughters-in-law. Women’s subordination has a temporal quality 
and the lowly position of a young bride may be very distinct from that of a 
mother, especially a mother of sons. 
Women’s involvement in violence 
[M]en and seniors have also been the subject of kinship discipline. It 
has been, paradoxically, the relative success of the kin contract to 
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discipline males and seniors into their responsibilities and 
obligations, to manage their labour, to commit them to their 
families, that has led to the asymmetrical vulnerability of women 
and juniors. (Joseph 2000a, p. 135) 
Since the motivation for males, as political actors in the public sphere, to 
conform to the norms of ‘honour’ has been explicated in terms of building 
profitable alliances, this raises the question of why women may support this 
system, since it limits women’s autonomy in multiple ways such as 
prohibiting political participation, education, employment and extra-mural 
leisure. First, marital arrangements which are beneficial to the collective 
benefit female members of that collective as well; mothers, sisters and aunts 
may all stand to benefit indirectly from a prestigious or instrumental alliance, 
and as such, are, no less than males, stakeholders within the system. 
Secondly, it is common amongst subordinated peoples for a normative 
system which favours their oppressors to have become internalised through 
their socialisation. Even where it is not fully internalised, lip-service may be 
paid to this system, rather than facing sanctions from more powerful 
members of the collective. Thirdly, since the symbolic capital of namûs is 
based on delineating ‘good’ from ‘bad’, women can gain status and self-
esteem from including themselves in the former category, and demonstrating 
this through outcasting women who have not proved to be careful custodians 
of their reputation, in the sense that Hawthorne (1850) depicts self-righteous 
Puritan women revelling in the humiliation of the adulterous Hester Prynne.  
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Yet there may be features of kinship structure which further diminish 
women’s solidarity: beyond the symbolic division of namûs and bênamûs, 
there are distinctions of generational differences in power between women. 
These particularly affect a new bride in a patrilocal extended family, and, to a 
reduced degree, in a patrifocal but separate residence. 
Women in patrilinear family structures 
Where patrilocality or, to a lesser degree, patrifocality, occurs within a 
separate spheres model of gender relations, elder females may become 
dominant in the realm of the private wielding power over her own children 
and any of their wives. Her power may be delimited outside her domain, but 
within the domestic realm, she has an unchallenged line of authority over all 
residents, except the nominal patriarch. For men, their interactions in the 
public sphere are inflected by their consciousness of their own insecure 
status vis-à-vis their fellow men, which is a ground for anxiety and potential 
contestation. A summary of these power relations is shown in Table 4.1. 
 Male  Female  
Senior  Executive dominance over 
household 
 Executive role in marital 
arrangement for children 
 Reliant on family connections 
for survival (brothers/cousins 
etc.) within a competitive 
agora 
 Practical dominance in the 
private sphere of the  
household, but subject to 
husband’s executive power  
 Selective role in marital 
arrangement for children 
 Reliant on male support for 
survival 
(husband/son/brother) 
Junior  Subordinate to parents; 
dominant over sisters/wife 
 Subordinate to all other 
household members 
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 Little ability to influence 
marital arrangement 
 Reliant on parents/agnates; 
not yet considered adult 
 Least ability to influence 
marriage arrangement 
 Liminal status between 
agnatic and affinal families 
Table 4.1: Axes of power by age and gender within the patrilinear extended family 
One of the first lessons a Chinese bride has to learn upon entering the 
patrilinear extended family, according to Wolf (1974), is that her husband 
cannot be counted upon to support her in disputes with her mother-in-law — 
that she has no effective allies within the household. If the bride cannot make 
herself pleasing to her husband and thus gain a supporter in a household full 
of strangers — a difficult task, given the extended family’s attempts to 
undermine marital intimacy and the lack of privacy involved in collective 
habitation — she has only one hope: to bear a son, which will cement her into 
the affinal patriline. This not only leads to an improvement of her position in 
the family, but also provides her with a male supporter, able, in due course, to 
participate in public life upon her behalf, and whose affection she can be 
surer of commanding over the long term. 
Thus, younger women’s transition to power comes through the development 
of a ‘uterine family’ (Lamphere 1974) nested within the patriline. In order to 
protect her interests, she binds her son closely to her as her representative in 
the public sphere, and her source of financial security in old age using any 
means necessary; his wife, once trained, replaces her domestic labour, 
allowing her to retire to a supervisory role.  
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Thus, a woman’s most productive embedded strategy for self-advancement is 
one which supports the overarching system of patrilinearity. A Turkish 
mother-in-law, finds White (1999, p. 45), seeks to monopolise her 
daughters’-in-law’s labour for the benefit of the affinal network, and may 
restrict her abilities to tend to her own mother and father, using strategies 
from restricting her movements to encouraging spousal violence against her 
(pp. 53-54). Sonuga-Barke and Mistry (2000) find that the mental well-being 
of elder females far surpasses that of younger women in South Asian 
extended households; younger women disproportionately report depression 
and other mental illnesses and comparatively high levels of suicide, which 
suggest that these intergenerational conflicts between women within the 
household have serious negative effects upon the wellbeing of junior women. 
Vertical patrilines are primarily affected by lateral conflicts — competition 
between brothers, and rivalries between neighbouring families and tribes; 
whereas the uterine family is beset with vertical conflicts of generation and 
status, confrontations between mothers and daughters-in-law where 
mothers assert their dominance over an incoming bride, assuring their 
primacy in their relationship with their son, which is crucial to their 
continued well-being, and in order to maintain their command over the 
domestic realm. Fischer-Tahir, for instance, observes that Kurdish mothers-
in-law have full licence to criticise their son’s wives, but that wives cannot 
counter-attack (2009, p. 61). 
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Kurdish mothers have historically played a predominant role in the selection 
of wives for their sons (Hansen 1961). As, in societies which practise sexual 
segregation, males rarely have contact with unrelated females, so it may fall 
to the mother find her son a mate, which his father then approves. If the 
mother-in-law and daughter are to be co-workers in the same kitchen, then 
the mother is likely to spend significantly more time in her presence than the 
husband will, so the success of their relationship may be more significant to 
the family functioning than that of the marital dyad. Through this close 
contact, it is also the mother-in-law who is in a position to judge the bride’s 
behaviour, and to raise allegations against her ‘honour’.  
For these reasons, it is not necessarily in the interests of elder women to 
subvert the gender order: it would put them in the position of having made 
great investments in building their personal power bases only to lose them 
just before they began to see a return on their labour and sacrifices, through 
the overturning of the established patriarchal bargain which brings them 
status in return for longitudinal conformity to social norms (Kandiyoti 1988). 
Through dissenting to the doctrine of ‘honour’, they risk relinquishing the 
ability to bring an interloper into check by disallowing the strategy of 
threatening to accuse her of ‘immoral’ behaviour. 
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Adolescence/early adulthood as a period of 
vulnerability 
Cross-culturally, girls in their middle to late teens are disproportionately 
subjected to checks upon their sexual behaviour which can upset family 
marriage plans (Schlegel 1995) and lead to early pregnancy. Kurdish victims 
of honour killings may be of any age, but are predominantly between the ages 
of 13 and 20 (Begikhani 1998), a similar profile to other countries where 
statistics upon honour killings have been available for analysis, with young 
married women being the most likely victims (Kressel et al. 1981; Shalhoub-
Kevorkian 2004; Hoyek et al. 2005; KA-MER 2005; Nasrullah et al. 2009) — 
although it should be noted that the impetus for a family to kill for ‘honour’ 
may not dissipate over time. ‘We have heard,’ say Düzkan and Kocali, (2000, 
p. 385) ‘of women with grandchildren who have been murdered because they 
eloped to get married in their youth.’ This liminal period of adolescence to 
early adulthood is also notable for a high occurrence of female suicidality in 
the KRI (Rasool and Payton 2014) and the Middle East in general (Rezaeian 
2010).  
Alinia’s research interviews with survivors of HBV (2013), conducted across 
twelve women’s shelters in the KRI revealed a startling fact: of unmarried 
survivors, all had refused arranged marriage (p. 111); of married survivors, 
all had been married without much in the way of explicit consent (p. 116). In 
the KRI in 2004, 6.8% of girls were married before the legal age of 15, and 
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26% before the age of 18 (UNICEF 2004); almost all are married by 25 
(WHO/Iraq 2006/7). Marriage can thus be described as compulsory for Iraqi 
Kurdish women. For over 65% of married women and girls aged 15-19, their 
husband is over five years older than they are; for around 28%, this age 
difference exceeds ten years (UNICEF 2004). From menarche, occurring at 
around 13, girls may be considered eligible for marriage, which implies 
physically leaving their natal patriline. Menarche thus marks the point at 
which a girl’s peripheral status becomes manifest, from which point 
surveillance of her behaviour increases, and some families take steps to 
locate a suitable husband if one has not already been found.  
This is an age where it becomes likely that girls may be removed from school 
to protect their ‘honour’ (although another motivation may have been to 
benefit from their domestic labour (White 1999, p. 71)). This is a marked 
phenomenon in rural areas, even though the KRI has achieved a high level of 
attendance in education for girls in comparison to other parts of Iraq 
(Geopolicity 2009), due to the comparative security of the region. However, 
in Sulaymaniyah only around half of those enrolled in Grade 1 make their 
way to Grade 6, with slightly fewer than half completing their studies in 
Dohuk and Erbil (UN Children's Fund 2010). Brenneman (2007, p. 81) 
remarks upon the loneliness of his own daughter due to the disappearance of 
her playmates from the streets and schools from the rural Kurdish village 
where they lived. From age 10-12, he says, these girls were restricted to the 
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domestic realm to be protected from potential ‘dishonour’ in anticipation of 
marriage. 
A young bride remains at the margins of her husband’s patriline until she 
reproduces it through bearing a male child, which improves her status within 
his family and cements her into the affinal patriline. For women in patrilinear 
societies, the period between menarche (at around 13 years) and the birth of 
a first son could be described as a state of liminality (Triandis 1995, p. 179); 
peripheral to the male-defined core of her own family, and not yet fully 
integrated into that of her affines (cf. Turner 1964; Wolf 1972, p. 149) — a 
period which correlates with the greatest risk for violence. This is also a 
period where the intense preoccupation with young women’s bodies is most 
keenly expressed, focussing specifically upon the physical manifestation of 
virginity. 
The importance of virginity 
Houzan Mahmoud, activist with the Organisation for Women’s Freedom in 
Iraq, recalls an incident where, as a young girl, she caused a scandal amongst 
her peers by climbing a tree. ‘Come down from that tree,’ they called up to 
her, ‘or you’ll lose your virginity.’  
The ‘hymenisation’ of virginity, as the demarcation between the classes of 
women, a prerequisite for marriage, and the responsibility of the agnatic 
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collective, appears to originate from the Hebraic rather than the 
Mesopotamian worldviews. Deuteronomy 22:13-20 insists upon bloodied 
sheets as proofs of virginity and the Babylonian Talmud notes several cases 
of men raising complaints about a lack of blood when engaged in first marital 
coitus (Kelly 2000, pp. 19-20).  
As Fischer-Tahir finds, this distinction is found in everyday usage of the 
Kurdish language: 
To find out whether a certain man is married or not, a person might 
ask “Has he taken a wife (jin-î hênawe)?” A man who ‘takes’ 
something is active…To discover if a woman is already married, a 
person might ask “Has she married (şû-î kirduwe)?” But both men 
and women tend to ask “Is [she]31 a virgin or a woman? (kiç-e yan 
jin-e)?” (2009, p. 50) 
If women’s ‘honour’, in the sense of namûs, is considered a form of symbolic 
capital which is essential to the marital arrangements I have previously 
described, then this raises the question of why there should be such wide 
cross-cultural consistency across Eurasia in the connection of women’s 
symbolic capital with sexual restraint: why ‘honour’ in women represents 
chastity, virginity and restraint rather than sexual prowess, wit, athleticism 
or any other personal characteristic a woman might exhibit. There appears to 
be little practical reason why this should be the case: sexually active women 
                                                        
31 The original question as phrased in the source text was ‘Is it a virgin or a woman.’ 
However, the Kurdish language does not have gendered pronouns, so the use of ‘it’ in this 
sentence may indicate inconsistent translation rather than dehumanisation. 
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are not less industrious, less healthy or less fertile, than women who refrain 
from sex. There can hardly be a better indicator of fertility than a healthy 
child.  
Yet the linking of a woman’s symbolic capital with chastity is deeply rooted in 
Eurasian culture, from Pamela Andrews’ assiduous protection of her ‘virtue’ 
(Richardson 1897/2003) to the profit margins of a variety of clinics 
performing hymenoplasties in the present day.  
The hymen, unforgettably described by El Saadawi as ‘that very thin 
membrane called honour’ (1977/1980, p. 38), holds a crucial relevance to 
women’s eligibility for marriage, and is a point of anxiety for young women 
across the Middle East. Kressel states that the role of virginity in the Middle 
East is distinct from tribal Africa, Asia and Australasia,  and ‘primitive’ [sic] 
Europe, including even the most repressive of Victorian values, in that the 
loss of virginity is considered a justification for violence (1992, p. 168).  
Virginity is also presumed to be in the state’s domain in the Middle East, 
where virginity tests are conducted by officials (Parla 2001), even used as a 
means of political repression (Taher 2012). The state of the hymen then, is a 
public rather than a private matter. In conducting psychosocial research into 
Kurdish women living in Norway, Ahlberg found virginity was an extreme 
concern to all her clients. Her respondent ‘Aisha’ remarks that women who 
do not bleed upon marriage have their heads shaved, and are returned to 
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their families on the back of a donkey32 (2007, p. 87). ‘Fatima’ records the 
shame of failing to bleed sufficiently upon her own wedding day. She was 
discarded by her proposed husband who cried ‘You are no virgin! I have been 
deceived; I believed I was getting a proper wife.’ She was forced to leave the 
village with her family, hanging their heads in shame (Ahlberg 2007, p. 122). 
‘Fatima’s’ description of the ritual of defloration is similar to that recorded by 
Hansen (1961). 
Hansen (1961, p. 134) says that the young husband is expected to 
consummate the marriage abruptly and then ‘leave the field to the waiting 
woman, who roughly dries the bride’s genital opening in order to obtain as 
clear a trace on the sheet as possible.’ ‘Fatima’ (Ahlberg 2007, p. 122) adds 
that this ritual, as she observed it, was by no means private, as at all the 
weddings she had attended, guests crammed the wedding meal down, in 
order to crowd around every available window and door crack and observe 
the first act of coition between husband and wife. Linen strips safety-pinned 
to the bed as trophies. As soon as the act was completed, observers burst into 
the room and ran through the village playing a version of capture-the-flag 
with the blood-stained strips, with prizes awarded to the final possessors.  
                                                        
32 An identical punishment is prescribed for unmarried women or girls who break their 
hymeneal membrane in the Hindu Manusmriti, a Brahminical legal treatise [8/369], written 
in Sanskrit, which is, like Kurdish, an Indo-Iranian language. 
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Broude and Greene (1983) observe that, cross-culturally, the more likely it is 
that marriage is non-consensual, the less likely it is that newlyweds are 
granted privacy for their first sexual act; and the more sexually repressive a 
society is, the more likely that consummation is ceremonialised. Occuring 
within culture in which physical displays of affection between married 
couples and any display of flesh, male or female, are normally vehemently 
proscribed, this ritual appears to be a rather nerve-wracking experience for 
both newlyweds. The bride, may be sensible of the risk, now completely 
beyond her control, of being shamed, and even killed, if she does not produce 
sufficient blood; the groom, must attempt congress, possibly for the first time 
in his life, with a tense and potentially terrified woman who may be a virtual 
stranger to him, and maintain an erection of sufficient rigidity to pierce her 
hymen before an audience of his peers.  
It appears that there is more in play here than the ‘purity’ of the bride; that 
the male is also being subjected to a test of potency in his ability to perform 
sexually under adverse conditions (cf. Abu-Zahra 1970, p. 1086; Lindisfarne 
1994) Hassanpour (2001, p. 239) notes that the Kurdish noun piyawetî 
(manliness) connotes ‘the ability to fuck…with the given example [in a 
Kurdish-language dictionary]… “he that has become a man over the bride…he 
has removed her hymen.”’  
‘Within a patriarchal system,’ says Moruzzi (2013),   
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…men are as firmly tied into a binary identity as women are: The 
equivalent to women’s entrapment in the duality of the 
mother/whore opposition is men’s confinement to the roles of 
protector and patriarch or victimizer and criminal…Within the 
family, a woman is a mother or a possible mother-to-be; outside the 
family, a woman is a possible whore. Within the family, a man is a 
protector or a possible patriarch; outside the family, a man is a 
possible libertine or a thug.  
The ritual on the male side, binding them into new roles as family men, has 
more in common with the hazing of a US college fraternity or military unit 
than an erotic encounter; phallic masculinity is displayed to gain admittance 
to the homosocial community of adult married men. Virginity does not just 
demarcate the boundaries between girl and woman; taking it makes a boy 
into a man, through a public display of sexual potency (Donnan and Magowan 
2010, p. 140).  
Hansen (1961, p. 133) observes that the families of Kurdish brides keep 
blood-stained cloths (çarşeb) as proof of virginity until a successful birth 
binds the woman into her husband’s patriline33, in case of dispute about the 
bride’s ‘honour’, or indeed the groom’s potency, calling the marriage contract 
into question during the most hazardous period of liminality.  
The ritual described above, though it is telling that it has continued for so 
long, should not be considered contemporary practice — most urban Kurds 
will commence married life in the privacy of a hotel suite, beginning their 
                                                        
33 Cf. Deuteronomy 22: 13-21 
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lives in decorous privacy. The state of the hymen, however, may well remain 
a point of interest to their families, who may still demand the customary 
sanguine proofs34. The status of the hymen has been a point of legal interest, 
when used as a justification for ‘honour’ killing.  
A judgement pronounced in Duhok on 9 October 1999 stated: 
The father killed his daughter after she told him that she could not 
marry in Dihok because she was no longer a virgin…It is confirmed 
to the Court by the post-mortem that the girl’s hymen was broken 
while she was not married and this indicates that the girl was badly 
behaved and honourable motivation is reached in this case. 
‘Honourable’ motivation meant that despite witnesses to the murder, the 
father and uncle received a one year suspended sentence (Begikhani 2005, p. 
215). In the case of Du’a Khalil, a Kurdish teenager from the minority Yezidi 
religion, who was publically stoned to death in Bashiqa, Northern Iraq, the 
political ramifications of the state of her hymen were such that six doctors 
(two of whom were Yezidi, two Christian, and two Muslim, in order to evade 
accusations of bias) were called in to provide post-mortem gynaecological 
examinations. Her (intact) hymen raised far more medical interest than the 
pulverised skull and fractured spine which were the actual causes of death. 
                                                        
34 This may allow a couple who have pre-empted marriage, or a non-virgin bride with an 
understanding groom, to keep their secret between themselves, and evade any repercussions 
through fakery, using animal blood, or a small cut to an unobtrusive part of the body to pass 
the familial muster, if such proofs are indeed required. 
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There are, as Stone (2006, p. 241) identifies, few solid reasons to account for 
the value of virginity, as there is neither intrinsic nor functional value to this 
particular membrane. Many accounts of the high status of virginity seem to 
proceed from the curious notion that men have an innate sexual desire for 
virgins, which desire is most fully expressed where males have greater power 
over marital choice. Yet virgin preference on the part of males is by no means 
universal — in fact fewer societies require virginity before marriage than 
demand it (Schlegel 1995, p. 141). The !Kung, for instance, have no word for 
virgin in their language whatsoever (Fisher 1992, p. 263).  
As such the value placed upon virginity in Eurasian cultures remains in need 
of explanation. While there is a common notion within arguments based in 
evolutionary psychology that virgins are desirable as brides because they 
cannot be already pregnant, thereby hoodwinking a man into supporting a 
child that does not bear his genetic code, virginity is by no means the only 
method of ascertaining the status of any woman’s uterus. It is not even 
reliable, given the wide range of methods of faking an intact hymen available 
since antiquity, such as the 9th century Persian recommendation of an 
astringent coupled with a pessary fashioned from dove’s intestines and 
animal blood (Blank 2007, p. 91). The prophet Muhammad, writing within a 
pagan milieu where marriage, divorce and remarriage were very frequent 
(Bianquis 1996), instituted the iddat waiting period into Muslim practice, in 
which a woman is obliged to wait for three menstrual courses between 
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marriages in order to ensure that there is no uncertainty about paternity. 
There is no reason why such a method could not be applied to never-married 
women to ensure a husband’s reproductive dominion over his wife’s uterus, 
with far more reliability than a show of hymeneal blood. 
Schlegel (1991) is perhaps the only writer to have addressed the obsession 
with virginity in functional terms. She notes that virginity has high status 
where women either command dowries or expect inheritance. Her argument 
is that in agrarian societies, illegitimate children are unwelcome because they 
drain resources from the natal family without benefitting from the additional 
resources brought in by the father, and that virginity is prized in order to 
prevent opportunistic or otherwise unsuitable men from seducing women in 
order to benefit from their dowries and property rights, such as the 
spendthrift Willoughby in Austen’s Sense and Sensibility (1811). In support of 
this theory, we could note that in European history, women’s virginity has 
often been a predominant concern of the propertied classes while being 
rather less significant amongst the working poor, who lack estates or much in 
the way of property which would be subject to redistribution via marriage. 
However, Schlegel’s argument loses momentum outside the northern 
European milieu. The argument that illegitimate children are undesirable due 
to increasing the burden of family resources without providing an additional 
source of male income seems rather less convincing in a society as vigorously 
pro-natal as traditional agricultural corporatism, where children are put to 
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work from very young ages (Dzięgel 1982, p. 248). There is no reason why 
the illegitimate child of a daughter would make a less effective farmhand or 
shepherd than the legitimate offspring of a son, as long as there were 
sufficient resources to raise him or her from infancy, which could be diluted 
by contributions from the extended family. The need for support would not 
be prolonged in subsistence farming economies, where children begin to 
produce surpluses as young as six years of age (Harris 1997, p. 205).  
Schlegel’s assumption that a premium on virginity prevents an opportunist 
from seducing his way into his wife’s riches appears to depend upon a 
principle of ‘shotgun’ marriage, which assumes that an unmarried 
impregnated woman inevitably marries her seducer, thereby passing on 
control of her pre- and post-mortem inheritances. Within Schlegel’s schema, 
abortion, infanticide or lone parenthood are ruled out as viable options, as is 
marriage to a more eligible man willing to accept the role of pater to the 
offspring of a premarital association, despite the fact that any of these 
options would effectively confound the strategies of a scheming male 
fortune-hunter hoping to impregnate his way into a fortune. That these 
options were not available to the non-virgin woman suggests that the causal 
chain Schlegel makes must be reversed: it is only because there is a high 
premium on a virgin bride that the seducer’s strategy can be effective, 
because it is based on a belief that an unmarried but sexually experienced 
woman is an unmarriageable social outcast. 
POWER AND THE FAMILY  
 
 
 124 
Moreover, in Islamic marriages, there is no assumed commonalty of property 
through marriage, as there is in the European assumption of coverture, nor 
are there substantial dowries or ‘portions’ payable to the groom from the 
bride’s family. While a Muslim husband may attempt to persuade his wife to 
contribute to the household, he has no legal ability to force her to do so; and 
while he does potentially inherit from her estate, the amounts of inheritance 
in cash terms from women are comparatively smaller, and since women often 
outlive men, particularly in societies riven by conflict, and since wives are 
typically younger than their husbands, they are more likely to be 
beneficiaries of their husband’s estate than testators of their own. While the 
potential of women’s inheritance rights can be problematic to patrilinear 
corporatism, within the Middle East these are often contained through 
preferential patrilateral cousin marriage, which is a parsimonious strategy 
for retaining property within a kinship group, and through persuading 
women to waive their inheritance rights in exchange for guarantees of 
fraternal protection in the event of marital breakdown. It seems more likely, 
as King and Stone (2010) and Altunek (2006) observe, that it is the 
overwhelming weight of patrilinear ideology that renders illegitimacy 
unthinkable — not to mention the difficulties of marrying off an illegitimate 
girl where ‘honour’ is conceived not only as collective, but as a heritable 
quality (Altunek 2006, p. 62). 
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Ortner (1978) identifies a large region where virginity is considered men’s 
concern, which includes the familiar roster of the Mediterranean, Middle 
East, India and China. Ortner relates this to the rise of state ideologies of 
purity. While the dialectic of purity and contamination is have symbolic 
resonances within many societies, this explanation tends to beg the question 
in eliding the hymen with ‘purity’.  
This is a peculiar notion, given that the supposed ‘proof’ of physical virginity 
is a messy business and that societies that fetishize hymeneal blood are often 
notably squeamish about menstrual blood. There is certainly no necessity 
behind this association, as can be seen in societies where the defloration of a 
new bride is performed by an intermediary to avoid ‘contamination’ of the 
groom (Rubin 1975, p. 165 fn 1), which also rather undercuts the notion that 
there is a ‘natural’ basis to ensuring paternity. 
The discourse of purity and filth is commonly, and cross-culturally, deployed 
to make moral judgements (Nussbaum 1999). The linkage of hymeneal blood 
with ‘purity’ may speak more deeply to the emotionalisation of conventional 
morality, which tends to carry cognitive connections with disgust (David and 
Olatunji 2011) rather than with any actual concerns about dirt. Douglas’s 
core position is that the language of contamination is deployed in symbolic 
terms, so it is worth considering whose interests the symbolic linkage of a 
hymen with ‘purity’ serves. 
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Looking in more depth into the context of Islamic family law, a local, cultural, 
explanation presents itself. In the context of the Shafi’i articulation of Islamic 
jurisprudence, associated with Sorani-speaking Muslim Kurds, the father and 
paternal grandfather, and other patrilinear relatives, are amongst those 
persons who have an exclusive licence to arrange the marriage of a virgin 
without her consent, whereas they do not have similar rights over a non-
virgin woman. According to a manual of classical Shafi’i jurisprudence: 
Whenever the bride is a virgin, the father or father's father may 
marry her to someone without her permission… As for the nonvirgin 
of sound mind, no one may marry her to another after she has 
reached puberty without her express permission, no matter whether 
the guardian is the father, father's father, or someone else.  
(al-Misri c. 1368, p. m3.13) 
Al-Shafi’i explicitly equates the paternal power to force marriage upon a 
virgin daughter with the authority of a master over a slave (Ali 2010, p. 38). 
Thus, within the Shafi’ite system, a public demonstration of a woman’s 
virginity serves as a communication of her subjugation to patrilinear will. 
The presence of blood forms a physical proof of the absence of the 
requirement for the consent of the woman, hymeneal ink signing a contract 
between agnatic and affinal families, in which the effluvia from a woman’s 
body serves as witness to her exclusion from the decision making process (cf. 
Mernissi 1982, p. 183).  
There is perhaps, another, simpler, but perhaps more compelling and 
universal rationale for an insistence on the presence of the hymen, which is 
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that, in the absence of trickery, a woman can appear as a virgin only once in 
her lifetime, and in a community where she is known, falsifying virginity 
within a second marriage is an impossibility. If virgins are identified as the 
only acceptable category of marriageable women, then unhappy married 
women with no means of support but marriage may consider themselves 
unlikely to remarry well, and thus remain within their first marriage. Their 
options are to remain in an undesirable marriage, the ignominy and 
uncertain future of a return to the natal family, or destitution: thus making 
virginity a requirement for marriage serves a function of increasing women’s 
dependence upon an individual man, and reducing the chances that she will 
seek divorce, and break the connections of alliance which her marriage both 
symbolises and embodies. 
Of the Abrahamic faiths, Islam has a comparatively liberal attitude to divorce, 
to the point where marital bonds are perceived as inherently fragile and 
unstable (Charrad 2001, p. 34), whereas Christianity has been particularly 
resistant to divorce (Goody 1983, p. 41). Catholic women can testify to the 
lifelong claim a husband is presumed to have over the body of his wife, while 
patriarchal Protestant movements in the States call for ‘Covenant’ marriages 
which eschew ‘no-fault’ divorces as ungodly and damaging to children (Spaht 
2002). Female-initiated divorce is particularly disruptive within patrilinear 
family structures, which seek to ensconce a woman and her children under 
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the control of a man (and his family) for as long it suits his (and their) 
purposes.  
Islamic directives on divorce are asymmetric, and do not favour women — 
men may divorce according to their whim through pronouncing a triple 
talaq35, with few long term obligations to support their former partner, 
whereas women must supplicate to religious authorities to be released from 
marriage, and ransom their freedom by repaying any monies or property 
they received as dower (mehr36); some lose custody of their children in this 
process.  Female-initiated divorce (khul’) remains possible for Muslim 
women, however, and may indeed have been very common in Middle Eastern 
history. Stowasser and Abul-Magd (2004), for instance, place the current 
idealisation of marital permanence in the Arab world as a colonial 
importation, derived from Christian practice. Within pre-modern Egypt, 
Syria, Palestine and Jordan, khul’ divorces were liberally dispensed 
(Stowasser and Abul-Magd 2004; Rapoport 2007); for instance in 18-19th  
Century Nablus, half of all divorces passing through the court were khul’ 
(Tucker 1991, p. 241), and more than half of those within the medieval 
Ottoman court of  ‘Aintab (Pierce 1999, p. 282).  
                                                        
35 Islamic divorce has a very similar structure to that in Orthodox Judaism, where men are 
merely required to make a triple statement of divorce before witnesses, whereas a woman 
must seek consent of her husband, or of the Rabbinical court if this is withheld. 
36 See p. 172 below for a more detailed discussion of mehr. 
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Bargaining theory addresses three points in relation to marriage:  the first 
decision is when/whether to marry, the second, whom one marries, and, and 
the third is how the surplus value of marriage is distributed (Zelder 2002, p. 
157). Within a system of marriage arrangement, the expectation is that the 
collective holds executive control over the first two points of bargaining. The 
couple does, however, have to live together and arrange their lives as a 
couple, and generate patterns of the division of labour and resources. 
Economists see divorce as a ‘threat point’ (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 
and Horney 1981) where either spouse will refuse an output share that 
makes him or her worse off than if they were to divorce. This mechanism 
works to maintain a limited degree of equilibrium within the marital division 
of resources and labour. The asymmetric ability of men and women to 
divorce, however, leads power within the relationship to accrue towards the 
male. Some men may threaten their female relatives with an easily-
accomplished divorce (for example, threatening daughters with the 
dispossession of their mothers in the event of non-compliance in marital 
arrangements) making divorce threat a means of power and control over 
women. Yet, in order to maintain patrilinear control over the family, and to 
solidify the bonds of obligation and alliance between families created by 
marriage, women’s ability to deploy divorce threats must be contained, 
delimited and penalised. 
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So the premium upon virginity, and the exclusion from licit sexuality of 
unmarried non-virgins combines to constrain female divorce threat; the high 
status of women’s virginity —men’s virginity being largely their own private 
affair (Mernissi 1982, p. 185) — may be linked to a strategic desire to limit 
women to one marriage over their lifetimes rather than any intrinsic value 
associated with the hymen.  
If this is the case, it is certainly effective: Bois, writing in the late 1960s, 
suggests that divorce was infrequent among Kurds, and was mostly initiated 
by males where a wife had failed to produce male children to reproduce the 
patriline, that women’s remarriage after divorce was even more rare, and 
that the patriline always retained custody of any children, so that for a 
woman, divorce inevitably led to the loss of her custodial rights (1966, p. 44). 
Indeed, it continues to be rare: of ever-married single women in Iraq, a mere 
5.7% were divorcées: the rest were widows (United Nations 2009).  
By comparison, within horticulturalist societies in New Guinea, Africa and 
Amazonia, while first marriages are often arranged by parents, these are 
often short-lived and divorce is treated unproblematically (Fisher 1992, pp. 
161-162). This suggests that where the kinship licence is less central to 
domestic economies, marital permanence is also less significant. A premium 
upon virginity then, may be an attempt to restrict women’s ability to divorce 
in societies where this is an option legally available to women, but in which it 
is disruptive to the social orderings of labour, resources and reproduction. 
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The position of non-virgin women 
Do not run. Do not jump. Do not ride a bicycle. Do not go in for 
sports at all. Otherwise you might injure the hymen and then ‘we’ll 
lose our reputation.’ Do not speak in a loud voice, ʼeyb-e37! Do not 
sit with your legs apart, keep your eyes down, do not talk without 
permission, ʼeyb-e! Do not play with the neighbour’s sons on the 
street…and so on. (Fischer-Tahir 2009, p. 65) 
The hymen is of crucial significance to unmarried women, and yet is hardly a 
reliable indicator of a lack of sexual experience: hymens may be broken 
through non-sexual acts, or may be so tough or so flexible that penile 
penetration fails to rupture them, or they may, indeed, be non-existent from 
birth (El Saadawi 1977/1980, p. 80). With these factors in mind, it is 
unsurprising that Kurdish girls may be restricted from climbing trees, riding 
bicycles and the other physical pleasures of childhood — superstition 
endows the hymen with a dangerous fragility precisely because of its 
importance. The protection of the hymen becomes metonymous for the 
restriction of the entire body, limiting the range of motion and expression 
available to a girl or woman in the process of learning to embody expected 
behaviours. The obsession with the physical hymen telescopes into an ethic 
of total control of virgins — ‘women must refrain from sexual activity…and 
from any act that might lead to sexual activity, and from any act that may lead 
to an act that might lead to sexual activity’ and so on (Abu-Odeh 1996a) to 
                                                        
37 ʼEyb-e here is Kurdish for ‘shameful’, and is expressed in terms of a reprimand. 
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the extent that a woman or girl becomes an embodied extension of her own 
‘thin membrane called honour’ and subject to numerous restrictions upon 
her behaviour. In common idiom, a woman’s loss of virginity and ‘honour’ are 
described as like the breaking of glass, the staining of cloth, the striking of a 
match, the smashing of an egg, or the trampling of a flower into the mud — 
an irreversible act of destruction. 
Underlying the conceptualisation of namûs are stereotypes of female 
sexuality: non-virgin women are assumed to be lascivious and sexually 
indiscriminate, a belief which is only exacerbated by the fact that women who 
are not married, cannot access the labour market, and do not have supportive 
families may be forced into forms of transactional sex for their own survival. 
The situation of divorced women in societies where virginity is considered an 
essential prerequisite to marriage is poor (Cohen and Savaya 1997). Beiruti 
divorcées, for instance, are considered unmarriageable due to their lack of 
virginity, and considered legitimate targets for sexual harassment, and even 
rape (Wehbi 2002, p. 296).  
While Mernissi (1985) optimistically suggests that this fixation upon 
women’s sexuality is a form of a recognition of women’s power, it could 
equally be compared with the ‘Jezebel’ stereotype of enslaved women in the 
United States (Pilgrim 2002). It is unsurprising, perhaps, that a society that 
allows women a very limited capacity for discrimination in sexual affairs 
envisions them as being sexually indiscriminate. Such a conception could 
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provide an explanation for the strong preoccupation with female infidelity 
found in cultures related to ‘honour’ (Vandello and Cohen 2008). According 
to Buunk and Solano (2012), there is a high correlation between parental 
marriage arrangement and ‘mate-guarding’ behaviour — their term for 
sexual jealousy — which may be expressed by both men and women.  
Goddard (1987, p. 190) describes this view of  the omniverously sexual 
woman as an expression of a deep ambivalance around sexuality based in the 
contradictions generated by the attempt to reconcile women’s real existence 
as sexual agents within a system which is dependent upon them behaving as 
sexual subjects. This contradiction lies at the heart of the fragility of namûs 
and the valorisation of virginity, which is, if anything, a requirement to 
submit oneself to the status of sexual subjecthood, necessary for the orderly 
use of the ‘kinship licence’ as a political and economic tool, through 
eschewing autonomy over one’s own sexual and reproductive life.  
The next chapter takes a microsociological approach to the interactions 
involved in traditional forms of marriage, with particular attention to the 
operations of social capital, commencing the consideration of the role 
marriage plays in social organisation. 
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5. A microsociology of 
marriage forms 
I don’t want to marry a shepherd, 
who always has mud on his trousers. 
I don’t want to marry a drover, 
who has cracks in the soles of his feet. 
I don’t want to marry a scholar, 
who is so proud of himself, 
just for smearing ink with a pen. 
I don’t want to marry a rich man, 
whose wealth shows a wound in his heart. 
I don’t want to marry a poor man, 
that dare not look at my face. 
Dear mother, kind mother, 
I want to take the road38 as I promised: 
I want to marry the one that I love. 
Kurdish folksong (Zaza 1962), my translation 
 
                                                        
38 ‘Taking the road’ is the literal Kurdish term for elopement. See p. 214 
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This chapter will consider how various traditional forms of marriage express 
relationships within and between families and how this impacts upon the 
‘honour’ of women and families.  
Societal functioning depends on a multitude of promises, contracts, and 
arrangements, of which marriage may be the most significant within societies 
primarily structured according to kinship and filiation. For Timur (1981, p. 
68), traditional forms of marriage and the extended family represent 
‘functionally related phenomena.’ I now consider the various traditional 
forms of marriage strategisation in more detail, progressing from those with 
the closest proximity to the family (endogamy, in the form of cousin 
marriage), to the balanced reciprocity of direct exchange marriage, often 
occurring within small communities, to the monetised interactions of 
exogamy with brideprice, with a final discussion of the wild-cards of 
abductions and elopements.  
These four forms of marriage are by no means distinctly Kurdish but can also 
be found co-occurring within rural Italy in the 1950s (Pirro 2008), amongst 
the Roma in Bulgaria (Pamporov 2007),  in Afghanistan (Kargar 2011), and in 
Pakistan (Afzal et al. 1994; Jacoby and Mansuri 2007), and according to 
Segalen (1986, p. 16), in Southern France. This suggests that these forms may 
be logical formations within the political economy of marriage: that they are 
not distinctive ‘traditions’ delimited to any one culture, but may be 
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considered more in terms of catallactically generated manoeuvres, in the 
Bourdieusien sense of ‘regulated improvisations’ which have developed 
within similar contexts, in similar ecological niches, and within similar 
familial structures. 
 I do not intend for the reader to take the forms of marriage described in this 
chapter as describing a predominant contemporary reality, since although 
these modes are still practised, as survey results show (page 285), they are 
declining in the face of modernity; rather, I wish to identify these forms as 
ideal-typic models, similar to Collier’s (1988) treatment of three Amerindian 
marriage forms39, in order to consider how different forms of marriage relate 
to the structure of patrilinear societies featuring the ‘exchange of women’, 
and how these may motivate and inflect the societal preoccupation with 
namûs. I also be consider how these interact with the hegemonic presence of 
Islam within Iraqi personal status laws (Efrati 2005) which impact upon the 
individual regardless of confession or level of religiosity. 
The hazard of using an ideal-typic approach is the danger of homogenizing 
diverse experiences and giving the impression of stasis. As Hansen (1961) 
notes, prior Western writers drew few distinctions between women’s various 
differing situations in generalising about ‘Kurdish women’. Accordingly she 
                                                        
39 Collier’s discriminations between the three forms of marriage she identifies — 
brideservice, equal bridewealth and unequal bridewealth — are based on the forms of 
prestation accompanying each transaction. However, my discriminations focus instead of the 
identities of the spouses and their bearing on relations within the family and community.  
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takes care to attend to differences in educational level, and urban/village 
backgrounds. There are, of course, many more differences than these 
between women which inflect their experiences of gender and kinship. Natali 
(2005, p. 31) points to a variety of socioeconomic and political statuses based 
on tribal/non-tribal and Muslim/non-Muslim distinctions, as well as 
‘warriors and tillers of the land, landowners, peasants and urban groups.’ 
Hansen’s own study (1961) is underpinned by a blithe functionalism which 
elides any asymmetries of power within the communities she surveys; 
however, the fact that she finds a community which is both orderly and non-
violent is indicative that active violence is not necessarily integral to the 
system, as long as its norms and values remain unchallenged. Thus, casting 
the history of gender relations across Kurdish history as irredeemably 
violent and exploitative is to ignore the influences of a recent history of 
internal strife, devastating geopolitics and a precipitous confrontation with 
modernity; however, historicising it as harmonious and egalitarian (even 
within the restrictions of a gender-complementarian model) overlooks 
intrinsic, structural inequalities and conflict, which may become most 
apparent during periods of societal stress.  
While Kurds may belong to many religions, the majority are Sunni Muslims, 
and Islam has a hegemonic status as source of family law in both Iraqi and 
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Kurdish law, meaning that Islamic ideations of the family may be particularly 
influential. 
I commence with a discussion of a form of marriage which is considered 
unique to the Middle Eastern region: preferential patrilateral cousin 
marriage. 
Cousin marriage 
Anne Elliot, protagonist of Jane Austen’s last novel, Persuasion (1817/2006), 
faces a marital dilemma: approaching spinsterhood at the ripe old age of 27, 
she is courted by her suave but self-interested cousin, William Elliot, who 
proposes a match between them that would allow her to return to her 
beloved family home, entailed to him through primogeniture. She also 
reencounters a former suitor, the stalwart Frederick Wentworth, whom she 
had rejected eight years earlier under the pressures of friends and family 
who felt his social status was inadequate. The themes which underlie her 
dilemma — familial pressure, status, social capital, self-interest and property 
— are just as salient even where marital arrangements are handled by 
relatives rather than the intended spouses themselves. 
In the West, cousin marriage is low and declining within the indigenous 
population, falling to less than 1% over the 20th century in the United 
Kingdom (Shaw 2001, p. 316). Cousin marriage is now generally considered 
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rather uncouth. Across the entire MENA zone and within diasporic Middle 
Eastern and North African communities, however, there is a strong 
expression of preference for cousin marriage, with patrilateral parallel cousin 
marriage (hereinafter PPC40) being a particularly favoured form. 
Preferential nature of cousin marriage 
Yalçın-Heckman’s meticulous ethnography (1991) of members of the Kurdish 
Hamawand tribe, living in the Turkish village of Hakkari, indicates that of 66 
marriages where the relationship between the couple was known, 34 were 
endogamous, and 19 were real or classificatory PPC marriages. She notes that 
for Hakkari, PPC was considered ‘ordinary marriage’ (1991, p. 236). In the 
city of Van, in the Kurdish region of Turkey, researchers commented that the 
high level of cousin endogamy — 34.4% — was due to family pressure rather 
than choice (Akbayram et al. 2009). In Iran, consanguineous marriages were 
found to be at 38.6% overall, with less economically developed areas 
demonstrating higher levels (Saadat et al. 2004). In Iraq, research into 
genetic illnesses found that 43.3% of the control group had consanguineous 
marriages, of which 35.6% were between first cousins (Al-Ani 2010). 
                                                        
40 The existing literature preponderantly refers to this form of marriage as FBD marriage - in 
reference to the bride as the father’s brother’s daughter; however I have elected to use 
alternate terminology to evade the implications of focussing on the identity of the bride 
rather than the extended family structure. 
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Within ethnographic literature, the Middle Eastern version of PPC is 
considered unique because the lineage historically not only has rights of 
disposal over a woman’s body, but also has been considered to hold rights of 
access (Barth 1954; Fernea and Malarkey 1975, p. 188). This means that if a 
father wishes to marry his daughter to someone other than his brother’s son, 
he must first seek permission from his brother(s) and nephew(s).  
However, far from being an absolute rule, PPC marriage represents a strong 
preference. A father might well give lip-service to the importance of marrying 
his daughter to his brother’s son, particularly when questioned by an 
anthropologist where he will tend to give conventional responses, but this 
may not reflect practical reality for several reasons. First, and most simply, 
PPC marriage may not be mathematically possible where there are 
disparities between the numbers of unmarried males and females within a 
patriline (Ottenheimer 1986, p. 936). Secondly, a growing awareness of the 
genetic risks involved has led to a small decline in cousin marriages amongst 
Kurds (Brenneman 2007, p. 73). Last, a father’s choice may be weighted by 
individual preference rather than communal norms: if his brother’s son is a 
loafer, while his sister’s son or an unrelated man is responsible and 
industrious, he may well pick the latter in the interests of his daughter and 
her future children’s prosperity, although he may face opposition in this 
preference from his own brothers and nephews through their assumed right 
of ‘access’:  
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When Haifa Khalil, from a village near Aleppo, refused to marry a 
cousin whom she found “disrespectful and childish”, her parents 
tried to arrange a marriage to another, unrelated man. But they 
faced opposition from her uncle, who threatened them. He said she 
could marry any of his sons, but insisted they had priority over 
anyone else. Under pressure from tribal elders, Haifa finally agreed 
to the match. Now, she says, “I have no dreams or hopes in life. I feel 
that I am under sentence.” (IWPR - Syria 2009) 
Such ‘cousin-right’ may be broadly supported by forces outside the family: in 
a similar case in Diyana, in the KRI, a girl who refused to marry her cousin 
applied for the annulment of a marriage contract made while she was a baby. 
Despite the judge’s agreement, the village Mullah informed the judge that the 
match had his approval and should be upheld, and the girl was threatened 
with violence until she complied with family wishes (Minwalla and Portman 
2007, p. 17).  
Inheritance patterns 
Patterns of reciprocal cousin marriage has been strongly linked to female 
inheritance rights (Leach 1955/1971, p. 152). Sanmartìn (1982, p. 664) finds, 
for instance, that in the Mediterranean region, while cousin marriage is very 
common where female inheritance is recognised, it is rare, and even 
considered deviant, where women do not inherit. Tillion’s (1966/2007) 
expeditious but insightful ethnography of the Maghreb identifies the Islamic 
directive for female inheritance as a strong motivation for endogamy of this 
kind. Islamic laws on inheritance, known as ʿulm al-farāʾidd, (the ‘Science of 
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the Shares’), are diffusive, tending to spread wealth across many inheritors 
rather than concentrate it in the hands of a single individual, as is the case in 
primogeniture, which has historically been the organisation of European 
inheritance patterns. Islamic directives involve a great number of potential 
inheritors to any estate; moreover testators can only dispose of a limited 
proportion of their estate at their own discretion, and that proportion should 
not be bequeathed to an inheritor who already has a set share under Islamic 
principles (Esposito and DeLong-Bass 2007, p. 65).  
PPC marriages are strongly and significantly more likely to be found if the 
area  was part of the 8th Century Umayyad Caliphate,  and are far more likely 
to have been retained where the Islamic faith remains predominant 
(Korotayev 2000) — often significant as being part of national laws, 
regardless of individual preference.  
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Figure 5.1: The Umayyad Caliphate.  
While a great deal of contemporary feminist attention to Muslim family law 
on inheritance confronts the injustice of a daughter’s share being half of that 
of a son, which has predominantly been the case in Iraqi personal status law 
(Efrati 2005), the very fact that females inherit at all can be disruptive to 
patriliny, through the potential to impede the smooth transmission of 
corporate holdings, most significantly land and flocks, down the patriline.  
The following diagrams provide a demonstration of capital transference 
through Islamic directives on inheritance41, in which the size of each arrow 
represents the proportions of the estate. 
                                                        
41 Calculations were carried out using the online service ‘The Islamic Inheritance Program’ at 
http://www.islamicsoftware.org/irth/irth.html, according to Shafi’ite principles. 
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Figure 5.2: Transmission of the estate of a male through Islamic directives on inheritance 
 
Notably, the share accruing to the wife in the event of the husband’s death is 
the smallest and this is the only transmission of money into the affinal 
patriline.  
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Figure 4.3: Transmission of the estate of a female through Islamic directives on inheritance 
Rather less of a female’s estate is maintained within her own patriline, 
although this is not likely to be a large amount, as she may well have passed 
on her personal wealth, often in the form of gold jewellery, to her daughter as 
a wedding gift in advance of her death. 
The complex mathematics of Muslim inheritance may have been practicable 
to the Arabian communities who were the first recipients of Islam, whose 
economy was based in mercantilism and cattle herding. Mecca is, and was, 
A MICROSOCIOLOGY OF MARRIAGE FORMS  
 
 
 146 
extremely arid, and an inhospitable environment for plant-life; its 
prominence and livelihood was as a trading city rather than an agricultural 
centre, where each citizen — man, woman and child — often had some 
trading interest in every camel train passing through the city (Wolf 1951). 
The disposal of the estate of a trader and herdsman is more readily 
arithmetically resolved through the division of units of camels and tradable 
goods, which can in turn be bred or traded for profit.  
However, for the agricultural communities of the Fertile Crescent, the 
division of an estate rested far more firmly upon the division of land or flocks, 
with the potential to threaten the basis of subsistence for the family as a 
whole. The estate of a farmer must be divided geometrically, in acres and feet, 
which would ultimately, through a few generations, render some partitions 
so small as to be unusable. Moreover, land is not, like tradable goods or 
livestock, a renewable resource. Plough technology, first utilised in 
Mesopotamia, has been preserved without change since the 3rd millennium 
BCE in some Kurdish regions (Kren 1996, p. 169), and requires land of 
sufficient dimensions to plough effectively. Agriculturalists are resistant to 
the division of their estates which they hold as a corporate patriline; 
pastoralists have an interest in maintaining and defending their patrilinear 
claim to pastureland, and to prevent any divisions of their flock, particularly 
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since sheep herding requires a flock of optimal size42. This may be 
particularly salient where patterns of co-heredity are not simplified by high 
mortality rates (Goody 1983, p. 121). 
Inheritance directives, as Tillion observes, place Muslims who derive their 
subsistence from a corporate patrimony, whether agrarian, pastoral or some 
combination of the two, into a theological quandary: do they follow the tenets 
of their religion, or do they safeguard the interests of the corporate family, 
within very different economic models for survival? Given that the 
inheritance directive is in the Qur’an itself, it is difficult for any professing 
Muslim to evade its implications. As married women remain dependent upon 
their brothers and fathers for shelter and support in the event of marital 
breakdown, it is an easy, and indeed a common, strategy for men to dissuade 
female relatives from asserting their right to inheritance through providing a 
guarantee of support on such an occasion. However, Muslim women retain, in 
potentia, a jural right to claim their portion, vouchsafed by the most 
authoritative text within the Islamic faith. This potential disruption to the 
material basis of the family can be circumvented through ordaining 
endogamous marriage, suggests Tillion, which has the effect of binding a 
woman into the corporate family through marriage, and thereby assimilating 
her interests into those of the collective. It is as if, she tartly observes, women 
                                                        
42 Flocks below this optimum level will not herd together and become impossible to control 
(Lindner 1983, p. 57). 
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gain control over property at the expense of losing control over their bodies 
(1966/2007, p. 42).  
While anxieties around inheritance rights and the wish to maintain control 
over patrimony may account for cousin marriage becoming a widespread 
strategy, it does not account for the explicit preference for patrilaterality. 
Zoroastrians also practised cousin marriage, and women also inherit (and 
inheritance is technically equal between brothers and sisters, rather than the 
half-share that Muslim women receive), but there is no lateral preference 
(Fischer 1973). So Tillion’s explanation may provide a starting point, but 
does not account for laterality, nor take account of the common cultural 
techniques for evading women’s Islamic right to inheritance.  
Marriage and fraternal relationships 
‘The preferential right of a man to his [father’s brother’s daughter] actually 
entails a relationship between two men, the groom and the bride’s fathers,’ as 
Charrad identifies (2001, p. 59). Prescribing cousin marriage on the father’s 
side is a productive strategy where it serves the purpose of solidifying 
relationships between brothers (Holý 1989), relationships which are 
particularly significant in plough-based farming economies (Goody 1976), 
which rely upon collective male labour to function. This ability of endogamy 
to consolidate power and property has long been a facet of dynastic power, 
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from the brother-sister marriages of Ancient Egypt, to the patterns of PPC 
marriage found in the family of Constantine the Great (Goody 1983, p. 53).  
Tensions between brothers who share juridical property rights may threaten 
the transmission of patrimony even more than women’s inheritance through 
threatening the cooperative basis of agricultural labour. Fraternal relations 
lack the clear age hierarchies established in primogeniture, which is the 
European solution for maintaining an undivided patrimony. Men may be 
discouraged from demanding exclusive use of their own portion of land, or 
from requiring the division of a flock, where such actions would cause uneasy 
relationships between themselves and their brothers and nephews/son-in-
laws, which would thereby disadvantage their own daughters and 
grandchildren. Cousin marriage effectively ties a father’s interest in his own 
descendants to those of his fraternal relations. This may be particularly 
valuable if the death of a father in a classically patriarchal household leads to 
a frérèche – an acephalous household shared by brothers, which can be 
particularly vulnerable to fission.  
Holý (1989) argues that PPC’s tendency to increase male solidarity is a 
particularly valuable strategy within an environment of tribal contestations. 
He notes that in Kurdish regions, tribal ashireh Kurds, who are more likely to 
have greater needs for solidarity in the face of tribal rivalries have a higher 
level of PPC marriage than their non-tribal, less belligerent, sedentary peers. 
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This is a salient challenge against a position that places the containment of 
female inheritance as a sole motivation – ashireh Kurds, as members of a 
tribal grouping which may be nomadic or transhumant, locate solidarity 
within a notional patriline, and have a commitment to lineage which 
supersedes that of their commitment to land, whereas Kurds engaged in 
sedentary farming, have a more permanent relationship with their land, as 
the source of their livelihoods, rather than with their comparatively low-
status patrilines. They may also find it valuable to renew matrilateral 
connectivities through successive matrilateral cousin marriages, a strategy 
known as the renchaînement d’alliance (Richard 1993).  
As Yalçin-Heckman (1991) finds, tribal identifications must be constantly 
reinscribed through the making and remaking of kinship and other linkages.  
Patrilateral cousin marriage maintains and reproduces both patrimony and 
patriline by the same token. In times of conflict it is clearly a poor strategy to 
increase the reproductive potential of a rival clan. Conjecturally, if a society 
were to regulate its marriage practices entirely through PPC, all relationships 
would become agnatic and vertical, with no external horizontal relationships 
outside the patriclan which could mediate or discourage inter-clan hostilities. 
Thus, PPC will tend towards a continual regeneration and reinscription of the 
brittle, vertical structures of segmentary agnation which would tend to 
increase inter-tribal hostilities. In combination, these various motivations 
suggest a potential cyclical structure with a general tendency to increase 
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cousin marriage over the long term, particularly in situations where access to 
land and water becomes contested. Endogamous marriage preserves 
corporate property, but also tends to increase segmentation which in turn 
leads to hostility between families, tribes and clans. These contestations 
increase the requirement for male solidarity — which is formed through 
endogamous alliances.  
Thus, cousin marriage may appear as the consolidatory phase of a patriline 
— not least because any man who founds a new patriline is, perforce, a man 
who is distanced from his own agnates. Kressel (1992) finds that amongst the 
Bedouin of Ramla and Lod, cousin marriage does not occur until a patriline 
reaches the third or fourth generation, suggesting that in its early stages, a 
patriline is reliant on exogamous linkages to build social capital but that 
subsequently a successful patriline turns inwards as it becomes self-reliant in 
social and reproductive capacities. Kressel also finds that the networks of 
interfamilial reciprocity are delicately balanced, recounting an example 
where one individual within a family refused to accept a PPC marriage which 
ultimately led to chaos, bloodshed and long-lasting enmities across an entire 
extended family which he describes at length (1992, pp. 106-113). Thus, 
normative cousin marriage, through knitting the interests of several 
individuals together through kinship, risks a tumultuous disruption in the 
event of unravelling. The impetus for families to enforce and reciprocate 
cousin marriages is therefore strong. 
A MICROSOCIOLOGY OF MARRIAGE FORMS  
 
 
 152 
Khuri (1970), within a Freudian framing, suggests that the strategic merit of 
PPC marriage is that it tends to reproduce the family without changing its 
structure, leaving existing patterns of power and eroticism intact; through a 
transformation of kinship status for the marrying couple, rather than the 
insertion of an interloper into the family, established kinship and domestic 
structures are maintained without significant alterations. PPC marriage 
builds stasis into the family, through introducing no new affines, who could 
threaten the established familial order. PPC marriages are not just the 
‘normal’ form of marriage that Yalçın-Heckmann observed in Hakkari, they 
are also, in the words of a Kurdish informant, the ‘safest’ marriage formation 
(cf. Fricke et al. 1986, p. 493). Women are necessary for the reproduction of 
the patriline, but as interlopers within the virilocal household, they may hold 
a dangerous potential to threaten its continuity and cohesion. Related 
women, already inculcated with the family’s values, sharing, to some degree, 
their goals and interests, pose a lesser existential threat to the collective. 
From the other direction, containing female relatives within the family 
lessens their ability to share family secrets or ‘dishonour’ their family in front 
of unrelated persons. As potential loose threads, women are knitted back into 
the body of the family so they cannot snag or pull, and unravel the family 
reputation. 
Containment is also the aim in marriages designed, and even coerced, to 
‘save’ ‘honour’; where a woman has become suspected of ‘dishonourable’ 
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behaviour, it may be considered the duty of a cousin to step forward and 
provide a ‘respectable’ face-saving marriage. Zahra al-Azzo was 15 years old 
when she was kidnapped and raped. Her cousin married her in order to ‘save 
her reputation’, but this was not considered adequate by the collective. Her 
family dispatched her brother to kill her, to the dismay of the widower, who 
had developed a genuine affection for the young woman. Indicating the 
collective and public nature of such killings, news of Zahra’s death was 
celebrated with festivities in which her entire natal village participated 
(Zoepf 2007). 
Cousin marriages are not only the ‘safest’ form for the family’s property, the 
family’s cohesion and the family’s ‘honour’, they may also be relatively safer 
for the woman involved, as the degree of relatedness reduces the hazards of 
patrilocality for incoming brides. Cousin marriages have a lesser tendency 
toward intimate partner violence than exogamous marriages, as the 
daughter-in-law/niece is not in the extremely isolated and vulnerable 
position of a stranger-bride within patrilocal societies, who enters a 
household having little affective ties to the household (Ottenheimer 1986, p. 
936), but on the contrary, has a network of relatives ready to intercede in the 
case of abuse. Lower rates of psychiatric morbidity are recorded in cousin 
marriage than any other forms in Jordan, for instance (Daradkeh et al. 2006). 
Fricke et al. (1986) find that women married to cousins tend to be older at 
the age of marriage than those married for bridewealth. This, Fricke et al. 
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hypothesise, is due to the regime of agnatic surveillance: cousins, being part 
of that regime, do not need a child-bride to guarantee themselves of her 
virginity and pliability, as they can remain confident in their collective 
contribution to policing her behaviour, and have an intimate knowledge of 
the parental order under which she has been socialised. 
Despite such advantages, such marriages may be difficult to exit in the case of 
violence or incompatibility. In all cases where marriages are arranged by a 
collective, divorce has wider effects on more persons than the marital dyad 
and their children, including the loss of social ties — with possible economic 
ramifications. Where the couple are related this can lead to dangerous 
schisms between close relatives, which are deeply hazardous to group 
cohesion. That divorce rates are low in some forms of cousin marriage (Afzal 
et al. 1994) thus cannot be taken to indicate that such marriages are 
particularly satisfactory for the couples involved, but that the social costs of 
divorce are very much higher when a couple are already closely related. 
Indeed, the low levels of fertility and higher rates of divorce associated with 
cousin marriages in other environments are often adduced as examples of 
the Westermarck effect, a developmental explanation of incest avoidance 
which posits that people raised together from childhood are disinclined to 
become sexually attracted to each other in adulthood (McCabe 1983; Chapais 
2008, pp. 66-67). 
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A Moroccan proverb states that “He who marries the daughter of his father’s 
brother is like him who celebrates his feasts with a sheep from his own flock” 
(Webster 1982, p. 180). Women married to cousins are like sheep bred to be 
sacrificed for weddings in one sense: they are beings raised from birth for the 
explicit purpose of consolidating and reproducing the patriline. There are 
strong expectations within every society for a person to identify potential 
sexual partners within a particular category, whether this be class, caste or 
within kingroups, with social penalties upon those who do not comply.  To 
explicitly prefer another person outside the permitted categories for sexual 
expression is not merely a defiance of patriarchal power, but can be 
conceptualised as an act of sexual deviance.  
Barth finds that murders of Kurdish women and girls who refused their 
cousins were ‘not infrequent’ (1953, p. 28). In A Voice from Kurdistan43 Rauf 
and Mohammedi record that: 
 On 23rd August 1994, Shadieh Hassan Rasool Tayraheh was shot dead 
by her cousin in the city of Erbil, because she refused to marry him.  
 Chinar Abdulkhaliq was immolated by her cousin in Makhmoor 
district because she refused to marry him.  
 In early June 1997, Chiman Ali Mineh Soor was stoned to death by the 
men of her tribe, in Ismaeel Abad, a village near the Shelair district. 
                                                        
43 A Voice from Kurdistan is a Kurdish language pamphlet prepared by local activists Rega 
Rauf and Muzaffar Mohammedi, listing ‘honour’ killings and suicides across the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq between the years 1991 and 1999. A translation can be viewed at 
http://joannepayton.me.uk/wp/?page_id=1156 
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She refused to marry her cousin, and was accused of having had a 
sexual relationship with a man.  
While the first two crimes appear, at least on the surface, to be individual 
acts, ‘crimes of passion’ arising in an environment where male cousins 
enforce their presumptive rights over the bodies of their kin, the last is 
clearly collective, the act of a family acting in concert as a corporate unit.  
Such collective violence can also be seen in the most notorious case of a 
collective murder within recent Kurdish history, the death by lapidation of 
Du’a Khalil Aswad, mentioned earlier in this thesis. Du’a was a member of the 
minority Yezidi religion, under which women do not have inheritance rights; 
nevertheless, PPC marriage is practised within this group (Allison 2001b, p. 
137). She eloped with a young Muslim man and requested protection from 
his family. They were reluctant to shelter her due to the dangers of 
exacerbating tensions between the Yezidi and Muslim communities. Islamist 
propaganda portrayed the Yezidi as infidels and devil-worshippers44, leading 
in turn, to reactive and defensive organisation amongst Yezidi males, and a 
proliferation of inter-community hostility. Without the support of her 
inamorato and his family, Du’a appealed to state and religious authorities for 
protection, but these handed her back to her killers.  
Her murder was carried out against the wishes of her own parents who 
remain ‘shamed’ within the community, as it was believed they did not 
                                                        
44 This prejudice against the ancient sect forms a catastrophic part of the actions of the self-
styled Islamic State against the Yezidi minority in 2014, which includes the enslavement of 
Yezidi women and girls. 
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discourage her elopement. They did not participate in the stoning, which was 
instigated by the paternal uncle, carried out by cousins, and observed by the 
male population of the village, who recorded and distributed the event on 
their mobile phones, leading to enormous media attention and local and 
international abhorrence. In this situation the assumed ‘rights’ of cousins as 
prospective suitors overweighed the potency of the nominal paterfamilias to 
determine his daughter’s fate, and were accepted as such by the observers, 
and by the security forces who observed the murder without intervention. 
Thus ‘honour’ is similar to PPC in distributing presumed rights over the body 
of a woman to a family collective. Meeker (1976) notes that there is a 
distinction between those societies where a husband is permitted to kill for 
‘honour’, and those where the responsibility remains with the victim’s 
agnates (see also Tapper 1991, p. 16). The latter appears to be the case in 
Middle Eastern understandings of HBV (Payton 2014). The responsibility 
remains with the collective, insists Meeker, within societies in which 
endogamy prevails. Cousins, singly and collectively, as presumed potential 
future spouses, retain a residual responsibility and ‘right’ over a woman’s 
body even before marriage – the ‘right’ of access feeds into a motivation to 
control, monitor and discipline; to assume the attitude of a jealous and 
custodial husband in advance of marriage. Thus if a woman is suspected of a 
premarital relationship it may not be perceived as an indiscretion, but as an 
adulterous act against a group of men whose expectations are that she will 
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ultimately be married to one of their number, and a failure to meet family 
obligations on the part her father and brothers.  
Through the institution of cousin marriage, a presumptive allocation of 
‘rights’ of access to a woman’s body, and responsibility for her behaviour, 
derives from the moment of her birth onto a collective of related males, 
which is able to form both a surveillance network, and if need be, to take part 
in a murder. Thus, the normative expectation of cousin marriage creates a 
basis for the collective and familial control of women by their cousins, aunts 
and uncles and other patrilineal relations, whose interest in safeguarding her 
‘virtue’ is not merely deployed in the service of collective family reputation, 
but also in an individuated and possessive interest in her as a potential bride 
or affine. 
Direct exchange marriage 
Aveen Ali, 14, was only four years old when she entered into an 
exchange marriage. “Out of ten girls in my extended family, six other 
girls and I were married as kids,” she said. One of her uncles had 
fallen in love with a woman and had asked for her hand, but the 
woman’s family had requested a girl in return. Aveen … along with 
three of her cousins was exchanged for her uncle’s bride.  
 
“My father and my uncles didn’t regard us as human beings. We 
were sacrificed for their love,” she said. (Mohammad 2007) 
Jin be jine, literally meaning ‘a woman for a woman’, is a form of marriage in 
which one girl is directly exchanged for another, which has been long 
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recorded amongst Kurds in Iraq (Leach 1940; Barth 1953; Hansen 1961; 
Dzięgel 1982; Taysi 2009). Marriage by exchange is also recorded in the first 
written history of the Kurdish peoples, the Sharafnâma (Bitlîsî 1597/2005, p. 
21, verse 43). Direct exchange marriage is described by Kurds in Turkey as 
berdel, by Afghans as badal (Kargar 2011), makhtiar (Tapper 1981) or alish 
(Tapper 1991, p. 149), and by Pakistanis as watta-satta (Jacoby and Mansuri 
2007).  
Marriage by direct exchange is rare on a global scale (Schlegel and Eloui 
1988, p. 294), and is primarily associated with societies characterised by a 
horticultural means of production, lower levels of economic complexity and 
little accumulation of property (p. 296), and as such is somewhat unexpected 
within a country with an economy based in petroleum exports. It is probably 
due to the impoverishment of the practitioners that such marriages are 
considered the lowest status form of legitimate marriage (Dzięgel 1982, p. 
258; Fricke et al. 1986, p. 494; Jacoby and Mansuri 2007; Ertem and Kocturk 
2008). Jin be jine allows cash-poor communities and families to build 
technically exogamous but local alliances that accrue local solidarity without 
the necessity of raising brideprice. They create a quadrangular relationship 
which links the destinies of four persons, and which duplicates the 
connection between the respective patrilines. The categories of exogamy and 
endogamy effectively become unified through simultaneity. 
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A project to register the prevalence of jin be jine marriage within the KRI in 
support of a campaign by Kurdish MP Sara Faqe, which resulted in 5% of the 
female population of the Pshdar region coming forward to declare their 
marriages as being conducted by exchange (Mohammad 2007). Such 
enthusiasm for Faqe’s project suggests far wider prevalence in practice, 
where many of those married in this fashion were very likely to be unaware 
of the initiative, unable or unwilling to come forward, or may not have 
supported her abolitionist stance. In Turkey, Ilkkaracan (2001) also found 
that one in 20 of her sample population in the Kurdish dominated region was 
married via berdel. Kudat et al. (2000) found 17% of marriages of this type in 
villages on the Şanliurfa-Hurran plains of North-Eastern Turkey. Within some 
of the village-based micro-environments created by the rugged and 
mountainous landscape of Kurdish regions it may be almost universal, such 
as the town of Karacadağ, where over 95% of marriages are reported to take 
the form of direct exchange (Esmer 2010).  
Direct exchange forms of marriage benefit families with several daughters 
through accruing wealth and/or female labour to the patriline, particularly 
where polygyny is practised. Abdullah Ahmed, a Kurdish Pshdari man with 
one brother and seven sisters, divorced three wives upon reaching maturity 
and deciding upon a love marriage. Each had been contracted to him in 
exchange for one of his sisters by his father during his childhood 
(Mohammad 2007). The elder generation may also use exchange forms of 
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marriage to accrue additional wives for themselves rather than their sons, 
trading their daughters and nieces (Esmer 2010). For Sorani-speaking Kurds, 
the term gewre be biçûk45 may also be used to denote jin be jine where there 
is a generational gap (Hassanpour 2001) — where one or more young girls 
are exchanged for an adult woman. A rough local rate of exchange holds two 
prepubescent girls as the equivalent of one fertile woman: ‘A visitor would 
give us one of his daughters for two children,’ stated Mula Ahmed, an elderly 
villager from Rania, KRI (Johnstone 2009). 
Status matching in direct exchange marriage 
Berdel marriages require an absolute symmetry: from an equal number of 
attendees from each family to identical gifts of jewellery to the bride or 
furniture to the marital home (Esmer 2010), with some ceremonies even 
taking place across a bridge over which brides cross simultaneously from 
opposite ends (Ersen 2002), like spies passing over Glienicke Bridge in a Le 
Carré novel.  
Marriages, like many collective ceremonies, function as displays of social 
status: in direct exchange ceremonies, displays of social and cultural capital 
are carefully calibrated in order to give an appearance of parity. Ersen 
witnessed a marriage ceremony which almost ended in violent acrimony due 
                                                        
45 Literally, ‘a big [woman] for a small [girl]’ 
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to one family’s perception that the other had exceeded their allowance of 
guests. ‘Balanced [marital] exchanges,’ says Collier (1988, p. 103), ‘establish a 
dyadic relationship in which the exchangers are equal,’ — or, at the very 
least, must appear to be so. 
Sahlins (1974) outlines a schema of the political economies of non-state 
societies based in spheres of reciprocity: the household stands as a central 
unit in which members are expected to participate for the benefit of the 
collective as a whole, where the goods and services are considered to be 
communal (‘generalised reciprocity’); but each degree of removal from the 
household increases the tension around any form of transaction.  
Mapping the forms of traditional marriage discussed in this chapter onto 
Sahlins’ schema reveals that the differing nature of the transactions 
connected with each different form of marriage is related to their relative 
distance from the household.  
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Figure 5.4: Forms of marriage overlaid upon Sahlins’ (1974) diagram of spheres of reciprocity in simple economic 
systems 
Cousin marriage, operating at the smallest possible degree of removal from 
the household is the ‘safest’ form, in being the closest to ‘generalised 
reciprocity’, occasioning little in the way of financial recompense; outside the 
village or tribe ingroups, in the zone of ‘negative reciprocity’, transactions 
and negotiations are likely to be characterised by asymmetry, and hence 
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insecurity and concern. Jin be jine, which tends to take place at the level of the 
village and tribe, falls in an intermediate position between these two forms, 
striving for the delicate equilibrium of ‘balanced reciprocity’.  Transactions 
which occur within the village/tribe but outside the direct lineage, for 
Sahlins, are marked by anxiety, where parity in all dealings must be made 
explicit, at the risk of producing resentment which could trigger feuds and 
schisms, endangering the collective life of the community.  
Fiske (1992) describes ‘equality matched’ interactions as ‘a relational 
structure where people can compare differences and use the operations of 
addition and subtraction to assess imbalance’, where favours and goods 
given and received are recorded on a mental ledger to ensure that such 
transactions do not incur any cause for grievance between persons and 
families over time, and that the relationship is not unfair on either 
transacting party. 
The requirement of absolute reciprocity in direct exchange marriage 
demands that both couples divorce in the event of one marital breakdown. 
Ahmet Börek, a young Kurdish man happily married through berdel in 
Turkey, explains that ‘the brother is his sister’s shadow,’ and that he would 
not hesitate to break up his own marriage if his sister’s failed. The only 
alternative for Ahmet and his wife in this instance would be a payment of 
brideprice, changing the form of the transaction from direct exchange to a 
cash basis. This may be resisted by the groom’s family through a lost pride 
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over the failure of reciprocity (Ersen 2002) — which can, according to 
journalist Sebnem Eras, lead to violent tribal and interfamilial clashes (Das 
2010). Alinia (2013, p. 121) recounts the effects of one direct exchange 
marriage deal that went sour, which disproportionately fall upon the bride 
due to the patricentric ordering of Kurdish society. HK was married through 
direct exchange at 13 years of age, however, ‘HK’s husband’s family refused 
to give their daughter to HK’s brother…HK’s marriage was dissolved and she 
was sent back to her family. Her husband’s family kept her baby, who was 
five months old.’  
Jacoby and Mansuri (2007) propose that similar exchange marriages in 
Pakistan operate to reduce the mistreatment of brides, pointing to lower 
levels of estrangement, violence and depression in watta-satta marriage. In 
what they acknowledge as a sub-optimal solution for the widespread nature 
of domestic violence against women in Pakistan, they suggest that a man may 
feel restrained from beating his wife, if he knows that by so doing his sister 
may be beaten in reprisal.  
It is usual for a woman’s first port of call in the case of abuse to be to her 
natal family, who remain invested in her well-being (Haj-Yahia 2000; Haj-
Yahia and Sadan 2008), where she may be repelled or supported, or where 
particularly enraged brothers may pay the abuser back in his own coin 
(Morsy 1990). Such arrangements increase women’s dependency on males: 
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‘[a] woman whose brothers refuse to take her in is at the mercy of her 
husband, just as a woman whose husband renounces her is at the mercy of 
her brothers,’ (Collier 1988, p. 117). 
This ‘argument from deterrence’ neglects the distasteful corollary that 
implies that a man, upon learning his sister has been beaten, appears to be 
obliged to reciprocate this violence upon the body of his wife, rather than 
through a direct intervention to the abuser. So while such relational 
mirroring may encourage restraint, it also has a clear capacity to lead to 
escalation, where women may become hostages to proliferating male rivalry 
expressed through their own bodies. That such a stratagem is, at least 
according to Jacoby and Mansuri, more effective than otherwise, suggests 
that men may have closer affective ties to their sisters than to their wives, as 
could be inferred from Ahmet’s declaration of support for his sister. Joseph’s 
(1999) examination of the dynamics of love and power within Middle Eastern 
brother-sister relationships indicates a high level of connectivity between 
cross-gendered siblings — in which brothers groom their sisters to conform 
to masculine requirements for their future marriages, within a relationship 
which forms the closest approximation to adolescent love-play permissible in 
societies where male/female contact is delimited. 
The berdel commitment between families extends beyond the life of the 
woman, where a widower may take his widow’s sister through sororate, or 
request that his widow’s natal family pays half the brideprice required to 
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replace her (Das 2010), indicating that maintaining the alliance formed by a 
direct exchange marriage is the most crucial aspect for the life of the 
community. In this sense, if direct exchange forms do form a disincentive for 
spousal violence, this appears more likely to be an epiphenomenon than a 
motivation for the adoption of the form. The mirroring of the relationship is 
more likely to express a requirement for marital permanence than marital 
accord, a counter to the availability of divorce under Islamic law. 
Compensation marriage 
It is very common for a girl to be given away in marriage in 
payment of blood money. Thus if £90 is owing, the price of the blood 
of one man, the debt might be paid by the delivery of one girl, three 
cows and a donkey. (Leach 1940, p. 56) 
Badal khueen, literally meaning blood substitute46 or jin be xwên (woman-for-
blood), is the distinct form of exchange marriage mentioned in the 
Sharafnâma, where it serves as a means of averting blood-feuds and vendetta 
killings, often brokered by arbitrators attempting to mediate tribal disputes. 
Women married under badal khueen may not divorce and are required to 
sever any contact with their natal family; as Leach indicates two girls in 
marriage were considered the equivalent of the blood-money for the death of 
one man.  Such ‘compensation’ marriages are practised in current times in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan under the names of swara or vani. The young bride 
                                                        
46 Etymology provided by Dr Azad Osman, University of Arbil, Northern Iraq. Such marriages 
are known as fasliyah in Arabic, and swari and vani in Urdu. 
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— who may well be a child for whom no other arrangement has yet been 
made — may be mistreated by the family in reprisal for the initial killing of 
their kinsman (Minallah 2004; Kargar 2011 ch. 4). Bird interviewed a 
Kurdish agha who was involved in dispute mediation still deploying badal 
khueen as a means of building family reconciliation in the aftermath of 
murders, and disputes over ‘honour’ and land, in order to avoid blood feuds. 
He told her: 
Sometimes I resolve two or three killings a month, sometimes only 
one a year. The people come to me, and I try to reconcile their two 
families, with offers of money, or women, or land. 
(Bird 2005, p. 234) 
Bird observes that it is the poor, unable to raise blood money, who are most 
likely to marry off their daughters in such forms of reconciliation.  
Reciprocity and ‘honour’ 
Taysi assumes a causal relationship between direct exchange forms of 
marriage and ‘honour’-based violence (2009, p. 40); indeed areas like Sindh 
in Pakistan, Pshdar in the KRI, North-East Turkey, and rural Afghanistan 
combine a notoriety ‘honour’ killings with a wider prevalence of direct 
exchange marriage. While co-occurrence is an inadequate grounding for such 
presumption, particularly when there are many other commonalities 
amongst societies where it is practised (Schlegel and Eloui 1988), it is 
possible to speculate about potentially hazardous aspects of this form of 
marriage within the Middle Eastern context. Sev’er (2005), for instance, 
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commenting on the premeditated honour killing of ‘Semse’ identifies her as 
having been married in a direct exchange format, observing that if one of the 
brides in the pairing ‘is unacceptable — not a virgin, the other family may 
retroactively insist on bride-price. In such cases, either family may consider 
killing the woman who spoiled the deal.’ 
Concerns about ‘spoiling the deal’ are very pertinent. In Guizh, a mountain 
village in Rania, KRI, a young women immolated herself47 rather than enter 
an exchange marriage which had been arranged for her. Her mother, Peroz 
Ali, told a reporter from Al Jazeera: 
I said to my daughter you will bring us shame if you don’t marry. 
Now I wish I had accepted her decision. We have to stop the mullahs 
and the villagers from doing this. (Johnstone 2009) 
Here the daughter’s ‘shame’ is not related to any sense of sexual 
misbehaviour, but through rendering the family unable to fulfil an obligation. 
The potential for ‘dishonour’, in this sense, lies not ‘between a woman’s legs’, 
in Mernissi’s pungently crude phrase (1985), but rather between the pages of 
an unbalanced ledger, in a failure to conform to the political and economic 
norms of communal reciprocity. ’Honour’ in this context has a greater 
relationship to bext, the principle of fair-dealing, than namûs. Guizh villagers, 
galvanised by the tragedy, told Al Jazeera’s reporter they sought to reject the 
                                                        
47 This is a very common method of suicide in the KRI, and one which is particularly used by 
women and girls (Rasool and Payton, 2014). 
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custom of jin be jine. This could not be effected by a mere pronouncement, 
however, but required the ‘renegotiation of contracts’ (Johnstone 2009). Not 
all Guizh males and families could be expected to show the liberality with 
which Abdullah Ahmed released his three brides in Pshdar; they might 
instead demand alternative forms of compensation in terms of cash or goods 
which the families of their promised brides might be unable to muster. 
The concern for a status parity and reciprocity which is intrinsic to direct 
exchange forms of marriage suggests deep-seated structural tensions. 
Neither purely collective nor individualistic, the segmentary nature of Middle 
Eastern kinship patterns leads to ‘complementary oppositions between 
lineage segments of equal depth, and a structuring of violence on 
genealogical grounds,’ (Lindholm 1986, p. 343). Agrarian/pastoralist 
societies, largely lacking horizontal divisions of class or occupational 
differentiation, are vertically divided into patrilines, with little means of 
establishing hierarchy between most men, besides appeals to the depth, in 
terms of patrilinear history, and breadth, in terms of the number of 
supporters a family can count upon, either to back them in blood feuds or 
make political intercessions upon their behalf. 
As McDowall (1996, p. 9) observes,  
…in Kurdish society, like others dependent upon strong blood ties, a 
quarrel between two people is almost a contradiction in terms. No 
relatives of someone in a dispute can easily stand apart since they 
are required to take their relative’s side. Thus all disputes take on a 
dangerous factional quality. 
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In such an antagonistic scenario, marked by transient loyalties, cross-familial 
alliances are necessary for self-defence and internal harmony — but are 
ultimately fragile in nature. ‘Our families did not marry them, but we did not 
fight each other,’ remarked Yezidi agronomist Akim Saringovitch Farizian in 
1996, speaking of neighbouring Muslim villages (Meiselas 1997, p. 35), 
suggesting that these two distinct categories — the people with whom one 
intermarries, and the people with whom one fights, have a diametrical 
relationship. Indeed, the insular Pashtun Durrani describe themselves as ‘one 
people among whom women are exchanged’ (Tapper 1981, p. 392). The 
Yezidi eschew intermarriage with Muslims in order to shore up their internal 
solidarity and consolidate and protect their minority religious identity, yet 
this, as earlier pages have demonstrated, leaves them vulnerable to attacks 
from the more populous Muslim Kurds with no marital alliances to bridge the 
communities. 
This picture of ‘honour’ we see in the Guizh case, then, is markedly different 
from the obsession with female comportment which has been described by 
Kurdish and Turkish respondents (Kardam 2005; Sır 2005; Taysi 2009), but 
relates to a family’s ability to build suitable political alliances, and to follow 
through on any marital contracts which have been arranged. This aspect of 
‘honour’, in terms of meeting obligations, seems consonant with the agonistic 
nature of interfamilial relations described above. It could be considered that 
all exogamous marriage alliances take place between potential antagonists, 
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and represent an attempt to recruit the other family as allies, or to neutralise 
any potential threat they represent, through recruiting them into kinship 
relations: a manoeuvre which is made particularly explicit in the practice of 
badal khueen. The delicate concern with status matching during marriage 
ceremonies bespeaks caution, forming an explicit display that both sides are 
entering into a mutual alliance in good faith. 
However, the intense fixation on status-matching during marriage 
negotiations and ceremonies can only allay the volatile nature of interfamilial 
relations to a certain degree. One gold bracelet may have an equal weight to 
another, but the primary axis of exchange — one woman for another, 
exchanging one family for another — can never be made upon a basis of 
equilibrium, as no two women, men or families are identical. Even where 
there is little occupational variation within genders, there remain physical, 
mental, intellectual and dispositional differences between any two persons 
which will inflect their roles as spouses. Sacks (1982, pp. 224-225) also finds 
there are integral contradictions between the roles of sister and wife in 
lineage-oriented societies — ‘[a] wife’s subordinate relationship to her 
husband and his lineage was ideologically in sharp contrast to the sisterly 
equality in her own.’ It is in the families’ interests to groom the departing 
bride in the image of her shadow, as Joseph’s observations (1999) suggest; as 
the reflection of the docile reproducer of the patriline that they wish to 
recruit to their number, a method of smoothing the transition from sisterly 
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equality to the deference appropriate to a wife and daughter-in-law within a 
patricentric household.  
As a form of symbolic capital as well as a social norm, namûs represents an 
available personal attribute which, unlike attractiveness, personality or 
character, can be rendered into some level of uniformity and some sense of 
equivalence in instrumental terms. Conformity to a normative code of female 
behaviour would tend to maintain the delicate balance of status matching, 
avoiding giving grounds for grievance to the family sought as allies.  
This inculcates a strong motivation for a family to police their kinswomen so 
that they are less likely to occasion challenges to the parallel relationship 
through any questions over her ‘honour,’ which would void the alliance and 
create antagonistic relations. Unlike lineage endogamous marriage, where 
the incomer bride largely shares the background of her spouse, direct 
exchange marriage locates a newlywed within an alien family, and with an 
unknown spouse, whose norms of behaviour and expectations may be 
different from those of her own household. Namûs functions as a normative, 
catallactically defined standard for wifehood, an assurance of a woman’s 
suitability to the role she must play to maintain her own relationship, the 
relationship between her kinsman and his wife, the wider relationship 
between the families involved — and ultimately, in maintaining the gender 
relations of the society as whole.  
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Young women are hostages not merely to the relationship of their ‘shadow’ 
but also to political disputes between patrilines due to their liminal role in 
both families; either divorcing, or ‘occasioning’ divorce through a perceived 
failure to conform to the expectations of marriage in terms of namûs, will 
jettison the social capital gained through the alliances.  
The shadow relationship of jin be jine links individuals and families to the 
wider political economy of marriage in a very direct sense; through deploying 
instrumental marriages to create alliances within a geographically delimited 
community, delicately poised between hostility and interdependence, women 
become embodied conduits, in Rubin’s (1975) sense, of strategic relations 
between families, a position which is crucial for the political survival of the 
family, but which places them in a position of extreme vulnerability through 
requiring them to embody communally defined norms of marriageability in 
order to maintain the alliance. 
Exogamy and brideprice 
My mother…was fourteen years old when someone came from my 
village and told my father about her…My father went to get her and 
brought some jewels. Her family accepted him, he, of course, paid 
something, and so she left with him. Still today families make the 
negotiations and still must pay.  
Kurdish agha, interviewed in 1996 (in Meiselas 1997, p. 36) 
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Bridewealth, referred to (twice) in the quote above, tends to occur in 
societies where corporate unilineal descent groups predominate. It is 
frequently associated with exogamous marriage, rather than the cousin 
endogamy in which payments are small or fictive, or the precise matching of 
direct exchange marriages, which tend to occur within a framework of 
village-level endogamy. Both of these forms are, indeed, frequently 
rationalised as a method of evading marital prestations. Thus substantial 
bridewealth payments frequently co-occur with exogamy, implying the 
displacement of a girl or woman from her agnates and her reinstatement 
within the affinal family. This may also be a chance to display status, 
particularly since exogamous marriage is considered a prestigious form for 
wife-takers (Yalçın-Heckman 1991, p. 236).  
While the most common marital prestations occurring within the 
organisation of marriage — bridewealth and dowry — operate in opposite 
directions, these cannot be considered as mirror images of each other, 
because the recipient of the prestation is different in each case. Dowries 
function as pre-mortem inheritance, as start-up capital for a new household 
in a manner similar to a wedding list at a department store, and can be an act 
of parental investment by the bride’s parents into the household, supporting 
the wellbeing of future grandchildren. They may also be a method of ‘buying’ 
status through hypergamous marriages, where the bride comes from a lower 
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socioeconomic stratum or caste than the groom, enabling cross-generational 
social mobility (Nasrin 2011). 
Under Islam, marriages require the payment of mehr, considerations which 
accrue directly to the bride, and which can be considered as a form of 
bridewealth (Bell 1998). The amount of mehr is even specified on state-
issued Iraqi marriage certificates. Mehr can be described as a form of indirect 
dowry or ‘morning gift’, with precedents in Judaic and Zoroastrian practice. 
In common with the rabbinic mohar (Satlow 2001, p. 214) established by 
Shimon ben Shathach (c. 120-40 BCE), mehr is often at least partially 
promissory, serving as a divorce settlement where wives have no claim to 
their husband’s property in the event of male-initiated marital dissolution. 
This aspect of mehr supposedly discourages men from recklessly divorcing 
their wives by repudiation and also provides some financial support for 
widowed and divorced women between marriages48. Busby describes gifts to 
brides amongst the Kurds as follows: 
The cost to the groom’s family is substantial. The amount varies 
depending on the social and financial status of the families involved. 
Between poor families the groom’s family will be expected to buy a 
complete set of clothes, including shoes, and perhaps a dresser. They 
must also provide at least one each of the following items of gold: a 
bracelet or watch, a ring, a neckchain, a pair of earrings, and a gold 
coin to be hung from the chain…If the families are wealthy, more 
gold is required. The number of rings, earrings and bracelets, 
                                                        
48 Women who initiate divorce on their own behalves waive their rights to mehr and are 
obliged to repay any monies received prior to marriage. This can lead to dissatisfied 
husbands reluctant to pay mehr mistreating their wives in the hope that they will become 
desperate enough to waive their financial rights in order to escape abuse (Kamal 1998). 
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lengths of chain and number of coins are all stipulated and may cost 
several thousand dollars. (1994, pp. 10-11) 
For one recent Kurdish groom, these demands amounted to some $12,700 
(Rûdaw 2013). This can be an opportunity for families to make conspicuous 
displays of wealth. Such gold and jewellery becomes the possession of the 
wife, forming a pragmatic method of preserving capital and achieving 
financial security in an environment where there is no modern banking 
system and the currency has historically been vulnerable to hyperinflation 
and collapse.  
However, the main focus of this section will relate to marital payments which 
enrich the patriline, rather than those which provide financial security to the 
daughter/bride. These payments to the bride’s patriline are referred to as 
naqd in Arabic, or şîrbayî (milkprice) or xönbayî (bloodprice) in Kurdish 
(Hassanpour 2001). This type of payment to the family of a bride will be 
referred to as brideprice in order to position it as a subcategory of 
bridewealth which in contradistinction to mehr, although as these are 
frequently simultaneously negotiated, they may in practice be somewhat 
muddied categories.   
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Figure 5.5: Directions of payment in marital prestations 
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Either form of dowry is an intergenerational transmission, whereas 
brideprice is retained within the elder generation. Where dowry or 
brideprice is negotiated by elders, this cements gerontocratic control. 
Couples who seek to marry can be prevented from so doing by a father 
insistent upon receiving a brideprice beyond the capacities of a suitor.  
Brideprice is common in Africa, yet rare in Eurasia, which has tended 
towards dowry across its history, particularly in European regions. I now 
examine the conditions under which a system of brideprice may develop. 
Origins of brideprice 
Fortunato’s (2011) linguistic phylogenesis of Indo-European languages 
developing from Ancient Hittite suggests that dowry predates brideprice 
across Eurasia, finding that the language of brideprice was a later adoption 
by collectives speaking languages derived from the Indo-Iranian family 
(which includes Kurdish) and Albanian49, and that indeed, some of these 
societies have oscillated between dowry and brideprice across history up to a 
maximum of four times.  
                                                        
49 Albania also has a current history of ‘honour’ killings of women and blood feuds, especially 
in the predominantly Catholic Northern region, where they are justified by reference to the 
Kanun of traditional law (Mustafa and Young 2008).  
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This can be supported through historical accounts: Rose (1998), for instance, 
describes marriage within the pre-Islamic Sassanid Empire as based in 
indirect dowry with no occurrence of brideprice50.  
For Fortunato, the key variable associated with brideprice across this deep 
history is polygyny — a proposition which is well supported by other 
scholars (Grossbard 1978; Atkinson and Lee 1984; Ember et al. 2007; 
Patterson 2012). Within the KRI, Barth found a level of 4% polygyny across 
94 men in four villages in the 1950s (1953, p. 29); Bois (1966) suggests that 
polygyny was common before the time of his own investigations of Kurdish 
regions, especially amongst tribal leaders making political alliances, but 
estimated a contemporary level of around 2%, suggesting a low and declining 
level of polygyny51. Middle Eastern patterns of polygyny tend to show a fairly 
low incidence in contradistinction to the high levels found in Africa, 
suggesting a scenario where limited polygyny is the privilege of  a small elite. 
McDowall (1996, p. 10) identifies that the larger social networks, and hence 
greater power, of an agha related to a history of polygynous marriage within 
his lineage, which was unavailable to male villagers and tenants, who were 
often subject to feudal control upon their marital choices.  
                                                        
50 Interestingly, several commentators agree that women’s consent was crucial to Sassanian 
marriage and that women commonly married in opposition to parental interests (Fischer 
1973; Rose 1998; Choksy 2003). 
51 However, Bird has the impression that polygyny was actually increasing in the KRI in the 
2000s, due to increasing wealth inequalities in a modernising nation and gender imbalances 
caused by the Anfal and male emigration (2005 p. 111). 
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Patterson’s (2012) analysis of the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample also shows 
a significant relationship between brideprice and slavery, finding that half of 
all societies with brideprice hold slaves52 and the presence of brideprice 
triples the odds of finding institutional slavery. If slavery, brideprice and 
polygyny appear to cluster within societies, this may suggest that all three 
phenomena result from an exterior determinant. For several writers, this 
determinant is warfare, in its pre-modern forms (Divale and Harris 1976; 
White and Burton 1988; Ember et al. 2007).  
That war correlates with polygyny and polygyny with brideprice has a 
certain logic: a polygynous society is one which establishes male/male 
competition for women, who become the rewards for male assertiveness and 
financial or military success, either through the high status of the most 
aggressive males, able to demand brides within their own community, or 
through the rape and enslavement of captive women, taken from other 
groups. Competition for in-group women may become intense in this 
scenario, where the most successful males monopolise the reproductive 
capacity of the collective (Betzig 2012), with particular crises likely when 
there are fewer captives available, either in times of peace or of defeat. This 
competition would tend to wreck communal solidarity if expressed through 
violent contestations between men of the ingroup. Monetization of this 
                                                        
52 The first slaves in ancient civilisations were women; geme, the Sumerian term for slave 
literally means ‘mountain woman’ (Fisher 1979 p. 314). 
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competition, therefore, can express competition within forms which are less 
likely to lead to physical injuries and the depletion of the military/defensive 
strength of the community. 
Polygyny thus both stratifies men into those wealthy enough to be able to 
afford more than one wife and those who have no licit means to achieve 
reproductive relations. Polygyny may benefit some women: particularly 
senior wives, who are able to pass on the most arduous aspects of household 
labour to their subordinate juniors, and the mothers of sons; but for junior 
wives, mothers of daughters, and the children of polygynous marriages, 
polygyny has numerous and severe hazards beyond the scope of this thesis 
(for a summary, see iMAPP 2011).  
Societies where males make war to plunder and to enslave female captives53, 
are able to replace all of the physical functions of wives with slaves. The 
‘natural’ balance of the genders, in the sense of the tendency of humans 
towards the conception of male and female children in roughly equal 
numbers, is in a constant state of disequilibrium through warfare, since 
defeat may lead to a high level of male death, and victory to an influx of 
female captives. Either position leads to a surplus of females providing a 
logical basis for polygyny, especially within a context of the combined 
                                                        
53 The enslavement of female captives is a frequent aspect of warfare. See, for instance, 
Euripedes’ The Trojan Women, the Old Testament [Judges 21:10-24, Numbers 31:7-18, 
Deuteronomy 20:10-14] and the ahadith [Bukhari 3: 432, Abu Dawud 2: 2150], and in 
modern times, the enslavement and sexual exploitation of Yazidi women by militants of the 
‘Islamic State’ in Iraq. 
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rationales for pro-natalism to be found in the agrarian lifestyle and a warlike 
orientation, where male children are valued both as warriors and as 
labourers. Successful individuals, in this scenario, are male warriors who are 
able to amass booty and captives, leading to a social orientation to place a 
high value upon ‘masculine’ values, which thereby leads to son preference — 
already strongly featured in patrilinear societies. Such societal orientations 
frequently feature high levels of female infanticide where male physical 
strength is a desirable quality, whereas female reproductive capacities run 
the risk of being alienated by the enemy in defeat, and may be replaced by 
captives in victory (Divale and Harris 1976).  
While son preference is recorded within Middle Eastern regions, this is not 
expressed in female infanticide which is robustly, and emotively, condemned 
in the Qur’an54 nor in the sex-selective abortions so common in India and 
China (Sen 2003). While a small gender disparity in the deaths of infants 
within the Middle East is discernible, this relates to differential parental 
attention within societies with a preference for sons, who may then tend to 
receive better medical care and nutrition, rather than as a result of a 
determined attempt to eradicate daughters (Ahmed et al. 1981). 
As Miller (1984) finds, in a comparative study of Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
the existence of brideprice can make an economic case for raising daughters 
                                                        
54 Qur’an 17:31; 81:8-9 
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within patrilinear societies: brideprice may effectively form a subsidy 
encouraging families to raise daughters even though sons are identified as 
more likely to increase a family’s status and wellbeing. Thus a societal 
adaptation to brideprice would appear to be adaptive in increasing the 
reproductive potential of any warlike, polygynous group. Polygyny can 
intersect with son preference, where one of the most common justifications 
for taking a second wife is the failure of the first to provide a male heir to 
continue the patriline. 
However, the continuance of brideprice in periods where polygyny and the 
kind of warfare which results in bride-capture are more marginal remains to 
be explained. 
Brideprice in relation to female labour 
Cultural understandings of how men acquire wives, by structuring 
the contexts in which some people work for others, also structure 
the conversations in which people develop culturally acceptable 
justifications for appropriating the labours of others.  
(Collier 1988, pp. 232-233) 
In Goody and Tambiah (1973) and Schlegel and Eloui’s  (1988) explication of 
modes of marital transaction, direct exchange and brideprice marriages are 
described as occurring where women’s labour value is significant. The 
geographical distribution of brideprice and dowry for the above writers rests 
upon the technology of production. According to this theory, in sub-Saharan 
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Africa marriage is arranged by brideprice where women are hoe cultivators; 
in Eurasia marriages are predominantly arranged by dowry where the 
gendered division of labour is more stark, and plough-based male labour is 
the main form of subsistence. African women occasion brideprice because 
they participate in subsistence farming, in this analysis; European women  
are dowried because they do not.  
At first glance, the evidence in the Kurdish case would appear to bear the 
asset-value argument out: Bois (1966) well illustrates the industriousness of 
rural Kurdish agricultural women, whose domestic labours occupy their 
entire day, from bread-making in the early morning to cooking the final meal 
of the day late at night. Female pastoralists are similarly tireless. Laizer 
(1991, pp. 10-11) recounts staying in a pastoral encampment during winter, 
where the men, unable to graze their animals due to snowfall, sipped sweet 
tea and chatted all day, while the women of the household cooked, cleaned, 
milled grain, baked bread, churned butter, milked, and cared for hens, geese, 
goats, sheep and other larger animals. Johnson (1940), states that Kurdish 
women were, in fact, responsible for all productive labour amongst 
transhumant tribes: men slept all day and spent their nights guarding their 
valuables from raiders of other tribes — and presumably indulging in some 
banditry themselves. For Johnson, the labour value of women was a primary 
consideration within marriage: 
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[T]he beauty of a young girl taken in marriage is a secondary 
consideration in determining her price…Her value will depend upon 
her utility — her physical strength for manual labour, and her 
ability to make carpets, rugs, clothes and other things. (p. 54) 
However, it is not clear that such women can be considered any more 
industrious than other peasant women in similar environments, with similar 
modes of subsistence: there is little reason to assume that the Sarakastani 
pastoralist women described by Campbell in Greece (1964) or the Sicilian 
agricultural women described by Schneider and Schneider (1976, p. 90) were 
any less hard-working than the Kurdish women described above, although 
their labours were augmented through the expectation that they provide a 
dowry including such items as several sets of hand-embroidered bed-linens 
and several sheep upon entrance to marriage. Such an ‘either-or’ model also 
fails to fit the evidence for the simultaneous coexistence of brideprice 
transactions within 75% of the societies practising dowry/indirect dowry 
(Nunn 2005). Therefore, to see such a distinction in terms of woman as an 
asset-value — as if African women were productive and therefore worth the 
outlay, whereas European women were indolent financial burdens to the 
extent that their husbands require compensation for their upkeep — has 
numerous problems.  
First, it ignores the possibility that such differences may merely be regional, 
an argument which Burton and Reitz (1981) support through log-linear 
analysis. Secondly, it conflates various experiences, and various women, as if 
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they were part of the same ‘market’ with the same internal values, whereas 
women, and women’s labour, may have different kinds of values attributed to 
them within different societies. For instance, in highly pro-natalist societies, 
women may be expected to produce numerous offspring rather than take a 
major role in primary production, and therefore their ability to contribute 
labour is less valuable to their affines than their fertility. In societies where 
women are less valued for fertility — those with high levels of infanticide, 
post-partum taboos on sex, etc. —  other characteristics such as practical 
skills, appearance or status may become more salient indicators of a woman’s 
potential value to her husband and affines. 
Bell astutely comments that: 
In order for dowry to imply a low valuation of women, it must be the 
case that their parents have attempted to find the highest positive 
prices for them — actively seeking brideprice — only to find that 
the highest prices are negative. However, we know that the payment 
of dowry does not imply the inability to sell the bride for a prestige 
price. On the contrary, the giving of dowry becomes a prestige 
practice, not the unfortunate consequence of having a worthless 
daughter. Dowry and brideprice are not different points on the same 
scale; they correspond to entirely different institutions.  
(1998, p. 206) 
The weakest point in the labour-value position on brideprice, I would argue, 
is the assumption that remuneration for labour, whether direct or indirect, 
has any straightforward connection to the value of that labour. As Hartsock 
(1985, chapters 1-2) identifies, there is a tendency for scholars to use the 
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exchange theories developed by Blau and Homans in overly functionalist 
ways, assuming that interactions express voluntary exchanges between 
equals. This neglects the imbalances of power and authority, and overstates 
the voluntarism of any individual’s engagement in political and economic 
relations within their milieu. Importantly, within gender-complementarian 
societies, neither marriage, nor the various forms of labour required within a 
marriage, could be considered voluntary (Jaggar 1983, p. 117). Due to the 
gendered division of labour and the taboos on premarital sex and 
illegitimacy, marriage is an essential rite of passage into adulthood, sexual 
maturity and parentage for both men and women. Where the gendered 
division of labour is intense and fiercely policed, each individual man or 
woman needs a heterosexual counterpart, whatever his or her contribution 
to production may be, due to the interdependencies introduced by a 
gendered division of labour. An adult man who refuses to perform tasks such 
as laundry or cleaning because they are perceived as emasculating (see White 
1999, p. 38), must marry, live in filth, or remain a source of labour to his 
mother and sisters; an adult woman who is unable to own or rent her own 
home must marry, take to the streets, or remain in her childhood home at the 
sufferance of her father and brothers. Such an entwinement of social, familial 
and economic interdependences means there is little choice in the matter for 
the individual. Just as, in capitalist societies, participation in the labour 
market is effectively involuntary for the vast majority of people who do not 
have private wealth, regardless of the terms of employment, participation in 
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the marriage market is almost inevitable for the vast majority of individuals 
in strongly gender-divided societies, whatever the price for this participation 
may be.  
Furthermore, either in the capitalist mode or within the combined unit of 
production and consumption which is the traditional household, it is 
problematic to assume that the market delivers an accurate reflection of the 
value of labour, particularly, one might argue, for the labour value of women. 
Delphy and Leonard’s (1992) identification of the persistent cultural 
devaluation of domestic and secondary processing labour performed by 
women and girls suggests that there may be widespread misrecognition of 
the female contribution to subsistence through emphasising the manly 
outdoor labour that ploughs, sows, reaps and threshes at the expense of the 
womanly indoor labour that winnows, grinds, kneads and bakes. Divale and 
Harris (1976) suggest that where male supremacy is entrenched, women 
may provide more labour-value to the family than they do in other societies 
quite simply because they lack the power to withhold their labour.  
Brideprice as recompense to affines 
Several commentators have presented brideprice as a form of refund for 
expended resources: as recompense to the bride-giving family for the 
resources expended in raising her to marital age (as is suggested in the use of 
the term şîrbayî meaning milkprice). This would not explain cases where 
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brideprice is absent, minimal or fictive, as in the forms found earlier in this 
chapter. A daughter does not consume less of a household’s resources if she 
is married endogamously. Moreover, a resource-refund argument would 
suggest that the brideprice of a spinster in mid-life should be higher than that 
of a nubile teenager, a position for which there is little supporting evidence 
and a great deal to the contrary (Rassam 1980, p. 174; Borgerhoff Mulder 
1988). Conversely, in Bangladesh, where dowry is expected, the marriages of 
older women reflect their reduced market value through payments of higher 
dowry as compensation (Chowdhury 2004).  
Barth suggests that for Kurds (1954, p. 167) brideprice is a form of 
compensation for eschewing cousin marriage and the patrilineal solidarity 
that this produces. Yet cousin marriage, as I have argued, is far from an iron 
rule, particularly amongst non-tribal populations, and it is difficult to 
establish whether patterns of brideprice and cousin marriage intersect in 
ways which could indicate a specific connection between the two forms of 
marriage: certainly, brideprice is globally a far wider phenomenon than 
cousin marriage. Barth’s explanation thus appears rather unilinear in 
positing a direct relationship between two opposing poles of marriage, when 
marriage practices have been shown to have several varying and flexible 
configurations.  
Sourcing explanations for the purpose of brideprice in emic accounts, as 
Barth does, can be problematic, due to the delicacy and vested self-interests 
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involved around discussions of marital transactions. Valeri’s (1994) study of 
the Huaulu, for instance, found that Huaulu men simultaneously insist that 
they ‘buy’ their wives, but ‘give’ their daughters in marriage, despite the 
identical and reciprocal nature of the transactions involved.  
Alternatively, brideprice payments could be considered in terms of 
remunerations for the transfer of certain specified ‘rights’ over a relative. 
This assumes that parents have the right to command and transfer these 
‘rights’, irrespective of their children’s volition. As Moghadam (2004, p. 171) 
says, ‘rights’ over a woman’s products, be they rugs or offspring, are 
considered to belong to their male kin, and are theirs to exploit or transfer. 
Such an assumption may be problematic from an individualistic human rights 
perspective, through allocating substantial powers over a child’s labour and 
body to her or his parents; nevertheless, such allocations of alienable and 
heritable ‘rights’ over individuals are common throughout history, whether 
over slaves or kingroup members.  
Marital ‘rights’ over women which are accrued through marriage may be 
arranged in separate ‘packages’ concisely summarised by Caplan (1984, p. 
31), which may, or may not, include: 
Jus in rem: Rights over her as an object; 
Jus in personam: Rights over her labour; 
Jus in uxorem: Right to identify her as his wife; 
Jus in genetricem: Right to assume paternity of her children.  
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Brideprice was one of the practices compared to slavery in the UN 1956 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery (Åstrom 2009, p. 111). From Wollstonecraft 
(2002/1759) and Mill (1869) to Pateman (1988) and Ali (2010), feminists 
have scrutinised the peculiar nature of the marriage contract through making 
comparisons between wifehood and indentured servitude and slavery. The 
practice of brideprice, if seen as payment for a woman’s body and the right to 
exploit her labour and reproductive capacity, seems to concretise these 
arguments through removing the final distinction between the categories. 
However, brideprice need not position women as outright chattels since 
‘rights’ over her labour, body and children which are transmitted by marriage 
are not necessarily held in perpetuity by the affinal collective, nor are they 
transferable beyond it. A heated anthropological debate in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s concluded that brideprice cannot be considered the outright 
purchase of a woman, as even wives in the most unfavourable of conditions 
differed from slaves in at least one respect: that married women cannot be 
further alienated from their natal families than they already are, whereas 
slaves can be resold freely. Only the natal family have the authority to marry 
off a woman, and this right is rarely transferred by marriage (Valeri 1994, p. 
3), with the possible exception of levirate, where a widow is obliged to 
remarry within the patriline of her late spouse — again, a method of 
maintaining interfamily relations within a patrilinear order.  
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It may also be noted that these transferred ‘rights’, as identified by Caplan, 
remain similar whether or not brideprice is paid. Nevertheless, within highly 
patriarchal societies, the distinction between wife and slave can be very fine 
(Seaver 2007, p. 155) and the difference rests rather less in the rights 
extended to any individual woman than in the ‘rights’ which are retained by 
her natal family.  
Within Islamic law a clear and important distinction is that women maintain 
ownership of their own property after marriage and their own legal 
identities, a right which British women did not achieve until the passing of 
the Married Women's Property Act 1870. Muslim women could themselves 
own slaves, although they could not, Ali (2010) notes, make sexual use of 
their slaves, a liberty which was reserved for Muslim men due to Islamic 
concerns about patrilineal paternity. Women’s gold and other personal 
possessions may be passed down to their daughters through matrilineal 
inheritance, in contradistinction to the patrilinear trends of Islamic societies, 
and mature widows may be freer from familial pressures over subsequent 
marriages than they were over their first (Rassam 1980).  
While there has been a great deal of resistance from anthropologists against 
describing marriage by brideprice in terms of commerce, this does not mean 
such exchanges can be considered merely symbolic or ceremonial, in the 
sense of traditional Japanese yuino gifts of dried cuttlefish. Brideprice can be 
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the subject of negotiation, even delicate haggling, within Middle Eastern 
settings. This would suggest that its social function goes far beyond the 
symbolic representation of an act of transference, but itself forms an integral 
part of the transference relationship. According to Van Bruinessen (2000), 
Kurdish brideprice payments tend to be high rather than tokenistic or 
symbolic. Their negotiation involves ‘considerable, subtle diplomacy’ (Barth 
1953, p. 26) in calculating the ‘actual economic value of a woman’ (p. 28). 
Tapper (1981) found that the Durrani Pashtun men sought to arrange their 
own marriages in areas where the brideprice was low, but hawked their 
daughters in areas where they were high, showing a canny awareness of 
market forces and an eagerness to maximise the returns upon their 
expenditure. She also quotes a will left by a Durrani tribesman in which he 
numbers his daughters amongst his personal effects, allocating the ability to 
arrange marriages and receive brideprice to various inheritors and creditors, 
treating daughters as assets to be distributed (Tapper 1991, p. 104). 
Brideprice may, then, be a crucial source of income: catastrophically, in times 
of financial crisis, young brides may be effectively sold to elderly men for 
money or to repay familial debts (Brenneman 2007, p. 98), or trafficked into 
prostitution under the guise of marriage (Minwalla and Portman 2007). 
Tapper thus argues that wedding prestations: 
…cannot be treated as a closed system, nor understood apart from 
other prestations (including intangibles such as prestige and 
political support) which are also part of marriage arrangements; 
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nor can all these prestations themselves be understood apart from a 
detailed economic and political structure of the total society. (1981, 
p. 390) 
Borgerhoff Mulder’s (1988) longitudinal examination of brideprice payments 
amongst the Kipsigis certainly shows that these are inflected by the demands 
of the local market and subject to change, along with societal changes and 
variations in the broader economy. As such, the levels of brideprice which are 
negotiated may be of particular interest in understanding how these 
payments fit into interfamilial relations. Kressel’s examination of brideprice 
amongst the Israeli Bedouin shows that the level of brideprice negotiated 
relates to the respective social positions of the arranging parties: 
A suitor in a clearly superior position to the bride’s group, 
economically and in political strength (e.g. having a large number of 
agnates) may pay a low brideprice plus his implicit patronage for 
her kinsmen. In addition, a solitary immigrant to the community 
who may be impecunious may get a bride as an ‘act of mercy’ almost 
for free; he thereupon becomes affiliated with her group or lineage. 
On the other hand, an agnatic outsider seeking a bride in the group 
may have to pay a top price. (1992, p. 125) 
Kressel’s first example shows that low bridewealth may correspond with a 
greater transmission of social capital to the wife-givers; the second example 
suggests the absorption of an individual into the wife-giving patriline as a 
client, benefitting from his subsequent loyalty and labour; and the third 
redresses the lower availability of the social capital within a connection with 
A MICROSOCIOLOGY OF MARRIAGE FORMS  
 
 
 196 
a son-in-law with roots outside the community who may well take his wife 
and leave the area. The greater the distance from the natal family, generally 
the higher the price: close agnates pay less than distant agnates; unrelated 
neighbours pay more than distant non-relatives, and non-countrymen pay 
the highest of all (Kressel 1977, p. 444). Brideprice can clearly be seen to be 
operating alongside, and compensating for, exchanges in social capital and 
labour rights between families wherein both the capacities of the bride and 
groom, and the respective statuses and affordances of their families and 
connections, are all subject to valuation.  
Brideprice and ‘honour’ 
For Bell (1998), dowry represents a gift for alliance. Yet persons in societies 
using brideprice also have the need to develop alliances and patronage 
relationships through marriage. Lin (2001, p. 136) argues that a movement 
towards societal organisation by social capital is part of a movement away 
from slavery and conquest, which may be the conditions under which 
brideprice developed: 
[A]s the size of the primordial group increases, it also creates 
problems for the maintenance of centralised authority over 
resources and competition for the succession to resource 
entitlement...Competition for scarce materials can be and is ended 
at a primitive level by one group taking physical possession of other 
primordial groups and turning the members of these groups into 
resource generating instruments — enslaved labourers. However, 
unless the ability to take possession of another group is 
overwhelming in terms of relative size or superiority of instruments 
(technology), there is always a risk that the confrontation will result 
in the enslavement of ego’s group instead. 
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A less risky strategy than conquest, then, is the building of relationships as 
social capital. The enslavement of captives, alienated from their own kinship 
networks, may be replaced by the translocation of brides into patricentric 
structures; somewhat distanced from their agnates, but where the 
maintenance of interfamilial relations provides important social linkages for 
resource and information sharing, and conflict resolution. 
Exogamous ties formed through marriage would be considered ‘weaker’ than 
those between persons with pre-existing relationships, yet it is these 
supposedly ‘weak’ ties which may be the most valuable (Granovetter 1973), 
since they extend links of social influence beyond existing parameters, 
creating diffuse and varied channels of interfamilial connectivity  — forming 
bridging capital, in Putnam’s sense (Leonard 2004). The strong ties of cousin 
endogamy and the village endogamy of direct exchange marriages 
consolidate pre-existing relationships and build ingroup loyalties — they do 
not establish new patterns of knowledge/resource sharing or patronage from 
which the contracting families can profit.  
According to a Kurdish informant, tribal transhumant nomads often choose 
to marry off some of their womenfolk into sedentary farming populations or 
towns, which would tend to provide kinship-mediated routes of access to 
those resources unobtainable through pastoral life, and supply political 
linkages into the life of the village. This creates a softer route to influence 
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than the exploitative power relations historically observed between 
pastoralists and farmers, thus following Lin’s trajectory of relationships 
formerly expressed through violence and subordination becoming expressed 
through social networking, in this case, expressed through marriage/kinship 
relationships. 
In terms of social capital then, exogamous marriages may be the most 
advantageous to both sides of the transaction; but since the distance between 
the parties is the greatest, there are more likely to be inequalities between 
the transacting parties. In this instance, the negotiation of brideprice and 
marriage itself takes place under circumstances which Sahlins (1974) would 
characterise as ‘negative reciprocity’ —transactions take place within an 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion, and where negotiations must be conducted 
with the utmost delicacy, and which take into consideration the value of the 
alliance to each family — as well as the personal characteristics of the bride 
herself.  
Pamporov (2007, p. 473) commenting on marriage amongst the Bulgarian 
Roma55 outlines the following determinants of brideprice: 
1. The appearance of the bride; 
2. Her practical skills; 
3. The reputation of her family; 
4. The wealth and property status of both families; 
                                                        
55 Roma marriage follows similar patterns to those described in this chapter, including 
patrilocality, cousin endogamy, direct exchange, brideprice exogamy and 
abduction/elopement; virginity is demanded and female sexual autonomy is repressed. 
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5. The level of connectivity between the two families. 
 
So, the elements of brideprice which relate to the bride as an individual are 
erotic/reproductive potential and capacity for labour. In terms of social 
capital, status — wealth and property — will increase the value of the 
bargain. The other determinant related to her family is somewhat obscurely 
described by Pamporov as ‘reputation’. A Kalaydje Rom clarifies this: 
brideprice, he says, is ‘a payment about the honour of the bride’ (Pamporov 
2007, p. 472).  
Chastity then, and the family’s reputation in enforcing this, may be 
considered one of the determinants of brideprice. Exogamy means that the 
prospective affines will tend to have less knowledge of the household order 
under which the young bride has been socialised and may fear buying a pig in 
a poke: ‘bad girls go out’ according to Ertem and Kocturk’s (2008) Kurdish 
respondents, suggesting that a girl who has garnered an unfavourable 
reputation within her natal area may be married exogamously to a family 
unaware of this.  
Negotiations around exogamous marriage may therefore be particularly 
tense, combining mutual suspicion with a desire to maximise the value of the 
alliance. In such circumstances, the appearance of conformity to the 
standards of ‘honour’ becomes a particularly salient quality, which must be 
protected from the least doubt, and where the status of both families taking 
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part on the transaction are subject to valuation; and where disagreements 
may be taken as status challenges. 
Women’s opinions of brideprice 
Early ethnographers of Kurdish regions tended to state that women found 
brideprice flattering, as a mark of status and regard (Hansen 1961). Leach 
(1940, p. 120) reports that Kurdish men claim to have paid high fictive 
brideprices for their cousin-wives in order to flatter their feminine vanity. It 
might be noted, however, that brideprice as a mark of status is likely to be 
relational to the status of other women: a woman is unlikely to consider her 
brideprice flattering if it is markedly lower than that of her peers.  
Later research has found that most women express hostility to the practice. 
Of Ilkkaracan’s (2001) Turkish and Kurdish respondents, 61% reported an 
exchange of money from their husband’s patriline to their own in order to 
realise marriage. 78.9% of women were opposed to the practice of 
brideprice, and in open-ended questions, 56.3% described their opposition as 
being due to the commodifying nature of being married in return for 
payment. Kreiger (1986, p. 125) reports that Cairene women expressed 
resentment over marriage for brideprice in similar terms: 
I knew of several women’s anguish at having been married by their 
fathers to men they didn’t care for, while they were not allowed to 
marry men they loved. The phrase ‘my father sold me for money’ 
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was uttered by several women as an explanation of why they had 
married their husbands.56  
In research specifically examining brideprice, less than 0.5% of Ugandan 
women supported the institution, giving reasons similar to those advanced 
by Ilkkaracan’s respondents: 
 It posits women as property 
 It leads to child marriage within impoverished families 
 A refusal to refund brideprice by the natal family leaves women 
trapped within their husband’s kin-group in the event of marital 
disharmony or widowhood (Kaye et al. 2000; Hague et al. 2011). 
 
Women in societies who have experienced a transition from other forms of 
marriage towards brideprice feel their status to be degraded (Lovett 1997). 
Ilkkaracan’s respondents added that men who pay for brides believe they 
have gained ‘all rights over their wives’ sexuality and fertility,’ suggesting 
that the monetization of the transference of rights implied in marriage is 
perceived as instantiating a higher level of control over them.  
Brideprice then may be a method of creating relationships of peonage, where 
the initial payment is used both to justify the subordination of wives, and as a 
                                                        
56 Hoodfar’s (1997) attentive and sympathetic study of marriage and work in Cairo indicates 
that fathers were often more interested in arranging profitable and high-status marriages for 
their daughters suggesting a greater emotional distance and a higher investment in social 
status, whereas mothers tended to prefer isogamous and endogamous marriages to reduce 
social inequalities in marriage between the partners, which they thought would reduce the 
husband’s ability to subordinate his wife and the likelihood of violence.  
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form of restriction which prevents her egress. Collier (1988, p. 165) suggests 
that this is the main purpose of brideprice — to oblige families to pay a 
financial penalty if the bride returns home, which would be her first response 
in the event of marital dissatisfaction.  
Just as mehr could be, in part, considered to form a kind of financial deposit 
discouraging a man from pronouncing a summary divorce, brideprice could 
be seen as a corollary: a deposit ensuring against a family’s acceptance of a 
married woman’s return to the natal home in the event of marital 
disharmony. Thus the societal co-occurrence and simultaneous negotiation of 
brideprice and indirect dowry identified by Nunn (2005) can be related to a 
single motivation: preserving marital relationships (and the social capital 
accrued through those relationships) through financially underwriting 
interfamilial connections within the most risky negotiations, i.e. those with 
members of outgroups, which are those which are the most marked by 
concerns about unequal bargains. Negotiations which take place in this 
insecure terrain place tensions across both families. A female Rom told 
Pamporov:  
If the woman57 who wants my daughter pays me, if she pays more 
expensive, it is clear that she is going to love my daughter much 
more and to give much more care. And if one day my daughter 
makes a mistake, she is not going to turn her out of the house, 
because she will be sorry for the money paid. 
                                                        
57 This presumably refers to the prospective mother-in-law. 
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Here she casts brideprice as an expression of genuine interest, which will 
reduce the chances of her daughter facing the potential for abuse in the 
patricentric household. However, if the family’s ‘reputation’ is linked to 
concepts of ‘honour’, in terms of being a reliable producer of women well-
socialised to their future roles as brides, then the performance of ‘honour’ is 
financially incentivised, whether this is self-interested, or perceived as being 
in the interests of achieving the best possible marriage for the bride. A 
payment ‘about honour’ invests the recipient family in verifying ‘honour’: if 
‘honour’ is a precondition of a financial transaction then ‘honour’ can become 
the crux upon which such a transaction succeeds or fails.  
While the requirement for brideprice suggests that it may inhibit the 
repudiation of women, due to the expense of requiring a replacement, this 
may not be the case if the affinal collective claims the woman is being 
divorced due to an offence against ‘honour.’ They may be considered to have 
legitimate grounds for complaint, which must then be addressed either by 
interfamily negotiations, potentially requiring the repayment of brideprice.  
This facility is open to abuse, as a case from my professional experience 
suggests. A young Kurdish woman had been married off by her impoverished 
father in return for brideprice which was agreed to be paid by instalments. 
However, her husband soon ceased payments and the father pressurised him 
to meet his obligations. However, according to her account, the husband had 
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determined to kill her under the guise of ‘honour’— through alleging she had 
been unfaithful — in order to avoid future payments and to argue for a return 
of monies already expended. Therefore a desire to contest or demand the 
return of brideprice can incentivise the identification of women as bênamûs. 
This is not to argue that the payments of brideprice inevitably lead to crimes 
justified by ‘honour’, nor the converse, since many of the European 
Mediterranean countries with recent histories of HBV practised dowry and 
forms of brideprice are common across sub-Saharan Africa, where evidence 
for HBV, as described in this thesis, is not marked. It does, however, indicate 
that there is a real marriage market, since ‘prices’ cannot be generated by 
‘mere random acts of exchange’ (Polanyi 1968, p. 128; cf. Bell 1998, p. 190), 
providing another indicator of the ‘exchange of women’ as an organising 
principle, and an incentivisation for the stringent control of sexuality within a 
marriage market in which this is considered a necessary precondition for 
participation.  
Brideprice, within this context can perhaps be most aptly described in Ben-
Yorath’s term (1980, p. 3) as an ‘approximation of the ex-ante differences in 
the expected values of the packages being exchanged,’ which includes the 
agreed ‘rights’ over women’s bodies and labour, the value of the association 
to the contracting families in terms of status, social capital and resource 
sharing, and the cultural expectations of conformity to the moral standards of 
the collective, which is deeply entangled with the conceptualisation of namûs. 
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Elopements and abductions 
The tale of Siyamand and Khadje, as interpreted by Kurdish folklorist 
Nourredine Zaza, describes an elopement in gripping detail: 
And so, on Khadje’s wedding day, when she was due to be taken on 
horseback from her father’s home to that of her husband, Siyamand 
attacked the convoy, which was guarded by seven of his beloved’s 
brothers. At the point of his sword, he took her from her guardians, 
threw her onto the back of his horse, and, with the speed of a hawk, 
ascended the inaccessible peaks of Mount Sipan58.  
(Zaza 1962, p. 36) 
The brawny Siyamand, an orphan working as a shepherd (a prototypical 
Kurdish folkloric hero), became besotted with Khadje, the mauve-eyed 
daughter of his employer. Khadje, equally smitten, encouraged Siyamand to 
formally request her hand in marriage. Her father refused due to Siyamand’s 
low status, so the lovers stage an abduction in a swashbuckling defiance of 
parental power. Camping out in the mountain caves, they awaited Khadje’s 
father’s acceptance of their union. The author dubs the couple ‘husband and 
wife’ after their absconsion, coyly indicating that they have made love. Sex is, 
according to Masters (1953, p. 158), the first act in any Kurdish elopement, 
‘so they can only be separated by death, for a woman who has lost her 
virginity out of wedlock must be killed by her kinsmen’. Khadje’s father, 
                                                        
58 My translation 
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sensible to the slight upon his dignity, remains set upon vengeance, and the 
pair is left to survive in the caves indefinitely, despite the onset of winter 
snows. In a cautionary dénouement, Khadje becomes saddened by her life in 
exile, despite the plentiful booty Siyamand amasses through banditry. 
Siyamand dies in an accident due to his characteristic impetuosity, and 
Khadje hurls herself off a cliff in despair.  
Such folk traditions identify a very different kind of relationship than the 
instrumental uses of marriage implied in the preceding sections of this 
chapter, bringing not only a rare expression of overt challenge to 
gerontocratic power, but also of discriminating female desire: through such 
displays of masculine vigour as galloping on horseback through the village 
with a sheep slung across his broad shoulders, Siyamand becomes the 
recipient of love-songs, gifts and love-letters from women and girls across the 
village. This folkloric passion is common in Kurdish oral or literary history: 
the national epic Mem û Zîn (1692) is only one amongst many tales common 
to Kurds of all faiths (Allison 2001a, b) depicting romantic love which is 
ultimately doomed by unsympathetic elders — the theme of chagrin d’amour 
familiar from Renaissance, early Arabian and Egyptian literature. 
Abu-Lughod’s (1985) luminous ethnography of the Bedouin Awlåd ’Ali tribe 
found that Bedouin songs and lyric poetry were rich with sentiment and 
regret, expressing the obverse side of a social order that otherwise demands 
stoicism in the face of misfortune. Normative arranged marriage in India, for 
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instance, feeds into the stylised romanticism of Bollywood heroes, who bear 
more than a passing resemblance to the intrepid Siyamand (see Afshar 1994, 
p. 139). Yet these tales of elopement and abduction by no means serve as 
wish-fulfilment fantasies for young Kurds: they reproduce, in heroic idiom, a 
real, if minority, practice in Kurdish regions.  
Romantic love…is a prominent feature of adolescence…A youth and 
maiden may arrange rare meeting in secret, and exchange gifts, 
embroidered handkerchiefs, flowers, apples or even rings…Most of 
these affairs…are ended by one or other of the parties being 
engaged to some other person. Several young men told of their love 
for girls in adolescence, and how their parents had ultimately 
betrothed them to youths they hardly knew or did not particularly 
desire…[C]ouples on the rarest occasions may elope, taking 
sanctuary with a chieftain who will arrange their marriage. Almost 
all, however, defer to the wishes of their parents.  
(Masters 1953, p. 265) 
Redûkewtin (which literally means ‘taking the road’) is a long recorded 
tradition in Kurdish regions by which young lovers can evade the strictures 
of gerontocratic control. Five per cent of Ilkkaracan’s (2001) Turkish 
respondents had eloped or requested their lovers to ‘abduct’ them; Yalçın-
Heckman (1991) reports on several cases of elopement/abduction in her 
study of the Hamawand.  
Romantic love in Western thought has typically been associated with 
modernity and nuclearisation (Bertilsson 1986), despite the emergence of 
the conjugal nuclear family clearly predating industrialisation (Laslett 1977; 
Macfarland 1978). From Weber to Habermas, and from Parsons to Simmel, 
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romantic love has been portrayed either as ‘an instrumental aid to the 
maintenance of an ever more rationalised society, or as a functional resource 
for increasing communication in a social universe that is fragmented and 
atomistic,’ (Lindholm 1998). 
Within this formulation, pre-modern peoples are not considered to be 
capable of romantic love as understood in the modern West. Hunt, (1959, p. 
10), for instance, states that: 
…by and large the clanship structure and social life of most 
primitive societies provide a wholesale intimacy and broad 
distribution of affection; Western love with its especially close and 
valued ties between two isolated individuals is neither possible nor 
needed.  
As Hunt describes it, the significance of love to Euro-Americans is a 
redirection of sentiments which, before modernity, were contained within 
the family. Certainly, within a nuclear family, the intense emotional and 
practical interdependence of the central dyad is pivotal, whereas 
participation in a wider social network can reduce the intensity of this bond 
(Broude 1987). This cannot be taken to mean that intimacy cannot develop 
between sexual partners and co-parents, nor that it is considered an 
undesirable outcome of marriage (Abu-Lughod 1998a, p. 11), especially 
where it reinforces, rather than threatens, the existing domestic order. To 
assume that a wider distribution of interdependence and sentiment means 
that Hunt’s ‘primitive’ peoples have no use for romance appears perilously 
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close to suggesting that the expression of love, like a fine cognac, requires a 
sophisticated palate to appreciate it. Yet subjective descriptions of the 
experiences of love in fact show remarkable cross-cultural consistency 
(Jankowiak and Fischer 1991; Riela et al. 2010) as shown in poetry from 
Sappho to Hafez and beyond. 
Goode (1959), writing in the same year as Hunt, notes that if anything, the 
breadth of the cross-cultural appearance of romantic sentiments can be 
discerned in the extreme measures many societies take to contain or redirect 
the disruptive, centrifugal force of eros, using institutions as culturally varied 
as purdah, chaperonage, and compulsory heterosexuality. Lindholm (1998) 
suggests that it is not that love is unknown to pre-modern and modernising 
peoples, but that the assumptions of Western scholarship are underpinned 
by a heteronormative sociobiological ontology which takes love to be an 
elaboration of the reproductive instinct, designed to produce stable pair-
bonds for the nurturance of offspring. Thus, the majority Euro-American 
‘affective’ orientation to sexuality assumes that the development of an 
intense dyadic relationship is a necessary precursor to sex and reproduction 
within long-term relationships, in contradistinction to purely reproductive or 
hedonistic forms of sexual expression (DeLamater 1981). However, where 
marriages are strategies to gain prestige and social capital, from Ancient 
Rome to the court of Louis XIV, Lindholm (1998) suggests, the sentiment of 
love, whether chaste or sexual, is relocated outside reproductive 
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relationships, and hence rendered invisible under the sociobiological schema. 
The Pukhtun of the Khyber Pass take an instrumental and dispassionate view 
of marriage, he claims, yet nevertheless idealise prostitutes and 
prepubescent boys — persons who are outside the realm of domestic politics, 
so that erotic and other interpersonal passions cannot disrupt the power 
structures of the household (cf. Rassam 1980, p. 175).  
Elopement, then, may provide a means for a society which has a high regard 
for romance between couples, yet an instrumental orientation towards 
marriage, to unify these aspects, providing a space for individuals with strong 
individual preferences to buck the normative system of marriage 
arrangement. Redûkewtin inverts the generational power basis of the system 
of marriage arrangement, through presenting parents with a fait accompli, 
placing the parents in the child’s position of having no options except assent 
or refusal. While some families will take steps to regularise an elopement, 
often involving post-marital exchanges of brideprice, others may respond 
with an ‘honour’ killing in response to the challenge to parental power. In 
2007, Jihan eloped with Jaleel Mustafa, a former peshmerga59 who had 
applied for her hand without success, and became his second wife in a 
polygynous household. Mustafa attempted to resolve the issue with Jihan’s 
family through a payment of $5000 and through giving his sister to her family 
under badal khueen. The families appeared to be reconciled; however in 
                                                        
59 Literally a term meaning ‘one who faces death’, a guerrilla fighter or militia member. 
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2010, when Jihan was pregnant with her second child, four of Jihan’s relatives 
invaded her home and shot her 20 times (Bahaddin 2010b).  
Nevertheless, for redûkewtin to have continued as a tradition, even as a 
minority practice or one confined to certain communities or tribes, many 
families must be more receptive to runaway daughters, and kidnapping son-
in-laws, than Jihan’s family. There may be reasons for a father to prefer a 
dynamic abductor to a meeker ‘by-the-book’ suitor, not least because he can 
use the fact of the elopement to press for a higher brideprice (Sweetman 
1994, p. 139). A man’s ability to conduct a successful abduction can 
demonstrate several character traits which are valued in agonistic 
communities that place a high status on masculine self-assertion — physical 
courage, ingenuity, and an assertive and dynamic response to any challenges 
to his status — which would include the refusal of his initial marital 
advances. Even a man who eschews the derring-do of a horseback rescue, 
and, like the Hamawand (Yalçın-Heckman 1991), prefers to organise a low-
key kidnapping in collaboration with his relatives and friends, displays a 
valuable capacity for generating and mobilising an alliance network, 
demonstrating leadership skills and social capital. Abductors also 
demonstrate their skills as providers, through their ability to provision the 
couple during their period of estrangement from the community, and 
demonstrate their dedication to the girl or woman of their choice. Since 
cousins have preferential access to related women, an abductor is likely to 
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originate from outside the primary family grouping, so if his family are 
reputable, this presents all the benefits of exogamy in increasing their 
influence network, without putting the families through the lengthy and 
delicate political work of alliance negotiation. In recognition of this, 
Hamawand fathers of pre-eminent patrilines have been known to hire 
bodyguards for their unmarried daughters, in order to prevent them from 
elopement with, or abduction by, lower status males seeking to accrue status 
through hypergamous marriage (Yalçın-Heckman 1991). 
Within the tribal past, redûkewtin may have implied seeking the protection 
and prospective membership of another tribe, where that tribe’s leaders 
would weigh up the benefits of adding a reproductive couple to their number 
against the potential for violent reprisals from the couple’s tribe of origin. If 
rejected by their families, a couple sheltered by a hospitable tribe or 
community could forfeit any claims upon their respective patrimonies 
through geographical separation, and likewise dissolve all their existing 
social connections, in order to found a new patriline. A modern alternative to 
seeking assistance from another tribe is to seek it from the state. Yet as the 
case of Kurdistan Aziz demonstrates, the state may not respond effectively: 
Kurdistan Aziz eloped at 16, and sought protection from the local police force 
in the capital city of Erbil. They carried out a virginity examination and 
finding her hymen to be intact and ‘no signs of sodomy’, rather than 
 A MICROSOCIOLOGY OF MARRIAGE FORMS 
 
 
 213 
organising protective measures, they restored her to her tribe, where she 
was killed (Begikhani et al. 2010, p. 71).  
Elopement in Kurdish culture 
As Kurds have historically been unable to define their own penal and family 
law codes, where even today, jurisprudence in the semi-autonomous KRI is 
subordinate to that of the Iraqi state, it is difficult to demonstrate official or 
popular opinions upon elopement. However, within the short-lived (1946-
1947), Soviet sponsored, Kurdish ‘Republic of Mahabad’ in Northern Iran, the 
following notice was promulgated repeatedly by the National Council: 
The Elopement (redûkewtin) of Girls and Women is Prohibited 
The Kurdistan National Council rules that any man who forcibly 
elopes a married woman or [a woman who] has not moved into [the 
husband’s home] will be sentenced to death; if a girl is eloped the 
man must be killed; but if a man asks for a girl’s hand in marriage 
and he is refused and there is no erî barrier60 [to their marriage] 
and [the girl] is unmarried and consenting, there is no punishment, 
otherwise there will be three months to three years of jail. (Mojab 
2001, p. 83) 
As Mojab observes, this ruling, issued with the authority of religious 
approval, conforms to a patriarchal reading of marriage: depriving a man of 
his wife, or his potential wife, (who may, of course, be a child bride promised 
                                                        
60 I have not been able to locate an English translation of the word erî as used in this 
directive, despite seeking expert opinion. It is most likely to refer to the Islamic degrees of 
prohibition in marriage, as stated in the Qur’an [4:22-24]. 
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to him from the cradle), carries a death penalty, whereas abduction carries a 
jail penalty, which could potentially be rather short, as long as a subsequent 
marriage is arranged. Mojab notes that this was presented as an 
Islamification of rural practices which had not previously felt the influences 
of shari’a, sardonically remarking that this respect for Islamic principle did 
not extend to land reforms which would allow women to claim inheritance of 
land or property in accordance with the Qur’an. Following Mojab’s cynical 
tone, we might also note that there is no attempt to regulate jin be jine which 
is specifically condemned in ahadith61 but which does not, like redûkewtin, 
disrupt male/familial control over marriage.  
In response to this ruling, Mihammad-Amin Manguri, a member of the 
Republic’s military administration, stated that this was in conflict with the 
tribal practices of the Bilbas confederacy. The Bilbas found this ruling 
oppressive, he said, because it did not allow for ‘freedom of loving, flirtation, 
falling in love, mixed dancing and abduction.’ Manguri felt that the ruling 
made young people ‘hermits’ and forbade the pleasures of love, and denied 
them the social status of redûkewtin – which proved both the desirability of 
Kurdish women, and the courage of Kurdish men. The principle of freedom of 
romantic love was, for Manguri, a defining aspect of the Kurdish national 
                                                        
61 Direct exchange marriage is forbidden within ‘strong’ ahadith - Sahih Muslim [3295] and 
Sahih Al-Bukhari [9.90B], using the Arabic term shighar. 
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character, a level of liberty unmatched by Europeans or their Arab and 
Persian neighbours.  
Manguri’s objections thus mark a potential starting point for a trend in 
Kurdish discourse to locate redûkewtin as a vivid counter-tradition against 
the otherwise rigid control over marriage and sexuality by families (Morgan 
2000; Talabany 2000). Manguri, and the Bilbas collective, appear to be 
willing to abdicate paternal power for the sake of their children’s freedom. 
But a key paradox remains: there were no effective barriers to the Bilbas 
allowing free association and marriages or other forms of partnering without 
requiring them to enact the performative act of abduction — they could 
merely have permitted youngsters to marry according to their inclinations. 
Redûkewtin, then, appears to have a symbolic status: through creating a 
visible challenge to elder control it simultaneously acknowledges it, paying a 
tribute to the ideal of parental control through the formulation of the act of 
defiance.  
Yet there may be other motivations in play in the practice than allowing free 
choice in marriage. The gendered asymmetry of the actors’ roles in any 
elopement or abduction is more likely to support young men’s access to 
women’s bodies than female sexual autonomy. 
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Relationship between abduction and rape 
Despite the ability of elopement to express women’s agency in convincing a 
chosen suitor to ‘abduct’ her, one may, however, question how much agency a 
woman can ultimately demonstrate when thrown across the back of a horse, 
or, in a more modern scenario, trapped in the back of a moving car by her 
abductor and his confederates. Neither the Mahabad ruling, nor Manguri’s 
objections, pay much attention to the principle of consent to the act of 
abduction, but only consent to a subsequent regularising marriage: so while 
redûkewtin may be linguistically different from the Kurdish term for bride 
capture (jin heĺgirtin), in practice there may be as much slippage between the 
categories as there is between marriages which have been forced, and those 
which have been arranged.  
In keeping with the private/public polarisation of gender roles, women’s 
encouragement of their chosen ‘abductor’ is covert, and hence enigmatic, 
whereas the male’s abduction is a public performance, a blatant expression of 
dominion over a woman’s body in defiance of parental wishes. Not all women 
may be complicit in their abductions; parents may indeed have refused the 
initial request upon their daughter’s urgings. The difficulty in establishing 
whether a case is one of a predatory abduction of an unwilling woman or a 
consensual elopement arranged between lovers rests upon the ever-present 
ambiguities around women’s consent, and the prevalent double standard that 
holds women responsible for sexual ‘shame’: women abducted without their 
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consent were considered to have connived in an elopement and punished 
(Yalçın-Heckman 1993); whereas women who have voluntarily eloped may 
be described as having been abducted to avoid admitting the shame of having 
an insubordinate daughter (Yalçın-Heckman 1991).  
Marriage by abduction, with its attendant ambiguities around consent, is 
recorded in many contemporary states sharing the KRI’s Indo-Iranian 
linguistic identity. It is primarily associated with Kyrgyzstan (Wilensky-
Lanford 2003) where only 34% of women from 504 households stated that 
their abduction was by mutual consent (Kleinbach et al. 2004). This practice 
appears to be spreading to Kazakhstan (Werner 2009) and Tajikistan 
(Ahmadova 2011) in a post-Soviet era of re-traditionalisation; bride capture 
has also been recorded in Azerbaijan (Kiryashova 2005) and Georgia 
(Amnesty International 2006; Duarte 2006), which border Kurdish regions; 
significant Kurdish enclaves currently exist in Georgia. Wilensky-Lanford 
(2003) describes this as a way for poor and otherwise unattractive males to 
achieve brides.  
Schneider suggests that bride-capture is a historical aspect of pastoral life in 
the Mediterranean: 
Pastoral families place a premium on large families and this 
focusses attention on women. They bear the sons that make the 
family economically and politically viable. In a sense, they are 
contested resources much like pastures and water, so much so that 
kidnappings, elopements and the capture of concubines appear to 
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have been frequent occurrences, at least in the past.  
(Schneider 1971, p. 18) 
Werner (2009) notes that marriage by abduction is represented as 
‘authentically’ Kyrgyz, despite being unable to locate any scholarly support 
for widespread prevalence before Sovietisation. She notes that through 
abduction, men profit from the honour/shame complex around virginity (p. 
323): once abducted, a woman is considered not to be a virgin and is thereby 
unmarriageable to any other man but her abductor. The family of the 
abductor may even make a display of a clean sheet in their window if an 
abducted woman does not bleed upon penetration, as if women should keep 
themselves ‘pure’ with their own lovers and fiancés against the eventuality 
that a stranger should choose to abduct and then rape them. A woman who 
vehemently refuses marriage with her captor is considered unmarriageable 
thereafter, because it is presumed that she has been raped. She may thus be 
under pressure to marry from her own family, who otherwise face the 
prospect of maintaining her in the paternal household indefinitely. ‘Now you 
are mine forever…you will not be able to refuse me,’ gloated a Kurdish rapist 
to his deflowered victim (Ali 2009, p. 37). 
Indeed, Article 433 of the 1926 Turkish penal code specifically abrogated any 
charges against a rapist if he agreed to marry the victim, as does Paragraph 
398 of the Iraqi Penal Code (Ahmed 2010, p. 14). In Turkey, this was not 
reformed until after 2000 (Ilkkaracan 2007); and even in 2011, Turkish 
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feminists have had to defend their position against suggestions that the 
principle be reinstated to Turkish law (Hürriyet 2011). In defence of 
rapist/victim marriages in Turkey, Doğan Soyaslan, consultant to the Justice 
Minister, stated: 
No man would like to marry a woman who is not a virgin. Marrying 
a rapist after rape is a reality of Turkey. The brother and father of 
the girl who was raped would like her to marry the rapist. 
 (in Ilkkaracan 2004, p. 258)  
Several reports point to women being forced to marry their rapists in 
Kurdish families with similar justifications relating to ‘honour’ and virginity 
(The Scotsman 2005; Zaman 2005); otherwise rape victims may become 
victims of ‘honour’ killings (Kara 2004; Agence France Presse 2009; Hardi 
2011, p. 60), making marriage to a rapist a preferable option to many women, 
where this is possible. Whether this is an available option depends upon the 
relationship between rapist and victim. For Nigar Rahim, raped and 
impregnated by her brother, there was no possibility of a ‘regularising’ 
marriage, and she was killed shortly after being ‘returned’ to her family, 
despite their signatures upon a commitment not to harm her (OWFI 2012). 
Neither was it an available option for women raped or forced into 
transactional sex by camp guards during the Anfal pogroms, leading to 
women remaining silent about such abuses in order to protect their own, and 
their families’ reputations (Hardi 2011, p. 65). Hence, these abuses have been 
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hidden from fuller accounts of the genocide: also missing from the Anfal 
body-count are those who died subsequently, at the hands of their own 
families, or at their own hands. ‘How many have been forced to marry,’ asks 
Hardi, (2011, p. 74) ‘and then killed because they were not virgins?’ 
In the wider setting, the ‘dishonour’ occasioned through rape is, or has been, 
considered to be dissipated through a rapist/victim marriage in Arab 
countries (Warrick 2005; Ouis 2009), China (Luo 2000), Italy (Pirro 2008) 
and South American countries (Lipsett-Rivera 1997; Sims 1997) amongst 
several other countries. 
Redûkewtin may be seen as a traditional form of resistance to parental 
control; however, the broader Central Asian experience suggests that such 
resistance, in which the male is the primary actor, hinges upon the 
ephemerality of women’s consent and the centrality of virginity within 
traditional culture. So, while the existence of redûkewtin indicates that the 
younger generation are not universally compliant to the expectation of 
marital arrangement, and that the elder generation do not universally 
demand that compliance, the practice remains an artefact of the system it 
appears to subvert, allowing certain women limited agency, which comes 
with the cost of increasing their vulnerability to opportunistic male peers. If 
the power relations of patrimonialism are seen in terms of a matrix of age 
and gender, with most power accruing to senior males and the least to junior 
females, and senior females and junior males occupy intermediate positions, 
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then abduction functions more in terms of intergenerational conflicts 
between younger and elder males for the control of female bodies, rather 
than an assumption of autonomy by women themselves. Elopements, then, 
may represent individual challenges to patrimonial control, but they are 
embedded within the values of this system. 
Synthesis 
If we consider a patrilinear community as a fabric of discrete but interlinked 
families and lineages, the lateral patterns of the ‘exchange of women’ forms 
the horizontal weft connecting the vertical, patrilinear, warp. Young women 
are peripheral, partible aspects of the family’s identity, whereas men embody 
its continuity and solidarity. Therefore, the weft threads are frail and 
insubstantial, being composed of individual women, whereas the warp 
strands are thick woolly plaits of the intertwined interests and identities of 
fathers and uncles, sons and brothers, including those female members who 
are integrated to the patriline through their sons. Thus the points of 
connection between patrilines are also the major points of vulnerability in 
their interrelations. Political enmities, territorial disputes, resentments, 
grievances or any other of the vexatious aspects of village or tribal life test 
the tensile strength of the fabric, with the potential to sunder patrilines from 
each other, ripping apart the frail lateral linkages formed by the exchange of 
women.  Persons suspended between groups tend to be vulnerable to 
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tensions between these groups: perhaps, then it is the marginal, liminal 
status of women within patrilinear orderings, with their divided identities, 
loyalties, and interests, that lead to the Islamic characterisation of marriage 
as rather unstable and fragile (Charrad 2001, p. 31). 
Of the forms of marriage recounted above, marriages by brideprice, jin be jine 
and badal khueen are transactional, enacted through explicit negotiation, 
whereas amoza and redûkewtin are transformative — the former enacted 
through a change in status from cousin to spouse, and the latter theoretically 
enacted through the severance of existing kinship alliances to found a new 
patriline, although in practice this often disperses into a transactional form 
through a process of regularisation. Interestingly, each collectively-ordered 
configuration can be based in a different mode of Fiske’s (1992) elementary 
forms of sociality: cousin marriage in communal sharing; direct exchange 
marriage in balanced reciprocity; and exogamous brideprice marriages in 
some form of market pricing. Yet the values which women must embody are 
generated across all potential forms of marriage so that women are circulable 
within the system in order that the family can be flexible in applying 
whichever mode of marriage they find appropriate to their needs by the time 
she reaches marriageable age.  
Cousin marriage involves a transformation of an existing familial relationship 
rather than a transference, yet the simultaneous operation of transactional 
forms within the same political economy institute similar values for 
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marriageability upon all women; for instance, a man cannot allocate a wife of 
‘lesser’ value to his nephew than he would to a stranger without showing 
disrespect to his kinfolk and thus endangering the most significant relations 
upon which his status, identity and livelihood rests.  
Most forms of traditional marriage thus have an inbuilt impetus to encourage 
the collective control of women.  
To summarise these: 
 Endogamous cousin marriage: Each cousin sees himself, or one of 
his brothers, as a potential spouse of his cousin and as such takes a 
quasi-husbandly role in delimiting her sexuality; disputes arising 
between fathers and their brothers have the potential to dissipate 
the patrimony and must be avoided at all costs; 
 Direct exchange marriage: Families, and brothers within the 
marital quadrangle in particular, are motivated to guarantee 
marriageability in order to ensure that the parallel marriages 
endure;  
 Exogamous marriage with brideprice: Chastity is surveyed in order 
to ensure a high brideprice, and to avoid becoming liable to repay 
brideprice; 
 Abduction/elopement: The threat of elopement/abduction which 
would alienate the symbolic capital of a woman to her family is 
reduced through limiting her interactions and monitoring her 
movements. 
To thoroughly comprehend the nature of marriage as a political economy 
however, it is necessary to go beyond the exchanges involved in any 
individual partnering and remember that each household, family and lineage 
is engaged in repeated marriage negotiations on behalf of each junior family 
member and does so within a context of the marriage negotiations of the 
other members of their lineage. ‘I am not the owner of myself. Everything I 
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do, I must think of my sisters,’ stated a young Kurdish woman (Bird 2005, p. 
175), because a girl who ‘goes astray’ may jeopardise the marriage chances of 
her siblings and cousins through bringing the family name into disrepute, 
effectively tarnishing the brand image of the family as producers of well-
socialised brides for the marriage market.  
Taysi’s delineation of risk factors mentions that women forced into marriage, 
women whose ‘shame’ was public knowledge, women from tribal 
backgrounds and married women had an increased risk of ‘honour’ crimes 
(2009, p. 40). These factors all dovetail with the foregoing explanation: 
families who force unwilling women into marriage already display more 
interest in attaining the various forms of capital dependent on the marriage 
alliance rather than the well-being of the woman concerned; women whose 
‘shame’ is public knowledge risk the corporate reputation of the family, 
disallowing more discreet solutions; tribes, having an identity based in 
kinship alliances and facing conflictual relationships with their rivals have 
the greatest investment in maintaining solidarity.  
It is of course questionable how far such forms of marriage persist: being 
clearly rooted in agrarian/pastoralist value-systems within a region which is 
rapidly industrialising, and reinventing itself as an oil-producing nation, the 
values surrounding marriage have been subjected to seismic changes — 
which I address in the next chapter. 
 MARRIAGE INTO THE MODERN ERA 
 
 
 225 
6. Marriage into the 
modern era 
[I]n the case of north-western Europe, we are 
looking at the singular example of a region that … 
had the accidental luxury of setting its own pace in 
arriving at what are now recognised as the trappings 
of modernity. The process … was very different from 
the ways modernity has since arrived in most other 
settings around the globe, where it has more 
typically been imported into a variety of sites beyond 
households.  
(Hartman 2004, p. 255)  
The individual man or woman was expected to view 
the family group’s survival or improvement as being 
of more importance than individual fulfilment 
…Today that old system is under severe strain 
through changed political and economic conditions, 
the transformation from a rural to an industrial 
society, war and conflict, and the influence and 
interference of the West.  
(Fernea 1985, p. 26) 
Despite economic changes in the broader social 
structure, kin groupings remain agents of social 
control, enforcing behavioural norms and ordering 
political life in their local areas. 
(Charrad 2001, p. 4) 
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This chapter addresses how traditional forms and understandings of 
marriage have altered over the KRI’s recent history of political and economic 
changes. 
Histories of trauma and conflict 
While sociologists have often viewed persons in terms of class, gender, 
ethnicity or culture, the impact of generational differences can also be seen to 
be deeply significant for the understanding of a society containing high levels 
of structural conflict. Each generation grows up in a milieu which is different 
from that of its parents, and for Kurds, this implies a very different encounter 
with the process of modernity, particularly where such changes have had a 
startling velocity.  
The Kurdish peoples have experienced an enormous amount of trauma over 
their history. A middle-aged Kurd living in Northern Iraq at the time of 
writing would have lived through the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) including 
mustard gas attacks upon Kurdish regions, the genocidal Anfal campaign 
(1986- 1989), a campaign of annihilation including chemical warfare, most 
notably the devastation of the town of Halabja (1988), the invasion of Kuwait 
(1990), immiserating UN sanctions (1990-1998), Desert Storm (1991), a 
populist nationalist uprising, which was swiftly crushed through superior 
Iraqi military power (1991), exacerbated by an embargo which left the 
Kurdish population near starvation (Laizer 1996, p. 125), a civil war between 
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the two major Kurdish political parties (1994-1998), and the second Gulf 
War (2003-2011). Although Kurdish regions are far better irrigated than 
other Middle Eastern countries through high levels of snowfall, aridity and 
agricultural underdevelopment reduce self-sufficiency. In 2007, some 80% of 
food was imported to the region due to ‘several decades of conflict, poor 
government policies, international sanctions, and more than 20 years of 
isolation,’ (RTI-International 2008, p. 1) making subsistence extremely 
parlous over this period.  
Decades of militarism and repression by external states overlie internal tribal 
contestations, which have been a perennial aspect of Kurdish life up until the 
present. British archaeologists in the 1920s excavating the ruins of 
Mesopotamian antiquity comment upon being interrupted by gunfire and 
inter-tribal warfare and brigandage by Kurdish tribesmen (Meiselas 1997) 
where sheikhs and aghas were in constant conflict (Fieldhouse 2006, p. 73), 
and where, even today, inter-tribal relations may be bellicose (Belge 2011). 
Such history has inevitable effects on a society, both through increasing 
militarisation, which increases both societal violence, and the association of 
masculinity with aggression (Enloe 1983; Saigol 2008). The Ba’athist imagery 
of men and women as coequals within the socialist workforce became 
supplanted by the more visceral symbolism of a male defending the honour 
of his country (and his women), violentization through the apprenticeship 
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into military or quasi-military units (Sanborn 2003)62, the ascension of 
patriotism as a masculine value occluding affective relationships (Rohde 
2006), and through the psychological traumata caused to individuals 
(Smelser 2004; Lindencrona et al. 2008). Luft (2008) describes such 
reorientations as ‘disaster masculinities’. It is worth considering that such 
historical trauma may well include the precipitous modernisation of the area 
after the Gulf Wars which is in itself disruptive of the Kurdish way of life — in 
particular, in that it presents radically different experiences and 
understandings of social life between those generations with direct 
experience of the region’s tragic history, and a generation born in a period of 
comparative peace, at least within their enclave.  
As Bird (2005, p. 74) remarks, Kurds have ‘lived with the suffocating weight 
of often indeterminate dangers their whole lives.’ The same middle-aged 
Kurdish man may be the veteran of several wars, conflicts and several other 
insults to his dignity and survival, in which close alliances with kin will have 
been vital for his well-being. Under an effective police state, there were 
obvious reasons for restricting relations to those persons one could trust and 
maintaining boundaries of kinship, clan and ethnicity. On the other hand his 
fifteen year old daughter will have lived in relative security and increasing 
prosperity, and an increased contact with the globalised media, from Korean 
                                                        
62 Hardi (in Neurink, 2014) notes how under Saddam Hussein, violence became a spectacle of 
power and control, including the exposure of children to brutalising images during the Iran-
Iraq war, where propaganda broadcasts showed mutilated Iranian corpses on primetime 
Iraqi television. 
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soap operas to American blockbusters, within an increasingly heterogeneous 
cultural landscape in an increasingly urbanised, industrial and consumerist 
society.  
The moral codes of a collective may be ‘tight’ or ‘loose’, (Gelfand et al. 2011) 
based upon the strength of social norms and tolerance of deviant behaviour. 
‘Tightness’ is related to ‘a dense and homogenous population: often situated 
in ‘an agricultural base…communal control of property, corporate control of 
stored food and production power…and high levels of tradition’ (Triandis 
1995, p. 53). Gelfand et al. (2011) find that societal trauma increases the 
perceived need for strong norms and a severe punishment of deviance.  
Thus in the KRI we find a fairly recent history of the homogeneity, 
pastoral/agrarian bases of society and corporate kinship organisation of 
resources which leads to ‘tightness’ overlaid with a high level of societal 
trauma which would tend to amplify the effect, overlaid yet again with 
intergenerational conflicts between an elder generation with vested interests 
in the status quo and a younger who are less embedded in traditional 
structures including the mechanisms around the exchange of women.  
The Kurdish feminist movement is increasingly visible internationally, 
particularly where female peshmerga in uniforms or masculine versions of 
the Kurdish ethnic dress are imagined as Amazons in a counter to the image 
of the niqabi-wearing women of the Islamic State. The contributions of 
MARRIAGE INTO THE MODERN ERA  
 
 
 230 
Kurdish feminism emerges out of a complex political consciousness which 
confronts histories of subordination as a stateless minority along with 
critiquing phallocentric tribal structures (Diner and Toktaş 2010) tending 
towards the secular, leftist oreintation that characterises Kurdish nationalist 
movement. Kurdish feminism has, thus, developed from multileveled 
experiences of subordination: as women in a society structured to some 
degree by patricentric family forms, as minoritised citizens in repressive 
states, as post-colonial subjects in an era of globalisation, and as focusses for 
geopolitical attention. Unusually, the inclusion of women in  Kurdish 
paramilitary movements challenge the expectation that women’s roles are 
primarily domestic and builds links between feminist positions and national 
identity. 
There are over a dozen campaigning organisations currently operating in the 
KRI (al-Ali and Pratt 2011, p. 340), and many more in the extensive Kurdish 
diaspora. After 1991, the apparent rise in ‘honour’ kilings in the KRI led to 
both the PUK and KDP claiming a cultural basis for these murders, coalascing 
religious, tribal and national conservatism into a cultural discourse which led 
to the concept of ‘honour’ becoming a site of vigourous contention in Kurdish 
discourse. Kurdish feminists working against violence agianst women have 
been subsequently engaged in either confronting or rearticulating national 
‘culture’ within the nationalist struggle, the state, and as a part of 
international feminist discourse. 
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Intergenerational changes 
The Middle East has an overwhelmingly youthful population, particularly in 
Iraq, with a birth-rate of 4.8 children per adult women, as shown in the 
population pyramid at Figure 6.1. Over 40% of the population are currently 
under 15 years of age (Roudi 2001; Assad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007). Alinia 
states that in the KRI, 36% of the population is under 14; only 4% are over 
63, and the median age is just over 20 (2013, p. 13). 
 
Figure 6.1: Population pyramid, Iraq 2006 (data from CIA World Factbook) 
Across the Middle East, high fertility combined with increasing levels of 
infant survival have led to a notably youthful population, often under-
employed and radicalised, disempowered, and kept within subordinated 
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positions in the family through the inability to find work or marry 
(Singerman 2007). General Middle Eastern demographic trends also show a 
substantial increase in the age of first childbirth, where over half of women 
aged 24 are not yet mothers (Panel on Transitions to Adulthood in 
Developing Countries 2005, p. 532), significantly increasing the period 
between first marriage and first childbirth. Increasing age at marriage will 
mean that conflicts about marital arrangement are more likely to arise.  
The older the parties are at a point of a marriage the less convincing the 
traditional justification that young people are too immature to decide upon 
their own marriages becomes. The more young people have the opportunity 
to associate with each other in the workplace or within educational 
establishments, the less willing they are to accept parental marriage 
arrangement (Ghimire et al. 2006). The demographic trends towards later 
age at marriage, and later entry into motherhood, increase the duration of 
women’s liminal status, which although providing a space for women’s self-
actualisation outside the domestic sphere, increases the duration of a period 
where the family ‘honour’ is particularly vulnerable, and involves the most 
rigorous levels of familial and community surveillance. According to Hartman 
(2004), this liminal period also creates discontinuities and disjunctions 
between familial/collective and individual/conjugal norms. A prolonged 
period of unmarried adulthood increases the opportunity of norm 
transgression — and thus of metanormative sanctions.  
 MARRIAGE INTO THE MODERN ERA 
 
 
 233 
Following a wider Middle Eastern trend (Singerman 2007), Iraq has seen a 
decline in age at first marriage and a higher proportion of women remaining 
unmarried until 1997, at which point the percentage of married women in 
the youngest group stabilises, and increases within older cohorts (United 
Nations 2009) shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 6.2: Trends in age at first marriage in Iraq (UN 2009) 
The uptick of early marriage recorded in 2007 may be related to the rise in 
violence and disorder during to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, including a 
massively increased incidence of gender violence, and the subsequent 
conservative religious orientation of the Iraqi leadership (Amowitz et al. 
2004; al-Ali and Pratt 2008; Susskind 2008), leading women and their 
families to identify early marriage as providing security within a chaotic and 
hazardous environment. The Kurdish experience of the Allied occupation of 
Iraq has been very different from that of South and Central Iraq, in solidifying 
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Kurdish statehood, and ridding them of a national enemy. There was little 
armed conflict in the region, and no power vacuum after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein, leading many embattled Iraqi minorities, such as Christians, to seek 
refuge from the tumultuous South and Central regions of Iraq both during 
and after combat.  
There was also little consolidation of right-wing religious power after the 
region acquired semi-autonomous status. Political attitudes in the KRI are 
markedly secular within the Middle Eastern context, since Kurdish 
nationalism (kurdayetî), has tended towards a predominantly pro-secular, 
leftist and ethnicized, even essentialist, character (Natali 2005, p. 182) where 
Islam is ‘worn lightly’. It could be assumed then, that while Kurdish regions, 
while being slower to industrialise, have historically recorded younger ages 
at marriage than South and Central Iraq (Kohli 1977), the broader trend for 
an increase in age of first marriage would be less likely to be have been 
attenuated by the war — and be more in tune with the pattern of rising age at 
first marriage across the Middle Eastern region.  
This represents a long-term change in one of the foundational forms of 
human organisation: the family. Changes in the domestic realm and the 
sex/gender system are rarely welcome to conservatives, who tend take 
recourse in the language of tradition and religion to justify the patricentric 
family.  
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The decline of marriage 
arrangement 
But how marriages were made now, the princess could not learn 
from any one. The French fashion—of the parents arranging their 
children’s future—was not accepted; it was condemned. The English 
fashion of the complete independence of girls was also not accepted, 
and not possible in Russian society.  (Tolstoy 1875-7/2003, p. 44) 
Tolstoy’s ‘English fashion’ — marital autonomy for young women — 
ultimately derives from distinctive Anglo-Saxon and Nordic family structures 
(Laslett 1977). These appeared at first as a global oddity, emerging before the 
Early Modern Era, but have subsequently become entangled with the 
dissemination and discourses of modernity and capitalism.  
Kinship patterns have distinct and specific geographical appearances and a 
far wider variance than is accounted for by Laslett and fellow kinship 
scholars who tend to allocate populations into categories based on broad 
geographical zones, based on rather scanty data (Wall 1998; Viazzo 2003). 
So, although I use the terminology of the north-western European family 
structure, I proceed, again, on the basis that these represent ideal types and 
tendencies rather than homogenous and static realities.  
Interestingly, the changes in family form within this region originate not 
amongst the élite, landed classes where the requirement to retain property 
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within the lineage tended to maintain a more traditional model of marriage, 
but within an incremental evolution of the lifecycle of the lower classes 
(Segalen 1986, p. 136). 
Seccombe delineates these types as follows: 
While in the West [of Europe], neo-locality (in the narrow sense) and 
the weak-stem family form prevailed; in the East, patrilocality was 
customary in many regions and strong-stem and joint family forms 
were prevalent, giving rise to larger compound households with 
extended co-residence and cooperative production. (1992, p. 153)63  
The distinctive features of the north-western European family were: 
1. nuclear family residence, with weak-stem families as a transitional 
form;  
2. late age at first motherhood, in the late 20s or early 30s, with a high 
proportion of unmarried persons; 
3. a low age difference between spouses, and;  
4. many persons spending part of their life-cycle attached to other 
households in service, from adolescence onwards. 
By contrast, the stereotypical ‘Oriental’ family structure (which again, shows 
remarkable diversity in practice) features (Tucker 1993): 
1. extended family residence;  
2. early marriage for women and hence early motherhood, with 
marriage effectively compulsory; 
3. a high age difference between spouses, along with normative 
marriage arrangement, and; 
                                                        
63 The ‘stem’ formation is associated with primogeniture, whereby a single child co-resides 
with their parents in perpetuity, benefitting from an uncontested inheritance and supporting 
parents in their old age. Those children who are expected to leave a ‘stem’ family may do so 
by marriage (in the ‘strong’ formation) or for other reasons, typically for employment (in the 
‘weak’ formation.) The ‘stem’ formation is often seen as a transitional form occurring 
between the extended and discontinuous nuclear family formations. 
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4. a fixation upon family ‘honour’ and lineage. 
  
The reasons for the development of the specific north-western European 
pattern remain contested, but the erosion of the traditional peasant class is a 
particularly salient factor. Seccombe, in particular, stresses the formation of a 
new landless proto-proletariarianised class in the Early Modern Era, 
obtaining their subsistence through providing waged domestic, agricultural 
or artisanal labour to property owners where it was available64 — and falling 
foul of newly minted vagrancy laws where it was not (Fumerton 2006). For 
less proletarianised regions, the process was slower. Of France, Segalen 
(1986, p. 126) observes: 
A number of studies who that even when no land was involved it is 
still possible to detect family marriage policies, because in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries peasants did own some 
property – agricultural implements, livestock, the lease to their 
farm, for example. The capital they owned in the form of family 
prestige, an ancient name and fame, was just as important, and 
perhaps even more so, in a poor society. In an economic system 
where it was impossible to amass wealth, the ultimate aim of 
marriage strategies was to maintain the position of the family, and 
sons and daughters adapted themselves to it all the more willingly 
as there was no social status outside the family.  
Within the proto-proletarianised classes in north-west Europe, the younger 
generation, including girls, left their own households to take up labour 
                                                        
64 Hardy’s (1891/2001) character Tess Durbeyfield presents a good example of this 
phenomenon: she finds migrant agricultural labour as a henwife, dairymaid and swede-
hacker before succumbing to the temptations of the more lavish existence of a ‘kept woman’. 
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wherever they could find it, often in service, sometimes setting up their own 
households as boarders or lodgers several years in advance of marriage 
(Pooley and Turnbull 1997) while they saved up for the expenses of family 
life. With no financial motivation to obtain their parents’ blessing and with no 
pressure to ensure the continuation of the tenancy of family land (which no 
longer existed), parental economic interests in the mate choice of their 
children gradually became severed.  
It was this liminal period of women’s ‘semi-dependency and semi-freedom’ 
as domestic servants, lodgers and boarders, located between the familial and 
the conjugal household, that, for Hartman (2004, p. 57), led to the 
development of a distinctively modern gender order. To illustrate her 
argument, Hartmann compares two towns — Montaillou, in the French 
Pyrénées, with a Mediterranean pattern of marriage and kinship, and the 
infamous Salem, Massachusetts, where gender relations were inflected by the 
Anglo-Saxon values of its colonists.   
In Montaillou, marriages were arranged for girls as young as six, and 
certainly were expected by menarche. Despite Christian rulings on incest, 
cousin marriages were practised in order to shore up lineage solidarity. 
Gender roles were rigid, and there is a likelihood that female infanticide was 
a common practice. Attitudes to women were brazenly misogynistic, and 
spousal abuse was widespread and considered acceptable: women bearing 
the marks of spousal assaults were plainly visible on the streets of 
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Montaillou. Men’s primary concerns were with the reputation of their ostal 
(household); women were concerned with their reputation for virginity and 
chastity, which was guarded by males of their ostal65. Non-marital rape was 
uncommon for all but indigent women and rape was treated as an offence 
against the ostal, rather than the woman herself. 
In Salem, on the contrary, marriages were late and self-determined, and 
hence the subject of anxiety, since there was a greater risk of ending up a 
spinster. Public attitudes to women were respectful, although women 
working outside the household encountered non-marital rape — which was 
prosecuted as an act of violence against the victim rather than her relatives. 
While women still identified their role primarily as wives and mothers, they 
made significant incursions into the male realm as co-workers. Gender roles 
were more fluid: ‘It is much harder,’ finds Hartman (2004, p. 143), ‘to detect a 
consensus in Salem [than in Montaillou] on what men and women considered 
most basic to manhood and womanhood.’  
Collective violence emerges less from pre-existing hatreds than from sudden 
uncertainties and shifting social conditions, suggests Tilly. For Hartman, the 
moral panic around witchcraft in Salem was disproportionately femicidal, 
                                                        
65 However this did not tend to lead to agnatic violence; rather, women took responsibility 
for managing their own reputations. Women of Montaillou made frequent recourse to 
litigation to charge gossips with slander, a pattern of female reputation management which 
can be found across Mediterranean regions and Spanish colonies after the Renaissance 
(Cavallo and Carutti 1990; Gotkowitz 2003), as well as public brawling in which women 
attacked their accusers (Taylor 2000). 
MARRIAGE INTO THE MODERN ERA  
 
 
 240 
precisely because of these mounting anxieties and ambiguities around 
gender roles; just as the femicides of Guatemala have been described as a 
backlash against women moving into wage labour and away from traditional 
domestic roles (Prieto-Carrón et al. 2007). 
Early marriages, which tend to embed couples into existing households (at 
least initially), entail an ‘apprenticeship into household management’ 
(Hartman 2004, p. 105) which is freighted with the weight of tradition. Later, 
neolocal, marriages, where the couple are founders of their own household, 
face the difficulties that each couple must effectively reinvent the wheel in 
deciding how to order the household: however, this constant reinvention 
undermines ‘decades of deference to the wishes of the elder generation,’ and 
effectively generates innovation. One of these innovations is, Hartman argues, 
the greater fluidity of gender roles found in Salem in comparison to 
Montaillou66.  
This geographical oddity — marriage by choice, deferred into adulthood — 
has developed into a global phenomenon. The older model, attuned to the 
needs of an agrarian society, has become supplanted by one which fits those 
of an industrial economy: severing family continuities, proletarianising the 
peasant class into a mobile workforce, increasing the requirement for 
                                                        
66 This intersects with Aykan and Wolf’s (2000) findings that neolocal households in Turkey 
tended to be less constrained by tradition. 
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literacy, and ultimately instituting the late-marrying, conjugal, nuclear family 
as the new normal (Coontz 2004, 2006).  
Rindfuss et al. (1983) describe such changes in the conceptualisation of 
marriage in South-East and East Asia since the 1950s as the ‘quiet sexual 
revolution,’ where parental authority over marriage has waned or been 
abdicated entirely across the whole region (Mitchell 1971; Malhotra 1991; 
Retherford et al. 2001; Jones 2003b, 2010). Virginity has become less 
important as a prerequisite for marriage, and a matter of reduced concern to 
parents in areas where this was previously a point of anxiety (González-
López 2004; Chang et al. 2011).  
For East Asia, the transformation from arrangement to choice took the form 
of a ‘voluntary abdication’ of parental power. Here, Jones (2010, p. 5) argues, 
lacking the strong patriarchal ideology of Confucianism, and already having 
bilateral patterns of descent, there was little reason to retain a system of 
marriage arrangement in the face of rising ages at marriage, and increases in 
women’s education and employment. Furthermore, due to the success of the 
‘tiger economies’ of East Asia, rapid development cushioned the transition 
from one family form to another through associating it with economic 
success.  
This transformation is by no means consistent, even within Europe: the 
family structures of Spain and Italy remain less individualistic than those of 
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the UK and Scandinavia, with far lower levels of single parenthood, for 
instance, and greater familial co-residence (Giddens 1998, p. 89). The trend, 
however, is undeniable, and it is those family structures within less 
individualistic societies in Europe which are exhibiting the most rapid 
movements towards convergence. Although there is never likely to be a 
single form of the family (Reher 1998), the ideal family form of classical 
patriarchy is increasingly under threat.  
Detraditionalisation 
[W]e lodged in a Kurdish house, typical of the style of architecture 
common among the settled tribes … The big house is the patriarchal 
roof, where the patriarch, his sons, their wives and children, and 
their animals, dwell together. (Bishop 1891, p. 89) 
Mir Hosseini (1987) notes the effects of proletarianisation upon an Iranian 
rural community, which led to fission among the landless and which 
‘compromised the economic viability of herders; and caused partial 
separation of landed households, which become residentially separate while 
retaining the joint ownership of family land.’ Mohammadpur’s (2012; 2013) 
investigation of family life amongst Kurdish tribal groups in Iran shows this 
economic transformation in terms of its effects upon family structure, which 
he conceptualises as a process of ‘disembedding’. He found the intensely 
patriarchal structures described by Bishop in the 19th Century were not so 
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distant a memory. One elderly female participant, who defined her family as 
‘feudal’ stated: 
I come from a family with 30-40 members. Our household affairs 
were managed and controlled by my uncle, and we had to respect 
and obey his orders. Even if he asked us to die, we had to die!  
(Mohammadpur et al. 2012, p. 87) 
This memory was in stark contrast to the tribe’s experiences of 
modernisation, where, while deploring the loss of traditional values, interest 
and pride in lineage, and community solidarities, there were greater 
indications of autonomous mate-choice, neolocality and female agency, as 
well as a reordering of the domestic realm. One elderly man commented: 
[W]omen[’s] power has been increased, and it is still increasing, 
because the culture has been changed; in the past, if a woman got 
sick, she felt ashamed to go [to the] city to visit [the] doctor; 
nowadays, my boy takes his wife to doctor if she is sick, he loves his 
wife very much, no shame. He think[s] that his wife has priority on 
any things! (Mohammadpur 2013, p. 127) 
Mohammadpur lists these apparently fairly recent alterations — in which the 
most significant factors were urbanisation, mass media and modern health 
and education — and describes their effects as: 
[l]oosening traditional patterns of family management, 
privatization of family life, personalisation of marriage, declining 
kinship roles in arranging marriage, decreasing kinship ties, 
limiting family size, changing attitudes towards family, and 
redistribution of power among sexes. (2013, p. 128) 
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Here, proletarianisation, and the other aspects of modernity identified by 
Mohammadpur, has made this society less like Montaillou, and more like 
Salem.  
From 1927-1977, Iraq underwent a period of transformation from a quasi-
feudal, quasi-tribal society to a modernised, urban society — although these 
changes did not significantly alter the lifestyles of rural women (Ismael and 
Ismael 2000, p. 189). From the 1920s, after the British conquest of 
Mesopotamia, land registry marked the step in a transition to a market 
economy. However, this tended to increase the power of aghas and tribal 
leaders, who registered tribal and collective land under their own names, 
rendering the peasant class landless and proletarianised. Through the 
typically British colonialist strategy of ‘indirect rule’ during the Mandate 
existing kinship-based power structures were co-opted into the imperialist 
project. 
Charrad (2001, p. 24) remarks that:  
Often, the objective of the colonizer was to make tribal kin 
groupings serve as conservative, stabilising elements of the social 
order, as political power was monopolized by colonial authority. 
Among the colonized, the extended kinship unit acquired further 
value as a refuge from those dimensions of society being 
transformed by the colonizer. 
This was supplemented by the mechanisation of agricultural labour 
increasing the movement of seasonal labourers into the growing cities, 
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leading to the proletarianisation of former sharecroppers (McDowall 1996, p. 
11). To end the resulting flow of migration to the cities, laws were passed 
favouring aghas and tribal communities, tying individuals more closely into 
their networks (Natali 2005, p. 30). By 1958, 55% of arable land had been 
consolidated into the hands of 1% of landowners (p. 41). As the Iraqi state 
became dependent upon petroleum exports, there was an increasing will to 
‘Arabise’ Kurdish regions and, thereby, their oil resources (p. 58). Ba’athist 
petrolisation led to a consumer society, where agriculture declined, and an 
‘oil rentier’ economy developed. Resources were channelled through the 
state, increasing the centralisation of power. 
Industrialisation not only proletarianises former farmers and pastoralists, 
but also replaces artisanal labour by mass production. The industrial and 
state sectors become predominant employers, particularly within oil-
producing nations, where the government are responsible for managing a 
national resource and distributing the forthcoming revenue. Waged labour 
replaces corporate kinship structures as capitalism becomes the 
predominant mode; and human capital — qualifications, skills and so forth— 
become an important mode of advancement. This leads young people to 
pursue education and labour opportunities outside their communities in 
order to take their place in the new economy, sometimes even outside their 
country: the geographic continuities between generations become lost. 
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Industrialisation and urbanisation have been both rapid and recent within 
the KRI: 
Following the implementation of Law No. 90, a special agrarian 
reform law issued in 1975 for the Kurdish areas, many villages lost 
their gardens and migrated to the major cities. In 1977, according 
to Iraqi statistics, 53 percent of the inhabitants of the Governate of 
Sulaymaniyah lived in rural areas, whereas 47 percent lived in 
urban areas. In 1987, only ten years later, 28.5 percent lived in rural 
areas and 71.5 percent in the urban centres. In 1977, 92,000 men 
and women were counted as working in agriculture but by 1987 this 
figure had dropped to 29,000. (Fischer-Tahir 2009, p. 27) 
Industrialisation has been shown to decrease the levels of sexual segregation 
and parental control of marriage within Muslim societies  and presents a 
vivid challenge to the rationales underlying marriage as described above 
(Davis 1993). Hansen paints the following picture of marital relations at the 
beginning of the 1960s: 
The young woman is thus selected by the women with whom she will 
have to live and work…From her own home she is well trained in the 
domestic work that can be expected of her. She has been brought up 
with the quite natural idea that her most important destiny and 
greatest happiness is to be allowed to bear children…She is not 
expected to be her husband’s comrade on a spiritual or intellectual 
level. (1961, p. 181) 
Hansen describes a homosociality so intense that men meet no other females 
than their relatives; and their bride only on the day of marriage, after which 
their relationship is expected to be formal and deferential. However, also 
according to Hansen (p. 180), a desire was expressed by young men 
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returning from universities outside the region for an educated wife with 
whom they could share a conjugal relationship. These represent the first 
cracks in the edifice of the reproductive, complementarian orientation to 
marriage she outlines. Camilleri’s (1967) longitudinal studies of a Tunisian 
village far more deeply entangled in the throes of modernisation in the same 
period indicated a more profound ‘shattering’ of the logical basis of the 
patriarchal model of the family, including young people’s demands for 
autonomous mate choice, which became a source of friction within their 
families.  
Abu-Rabia-Queder (2007, p. 299) suggests that, for Bedouin women, 
‘narratives of intimacy and love express modern ideas of individualism, 
freedom of choice and self-fulﬁllment,’ where women are torn between the 
‘dialect between the global and the local…personal autonomy, freedom and 
individuality, on the one hand, and the cultural expected feminine self, which 
is communal, embodied in the collective and the tribal, on the other,’ and 
where ‘narratives of intimacy and love express modern ideas of 
individualism, freedom of choice and self-fulfilment.’ 
In the KRI, Fischer-Tahir describes an increasingly educated young urban 
populace taking control over their own marital and sexual lives fifty years 
after Hansen:  
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In today’s Sulaymaniyah the [traditional forms of] marriage67…are 
more common among the older generation and in quarters of the 
city predominated by families that migrated from the rural areas in 
the 1970s and 1980s. In the educated middle-class milieus, the paths 
to marriage are very different. First of all, men and women meet as 
students in the university. Secondly, they are or were colleagues. 
Thirdly, men and women meet in the fields of politics, culture and 
sports. Fourthly, their families are close neighbours or live in the 
same neighbourhood. Fifthly, a man likes his best friend’s sister or a 
woman is attracted to her best friend’s brother, relationships that 
result in marriage. Finally, a woman and her family look 
systematically for a male migrant in Western Europe or the United 
States…Although kinship may play a role in these methods of finding 
a marriage partner, it remains in the background. (2009, p. 46) 
These young people of the educated urban middle classes then, are 
predominantly arranging their marriages by choice — for one subsection of 
the population at least, the progression towards what we might call post-
agrarian marriage is well underway, with a focus upon isogamous marriages 
rather than the prioritisation of lineage and patrimony. This can also be 
shown in a rapid increase in divorce: Alinia (2013, p. 122) notes that the 
divorce rate in the KRI increased by 66% in 2010. 
However, outside these middle-class milieux, such a societal restructuration 
poses a formidable challenge. Concerns around the ‘kinship license’ remain 
salient, and reactionary gender essentialists see the performance of 
traditional gender roles and deference to parental wishes as foundational to 
society.  
                                                        
67 I.e. those described in my previous chapter from page 140. 
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While modernity may decrease parental controls over sex and marriage, this 
should not be considered as unproblematic (Bossen 1975). As explained 
above, traditional Kurdish marriages were based in a gendered division of 
labour in which women are major contributors to the subsistence of the 
family. Ehrenreich and English (2005) delineate in detail negative effects co-
occurring with the ‘crisis of patriarchy’ occasioned by the transformation of a 
society from an agrarian base of subsistence, where women were at least 
valued for their labour, to an industrialised, consumer society where they 
became increasingly dependent upon a male breadwinner. Intimate relations 
were no longer built upon a structure of bilateral economic co-dependency, 
in which distinctive masculine and feminine skillsets were considered 
complementary, if not of equal value.  Therefore, while loosening sexual 
mores, modernity can also lead to the disempowerment of women who had 
rather less to bring to the table of marriage (at least in material terms) than 
their grandmothers, whose carpet looms, cheese-presses and tandoors gather 
dust, as a specifically feminine skillset becomes subsumed into consumer 
culture (cf. Abu-Rabia-Queder 2007, p. 301). The nuclear household becomes 
almost entirely a unit of consumption, romanticised as a retreat from the 
working world rather than a busy gynocentric locus of production with 
multiple participants, mostly women and children. The domestic realm 
comes to rotate around the activities of the absent member — the 
breadwinner, bearing his pay-cheque and demanding his dinner.  
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As consumers rather than producers, women’s dependency upon the 
breadwinner is increased (Ehrenreich 1983; Lewando-Hundt 1984). This has 
been identified as frustrating for the increasing amount of educated women 
within the populace, for whom the end of education may mark a withdrawal 
to a comparatively enclosed and isolated domestic sphere (Abu-Rabia-
Queder 2007).  
Where male power becomes removed from kinship status it may become 
attached to masculinity itself: a transition from the kinship contract 
identified by Joseph (2000a) to the sexual contract outlined by Pateman 
(1988) is not necessarily a great victory for women’s autonomy.  So-called 
sexual revolutions, then, may recreate pre-existing gendered roles into 
newer, but no less restrictive, phallocentric and heteronormative forms 
(Jeffreys 1985; Abu-Lughod 1998b). 
The cult of domesticity may represent a shattering of female homosocial 
spaces and women’s isolation within individuated households.  ‘Nazdar’, (in 
Laizer 1996) a Kurdish woman with a domineering husband, comments on 
the frustrations of conjugal domesticity in terms that might have been 
familiar to Freidan (1963) over 30 years earlier: 
A man has absolute freedom to do whatever he chooses, but a 
woman is expected to stay home awaiting her husband and his 
friends at any time of the day or night, cooking whenever visitors 
arrive, bringing tea and refreshments at all hours. She is a servant 
on duty every hour of the day, every day of the year for the rest of 
her life…Very few of us seem to break out of such a way of existence. 
A woman’s meaning in life had been predicted as someone who 
 MARRIAGE INTO THE MODERN ERA 
 
 
 251 
serves her father, her brothers, and later on her husband.  
(pp. 181-182) 
For Baffoun (1982, p. 241), while modernity represents an opportunity to 
shake off sexual and gender-based repression based in the ‘ancient 
superstructure of honour, purity and virginity’, which pivots around women’s 
role-performance of wifehood, daughterhood and sisterhood, this becomes 
replaced by ‘a cult of money’, where status is increasingly viewed in capitalist 
terms rather than through kinship hierarchies — within a milieu of 
immiseration and atomisation of migrants from rural areas, and the 
depletion of those kinship networks, which although restrictive of individual 
liberties, were also a primary means of protection and support.  
While HBV has been a recorded feature of Kurdish life since at least the mid-
1800s, it is difficult to say whether the current eruption of honour-based 
violence into the public consciousness represents an increase in crimes in 
real terms. Certainly most NGOs are reporting year on year rises (Kurdish 
Globe 2011), although this could be related to greater awareness of a 
phenomenon previously veiled in ignorance. However, an actual numeric rise 
makes sense if seen from the perspective of a growing backlash, of a sexual 
revolution which is not quiet, but clamorous and bloody upon certain fronts: 
of an emerging femicide, which bases itself in anxieties around changes in the 
MARRIAGE INTO THE MODERN ERA  
 
 
 252 
gendered organisation of society, such as those which have been identified 
behind the murders of women in Guatemala and Salem. 
An increase in the violent implementation of male dominance then, suggests 
that the system of socialisation is no longer an adequate means of control and 
that the general assent to long-established values is waning in the face of a 
‘crisis of patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti 1988). Zakaria describes the challenge of 
individualism to the status quo as follows: 
When an individual makes a decision based on the criterion of 
individual desires everything that is communal is immediately 
threatened. Failure to punish transgressions means that the 
community is weak, its edicts and pronouncements are not pressing 
on those wishing to belong and are, in fact, arbitrary and subject to 
being flouted. (2012) 
Zakaria suggests that increasing levels of honour violence are a result of a 
younger generation attempting to change the basis of decision making in 
their societies, to relocate executive power from the collective to the 
individual, in order to increase their own ability to make autonomous 
decisions. As Alinia notes, in the KRI 
Women and men who reject forced marriage and the various kinds 
of control reject and question not only gender roles in their own 
families, but also a whole system of knowledge, power and 
domination that has emerged in the intersecting violence of class, 
gender, ethnicity, sexuality and generation in a historical context 
permeated by colonialism, brutal ethnic and national oppression, 
poverty and mass violence. (2013, p. 162) 
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If ‘honour’ is seen as the discourse of a system of structural violence which is 
losing purchase with a younger generation, this could lead for an increased 
likelihood that those who wish to maintain control will make increasing 
recourse to physical violence — and also to make appeals to tradition, 
culture, and religion in order to shore up normative systems which are 
collapsing in the face of modernisation processes.  
‘Honour’ in  religio-legal discourse 
While the term ‘honour’ is used several times in the Qur’an, none of these 
usages apparently relate to the control of women’s sexuality but tend to be 
associated with military success. However, the ‘Affair of the Necklace’ 
indicates that the control of women’s sexuality was a communal affair for the 
first Muslims. The events are recounted as follows: Aisha, wife of Muhammad, 
was left behind by the caravan she was travelling with because she was 
searching for a lost necklace. She returned to the community at Medina with 
the assistance of a young man, which led to animadversions on her behaviour 
and calls for Muhammad to take action against her. It was after this event 
that Muhammad instituted the requirement for four witnesses to adultery, 
and instituted punishments for false accusations of sexual crimes which were 
just as severe as the penalties for adultery and fornication themselves. 
However, ‘honour’ in the sense of the control of women can be found in the 
enormously influential 10th century writings of Al-Ghazzali (2002), where a 
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woman’s sexual behaviour is felt to directly impact upon the social status of 
her husband (although he does not emphasise its impact upon her patriline). 
While Al-Ghazzali’s recommendations for women’s proper comportment to 
evade dishonour are extremely restrictive (women must not, for instance, 
look out of their windows or be seen on their roof-gardens, let alone leave 
their houses) there is a sense in which these are performative, intended to 
communicate male control rather than exert it. Al-Ghazzali recounts: 
Once when the Messenger [i.e. Muhammad] returned from a 
journey it was nearly night. He admonished the men saying: “Let no 
one go to his house suddenly this night. Wait until tomorrow.” Two 
men disobeyed; each one saw disallowed things in his house. 
It seems paradoxical that a wife cannot look out of the window, yet a husband 
must not return unannounced to allow her the opportunity to hide any 
evidence of a lover, but this perhaps this scenario speaks strongly to the 
sense of ‘honour’ as a collectively generated normative system where the 
eleventh commandment emphasises the public appearance of compliance 
over any actual transgressions.  
In contemporary times, Muslim discourse around ‘honour’ has become 
associated with the virulent misogyny of some Islamist preachers (Jafri 
2008)68, arising within an Occidentalist world view which identifies the 
                                                        
68 As an example, on 26th June 2013, the organisation Zhiyan raised a court case against Mela 
Mazhar, Imam of the Qadir Bla mosque in Arbil for describing women’s rights activists as 
prostitutes and ‘cattle unfit for sacrifice’ in an interview with the Kurdish newspaper Awene. 
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‘West’ as a threat to traditional family life and a source of cultural 
contamination, in the most spectacular manifestation of the modern 
efflorescence of identity politics since the 1980s (Moghadam 1994, p. 3), 
which has also featured a reclamation of idealised family roles by 
conservatives of all stripes, and in all nations (Moghadam 2004, p. 140). 
Shehadeh’s (2003, p. 234) survey of key Islamist thinkers finds a recurring 
theme that women’s ‘conduct, domesticity and veil are vital for the survival of 
the Islamic way of life, without which culture, religion and morality will 
crumble.’ This viewpoint intersects sufficiently with the doctrine of ‘honour’ 
to become utilised as an idiom for the continued control of women within 
circumstances where justifications based in tradition alone have diminishing 
traction. Central to the Islamist perspective, holding a significant symbolic 
value to many Muslims, is the body of Islamic legal traditions, consisting of 
Qur’anic scholarship (fiqh), a codification of Muhammad’s rulings over the 
first Muslim community, supplemented with interpolations generalised from 
his recorded sayings, the ahadith, which is often referred to as shari’a69. 
Hélie-Lucas (1994) identifies the preservation of fiqh-based personal status 
laws as the preferential symbol of Muslim identity within Islamist thought, 
noting the passing of several fiqh-inspired delimitations of women’s 
                                                        
69 This discussion follows Mir Hosseini’s (2010, p. 5) rough distinction between the opinions 
of the medieval jurisprudents — fiqh — which form the basis of many Islamic personal status 
laws and shari’a in the sense of a moral/religious/devotional ideal, which she argues have 
been erroneously treated as isomorphic. 
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autonomy justified in the name of shari’a, in Algeria and Egypt in 1984, India 
in 1985, Sri Lanka in 1986 and Mauritius in 1987 and 1989 — and of course, 
in post-Revolutionary Iran. As part of this trend we could add the intrusion of 
so-called shari’a courts into diasporic communities. 
The Islamic legal tradition treats any form of sexual contact outside legal 
marriage (or the sexual use of a female slave by her male owner) as a crime 
(known as zina) irrespective of gender, with 100 lashes specified as a penalty 
for the unmarried, and stoning to death for the married70. While such laws 
were obsolescent throughout most of the Muslim world throughout the early 
twentieth century, with most Muslim majority countries combining fiqh-
based personal status law with modern, carceral criminal laws, the Islamic 
Revival reinvigorated the reclamation of fiqh-based criminal law, in Libya 
(1972), Pakistan (1979), Iran (1979), Sudan (1983 & 1991), Yemen (1994) 
and in regions of Indonesia — and in 2014, in Brunei. Nearly all of those 
sentenced to stoning, lashes or prison for sexual offences so far have been 
women (Mir Hosseini 2010, pp. 10-11).  
There is a broad consensus in fiqh that the evidentiary standards for zina 
punishments are high, demanding four eye-witnesses to actual penetration; a 
rather unlikely occurrence for women outside the sex industry. While making 
consensual sexual behaviour the business of the state is clearly intrusive on 
                                                        
70 The sexual crimes of slaves were reckoned separately and were less severe, suggesting, 
perhaps, that slaves had a diminished ability to avoid sexual contact. 
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personal liberties, at least this tends to diminish the principles of patria 
potestas which underpin a family’s supposed right to kill a family member 
they perceive as errant, and instantiates some form of evidentiary 
requirement. However, the vast majority of violent acts against those accused 
of sexual transgressions are not delivered by the state, however, but within 
the power structures of the household, by relatives and without evidence. 
The question as to whether vigilantism is permissible in Islam is a matter of 
lengthy debate (Cook 2001); certainly there appears to be no question in the 
minds of members of zealot gangs and militias in Iraq persecuting 
homosexuals and women that the directive to ‘command right and forbid 
wrong’ is a duty of faith rather than the business of the state (Fang 2007); nor 
that some of those who see HBV as a family’s duty do so within discourse 
inflected by their own interpretations of Islam, and with the knowledge of 
these bloody punishments for infractions of Muslim law. This should be 
contextualised, however, with awareness that people tend to justify their acts 
within common idiom, and where religious language carries prestige, it is 
likely to be adopted to as a means of justification. Pew data finds very little 
support for any correlation between religious observance and approval of 
HBV within Muslim populations. Nor did they detect any consistent pattern 
between support for shari’a law and approval of ‘honour’ crimes (Pew 
Research Center 2013, Chapter 3). 
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However, this may not be the most significant aspect of interaction between 
fiqh and ‘honour’ crimes: the aspect which tends towards the continuation of 
the gendering of marital roles and expectations is not found within criminal 
law, but civil law, which has the power to shape and express hegemonic 
ideals around kinship and gender, and represents an area in which the 
heritage of Islamic jurisprudence is far more influential. ‘Agnatism,’ as 
Charrad states (2001, p. 42), ‘pervades Islamic law.’  Within Arabia, the 
Islamic form of marriage (nikah) replaced several diverse forms of marriage, 
some of which were matricentric, including polyandrous unions and 
matrilinear residence (Ahmed 1992, p. 42). The traditional Islamic model, by 
contrast, is firmly patricentric and patrilinear, modelled upon a contract of 
sale (Bukhari 70:4834) — ‘in which a man asked another man for his ward or 
daughter, paid her her dower and then married her’ (Mir Hosseini 2012, p. 
158).  
Fiqh diminished the role of consent, particularly women’s consent. According 
to Ali, for the 10th Century jurists: 
Marriage was necessarily consensual. It required an agreement, 
expressed in terms of offer and acceptance, by the two contracting 
parties. But these were not necessarily the bride and groom. 
Guardians and legal proxies abound in the legal sources, especially 
for brides. (2010, p. 30) 
Questions of consent differ between schools (madahib) of Islamic 
jurisprudence: however all allow for the compulsion of a minor into marriage 
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(Ali 2010, p. 32). Nor is there complete licence for the woman who has 
reached adulthood, whether through her defloration, or reaching the age of 
majority in the Hanafite school — the general concurrence of fiqh is that such 
a woman may not be compelled into marriage, but neither can she marry 
without the consent of her guardian (wali) (Ali 2010, p. 43). The guardian is 
identified as her father or paternal grandfather — a formulation which would 
be recognisable to Basil of Caesarea, centuries earlier, as patria potestas —in 
order that the voice of the patriline is represented in marital arrangements.  
‘In elevating religious law to civil status,’ claims Joseph (2000b, p. 19), 
‘Middle Eastern states have given senior men and not women and juniors the 
right to own property in their persons.’ The comparatively liberal Iraqi 
Personal Status Law of 1959, while claiming conformity with Islamic 
tradition, is nowhere near so restrictive, and was influenced by feminist 
activism (al-Ali and Pratt 2008): forced marriage is forbidden, with a 
maximum sentence of three years for those who coerce marriage, and 
relatives are not permitted to prevent a couple from entering marriage under 
Article 1.  
Islamists have criticised Iraqi law as failing to fulfil ‘shari’a’ requirements, 
and have attempted to desecularise family law and place it in the hands of 
clerics, with the justification of permitting differing Sunni and Shi’ite stances 
relating to marriage. This is a recipe for a Lebanese solution of laws differing 
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between individuals on the basis of their inherited confession. On March 8, 
2014, Iraqi women activists took to the street to protest a proposed law 
inspired by the Ja’afari school of Islamic jurisprudence which would lower 
girls’ marriage age to nine, along with various other legal changes similar to 
Iranian family law (Al-Salhy 2014). This proposition had been greatly feared 
by Iraqi feminists (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2010) who are well aware of the 
anti-feminist effects of clerical influence over family law in neighbouring 
Shi’a Iran. Indeed, increased levels of coerced and child marriages have been 
recorded in South/Central Iraq since the invasion, signed off by clerics rather 
than judges (al-Mansour 2012), signalling a de facto shift in the basis of 
power from the state to the clerisy. While Iraqi law is technically sovereign 
across the region, local Kurdish legislation has taken a markedly different 
direction. 
Love, sympathy and mutual responsibility 
Iraqi law was amended by the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2008, 
where men’s ability to contract polygynous marriage was greatly delimited 
(at least in terms recognised by the state, since it remains possible to conduct 
religious marriage without formal registration), and the rhetoric around 
marriage shows a turn towards valuing conjugality over reproduction, 
suggesting an adaptation towards post-agrarian understandings of marriage. 
The Iraqi law of 1959 baldly states that the purpose of marriage is ‘mutual 
life and children’, whereas the Kurdish amendments (Mufti 2008) redefine 
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this as ‘love, sympathy and mutual responsibility’, in a turn away from a 
reproductive model to one which is amatonormative71. However, while the 
same amendments pronounced forced marriages legally void, Article 2 
removed the necessity for marrying couples to be present at their weddings, 
allowing Kurdish women to be married off by proxy. While this may be 
convenient for members of the Kurdish diaspora who can marry without the 
trouble and expense of attending a wedding, this cannot be considered 
adequate for a full expression of consent.  
Furthermore the conditions for women’s ability to divorce hinge upon the 
gendered model of sexual relations. Women must prove that their husbands 
have failed to honour the ‘patriarchal bargain’ model of marriage to achieve 
divorce through providing proof of a failure to provide financial support or 
suitable accommodation (Article 5; 10.3); any alimony is suspended if the 
wife is deemed to have been ‘disobedient’, which includes leaving the family 
home without husbandly permission; mothers are only considered legal 
guardians by default if the father is absent or dead in Article 5.3, and patterns 
of Islamic inheritance are preserved in Article 25 .  
A woman’s rights activist related her organisation’s attempted involvement 
in the process of development of the reformed code:  
                                                        
71 Amatonormativity is a term used in Brake’s (2012) philosophy to describe the privileging 
of romantic/erotic relationships over other forms.  
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We held several meetings with parliament about these things and 
we managed to convince 40 members of parliament…We made 
them sign our proposals, but unfortunately the ministry of religious 
affairs did not accept them….[I]t was stopped because according to 
them it opposed the Shari’a. Then they organised a committee to 
discuss our suggestions, and the committee consisted mostly of 
religious clerics and some legal experts and all of them were men 
and they were all quite old…The outcome was that our opinion was 
totally disregarded… (Alinia 2013, p. 103) 
So while family law in Kurdistan may be more progressive than the 
superordinate law of Iraq, there are still powerful interest groups involved in 
maintaining gendered inequalities within the family, despite the region’s 
comparatively secular orientation, there is a confluence of conservative 
forces which use religious language to legitimise discriminatory law.  
Neopatrimonialism and nationalism 
Family is… a key political resource in most Middle Eastern and 
North African countries. This is in part because of the frequent 
inadequacy of government social service programmes, and partly 
because governments privilege family relations in offering access to 
government resources. Family provides a person with his or her 
basic political network: family contacts are usually the place to go if 
one needs access to a government agency. Political leaders, in turn, 
want to know of a person’s family connections and the support of 
family members. Politicians and administrators often allocate 
resources to persons through the head of the family, and favour 
their own families in the process. This constant emphasis on family 
in the state arena turns family relationships into powerful political 
tools. And since family is patriarchal, politics also privileges 
patiarchy. (Joseph and Slyomovic 2001, pp. 4-5) 
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Weber, Durkheim, Tönnies, and Parsons have been amongst the many 
thinkers who have envisaged the modern state as eroding the ties of village, 
lineage and tribe. As King-Irani (2004, p. 306) observes, however, given the 
harsh climates and economic and political insecurity of the Middle East, and 
the tendency of Middle Eastern states to serve the interests of narrow elites 
rather than those of the populace, the flexibility and durability of kinship 
relations remain valuable for individuals. Even with the advent of 
modernisation and the attendant challenges to the structure of the traditional 
family, she affirms that kinship relations retain ‘considerable power to 
galvanise ideologies, shape perceptions and guide actions in the realm of 
politics, commerce and administration’. Wider kinship ties, then, are not 
‘meaningless vestiges of the past, but… social forms that serve a real 
function,’ (Charrad 2001, p. 19). This combines with the predominant Middle 
Eastern identification of the family as the basic unit of society, wherein 
citizens are imagined in terms of sub-national collectives — such as 
kingroups, and tribal, ethnic and religious groupings — rather than the 
imagined rights-bearing bounded individual within liberal thought (Joseph 
2000b, p. 11). 
As Charrad (2000, p. 72) identifies, particularistic ties, including those of 
kinship, may retain considerable political relevance within the nation state. 
Sharabi (1992) dubs the persistence of the family forms of classical 
patriarchy within Middle Eastern modernity as neopatriarchy. The use of this 
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term does not imply a historical discontinuity with patriarchal family forms, 
but reflects the survival of the patricentric family in the face of the potentially 
centrifugal influences of modernity.  
Bureaucratisation institutionalises asymmetric patron-client bonds and veils 
their transactional nature (Beekers and Van Gool 2012, p. 9): where, for 
instance, the state becomes a major provider of secure employment, and 
appointments are mediated through interpersonal linkages, the connectivity 
provided by kinship remains a valuable resource for obtaining jobs, 
government contracts and access to power-brokers. For Sharabi, such an 
ordering leaves Middle Eastern society in an ambiguous position, stalled 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, which he implicates as the reason for 
the region’s failure to achieve economic modernity, development and a 
culture of individualistic human rights, through the requirement to accept 
personalised hierarchies and the inducement to identify closely with one’s 
own interest group.  
A more precise iteration of Sharabi’s concept may found in the term 
neopatrimonialism, coined by Eisenstadt (1973), which, like its Weberian 
parent term, was developed in order to explain societal change. If the 
institutionalisation of the hierarchies and interconnections of the patriarchal 
family is core to the patrimonialist mode of organisation, then 
neopatrimonialism represents a synthesis: the centralisation and 
bureaucratisation of patrimonialist relationships within a modern state. The 
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concept has been found particularly useful in the analysis of modernising 
African states, wherein patrimonial politics, built on relations of kinship and 
patronage, inhabit the institutional realm, operating alongside and within 
modern bureaucracies. These are also apparent within the Middle Eastern 
region, but underexplored, where there is a tendency to overemphasise the 
‘Arab strongman’ model (Bank and Richter 2010). O’Neil (2007, pp. 3-4) 
sums up three characteristics of the neopatrimonial state:  
1. Weak separation between the public and private spheres: including 
clientèlism, nepotism and corruption; 
2. A prioritisation of vertical over horizontal ties: prioritising kinship, 
religious identity and ethnicity over class identities; 
3. Personalism: a high concentration of power in a few individuals. 
 
He finds these are likely in artificial post-colonial states, with fragmented 
social organisation, and a pre-capitalist economy. The localism of patrimonial 
relations, structured around the interactions of various groups becomes 
centralised within the state, developing a core/periphery dynamic. The 
asymmetric but reciprocal rights and responsibilities of the small-scale 
patron-and-client dyad may not be an intrinsic aspect of ‘core’ 
neopatrimonial relations (Beekers and Van Gool 2012, p. 17), which can tend 
to exclude certain groups with fewer connections to the core state 
bourgeoisie. This can lead to insecurity for those on the periphery.  
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Brownlee (2002) notes that in Iraq, Saddam Hussein combined family-
centred rule, the recruitment of fellow Tikritis to the Republican Guards, and 
an apparatus of state oppression, including several secret services and a 
network of informants, which bolstered the regime from internal challenges. 
Charrad (2011, p. 64) finds that while the mechanisms of state control were 
kinship oriented, Hussein’s interactions with local patrimonialist power-
groups depended upon his personal needs for authority and control, 
swinging from attempting to destroy alternate power structures, to 
attempting to recruit them to his own networks. 
Hashim (2006) describes the mainstream Kurdish politics as ‘intolerant of 
political pluralism and heavily patrimonial’ where ‘intertribal 
differences…resulted in the creation of a political theme of clientelization and 
neopatrimonialism, which mirrored…the similar system that Saddam 
operated in the rest of the country,’ wherein leaders buy loyalty with rank, 
position, power and money. Such organisation by kinship is found from the 
bottom of the social ladder to the very top: the Kurdish political scene in Iraq 
has, until 2013 been divided between a duopoly between the PUK and KDP, 
with accompanying militias, and associated tribal and regional affiliations. 
Every male member of the leaders’ families held senior positions within the 
party, the party’s security forces or with the party’s massive economic 
conglomerates (Nore and Ghani 2009, p. 109). 
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There is, in fact, a disturbingly authoritarian drift to the Kurdish state, from 
the suppression of the free press (Reporters Without Borders 2010), violent 
suppression of dissent (Ahmad 2013), the harassment of dissidents (Qadir 
2007) and the prolongation of presidential rule without elections (Middle 
East Online 2013). Reporters Without Borders (2010) particularly note that 
common topics of self-censorship amongst Kurdish journalists include 
discussions of sexuality, criticism of religious and tribal leaders, and exposés 
of state corruption. 
Such kinship and patronage networks can be sustained not merely because of 
their ability to shore up autocratic power, however, but also due to their 
efficiency, particularly in states lacking formal infrastructure. Any social 
scientist who has used snowball sampling methods can attest to the ability of 
personal networks to reach large groups of people, yet would also admit that 
such a method is inevitably partial. Distributing power through social 
networks then, leads to the possibility for the development of an insecure 
underclass, disconnected from elite and informal networks, with a limited 
ability to access power. 
Fukuyama (2001) identifies social capital networks as a social good  — as 
long as these networks do not lead to entrenched and exclusive interest 
groups, with double standards for ingroup and outgroup members. The 
impersonal infrastructures of bureaucracy can be underdeveloped where 
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personal connectivities are a deeply embedded means of obtaining state 
services. American-Kurdish blogger, Helene Sairany (2010), recounts 
attempting to deal with an inefficient and frustrating bureaucracy in the KRI, 
commenting ‘God help the poor soul who intends to approach a public office 
for help without having any sort of wasta.’ Wasta is an Arabic term used 
widely across the Kurdish region which could be associated with terms like 
‘connections’ or ‘pull’. Wasta is used to evade the tedium and uncertainty of 
dealing with state bureaucracies, wherein ‘kinship, locale, ethnicity, religion, 
and wealth render some people more privileged than others in obtaining 
employment, university admission, or treatment under the law,’ (Hutchings 
and Weir 2006, p. 151).  
Privilege for some implies disenfranchisement for others, and hence an 
inclination to latch on to powerful networks. ‘Coping with insecurity means 
investing in the social relationships with friendship groups, family and 
community, but also in relationships with those in power who might offer a 
share of the privileges of neopatrimonial rule,’ according to Beekers and Van 
Gool (p. 19).  
Nepotism, cronyism and corruption make family ties important for social 
advancement; the lack of a welfare state and established banking system 
makes them essential for survival, where children provide security in old age 
and families provide support in crises and supply loans for new ventures 
amongst many other functions. Such connectivity is deployed in countless 
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actions, from gaining preference in making applications for scholarships for 
one’s children, to obtaining travel visas. Wolf (2001, p. 172) predicts that the 
existence of such élites will recreate the restrictions upon marriage found in 
the agrarian kinship licence ‘so as to minimise the outward and downward 
flow of resources.’ 
Qadir (2007) exposes a wide range of institutionalised corruption72,  which 
includes the operation of several parallel legal systems: the formal courts, 
state security courts dealing with political offences, military courts with 
jurisdiction over peshmerga militias, two separate KDP and PUK komalayati 
reconciliation tribunals, with similar organisations existing within tribal 
units73. The conception of justice in these arenas can be arbitrary — one 
particular case in point is the commutation of a life sentence passed upon a 
PUK peshmerga, Salih ‘Machine Gun’ Muzali, who had been found guilty of the 
murder of two sisters. This was achieved through the direct influence of the 
PUK’s leader Jalal Talabani, who had arranged for the case to be transferred 
to a komalayati.  
In such a situation, the Kurdish legal position upon ‘honour’ crimes may be 
unenforceable. One activist stated: 
                                                        
72 Qadir’s exposures of political corruption in Kurdistan led to a 30 year sentence for 
defamation (Rubin 2006). This was reduced to 18 months under pressure from the Austrian 
government due to Qadir’s citizenship status. 
73 Such informal tribunals have not been found to be favourable to women’s interests within 
the wider region (Manganaro and Poland 2012), and may not treat domestic abuse or child 
marriage as offenses worthy of any official response  (Tas 2013, pp. 1128-1129) 
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It is supposed that the courts should work according to the new law, 
but you see women are killed every day and nothing is done to stop 
it. In those cases where the perpetrator is punished, it is because he 
is not rich and/or does not have a powerful contact…I tell you very 
clearly that those in power create obstacles to these issues. The 
political power here in Kurdistan is the same as the political parties. 
They commit crimes against women by protecting murderers and 
perpetrators. When the issue goes to court we have problems with 
the legal system’s lack of independence…They can close a very 
serious case with a phone call…[A] person who is not a member of 
one of the ruling parties cannot be appointed a judge.  
(Alinia 2013, p. 100) 
Joseph (1996, p. 15) notes that ‘kin-based shops, businesses and farms 
account for a significant proportion of small and big businesses in the Arab 
world.’ Within the industrial sector in Turkey, factories tend to employ 
workers on the basis of kinship or other shared identities (Dubetsky 1976). 
Such family businesses reproduce the corporate family into an industrial and 
commercial era, where individuals remain dependent upon the goodwill of 
relatives for their survival and preferment — and the diffusive nature of 
Islamic inheritance laws may delimit businesses from expansion beyond 
family levels (Kuran 2010). Individuals are thus motivated to conform to the 
wider ideology of familism, which includes, according to Dubetsky, a 
reputation for ‘honourable’ behaviour. 
As this thesis has argued at length, marriage arrangement can be a means of 
building advantageous social capital relationships. Kurdish journalist 
Sardasht Osman wrote a satirical poem for the Kurdistan Post in 2010 
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entitled ‘If only I were Massoud Barzani’s74 son-in-law’, just prior to his 
abduction and assassination, which is believed to have been a reprisal for the 
poem. Osman (2010) enumerates the benefits his family would accrue 
through making such a connection: ‘For my uncles, I would open [a] few 
offices and departments and they, along with all my nieces and nephews 
would become high generals, officers, and commanders.’ As Osman’s satire 
identifies, families which have little influence can use marriage to procure 
connections75. ‘If a man does not have relatives, he picks a wife who will give 
him good connections,’ as a respondent told Morsy (1990, p. 112).  
So, the need for marriages to create social linkages may not be delimited to 
rural populations with concerns about land-use, water rights, seasonal labour 
and support during raids and blood-feuds, but may also apply to an urban 
bourgeoisie, which needs to build strategic kinship relations to mediate 
interactions with the state and other sources of political power. As an 
example taken from my professional experience, some Kurdish women, who 
had been married to Ba’athist operatives by their families, were ordered to 
divorce them in the aftermath of the second Gulf War. Due to the fall of 
Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party, these men had lost their utility value to 
                                                        
74 Massoud Barzani was, at the time of writing, the President of the KRI and the leader of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). 
75 Discussions of Osman’s poem (such as in an edition of ‘Inside Iraq’ broadcast on Al Jazeera 
on 25 June 2010) have fascinating overtones, where some readings present the poem as an 
affront upon the ‘honour’ of Barzani’s daughter and the Barzani collective rather than a 
critique of the excesses of neopatrimonial rule. 
MARRIAGE INTO THE MODERN ERA  
 
 
 272 
the families concerned, and the women’s fathers sought to build more 
advantageous connections through arranging remarriages which would hide 
evidence of former collaboration with the regime. A formerly instrumental 
relationship became an embarrassing mésalliance through a reversal of 
fortune, and women were told that their continuing relationships with their 
husbands were now perceived as shameful. 
Neopatrimonial logics thus underscore the operation of the entire political 
system. ‘Incorporations of patriarchal kinship modes of operation, moralities 
or idioms are not perceived as disruptions to the state or family boundaries, 
but continuous with them,’ states Joseph (2000b, p. 27). In keeping with this, 
she reformulates Pateman’s (1988) ‘sexual contract’ as a ‘kinship contract’ 
(Joseph 2000a, p. 110), which could be read as Wolf’s ‘kinship license’, 
adapted to the structurations of a modern state. Whereas Sharabi suggests 
that a stasis in family forms impedes the state from thorough-going 
modernisation, this analysis identifies that the modernising nation state, and 
other political actors, are themselves imbricated in directing kinship and 
marriage according to their own political ends — from the contestations 
around national personal status law across the Middle East, to the mass 
induction of Iraqi women into the workforce in the 1970s.  
These include the ‘desires of Kurdish leaders not to upset their more socially 
conservative constituency and undermine their political influence in the 
region,’ (al-Ali and Pratt 2008, p. 104).  The Kurdish women’s movement, and 
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other dissenters to the systemic subordination of women are therefore 
frequently pitted against religious and tribal leaders, who have often received 
the indulgence of the state, tribes and the Kurdish nationalist leadership, and 
been co-opted by British and American representatives (Alinia 2013, p. 22) 
and, prior to that, by the Ottoman authorities (Alinia 2013, p. 25). Even the 
donor agencies who provided support during the Anfal crisis tended to deal 
with established routes of power (Natali 2010, p. 46), tending to further 
consolidate patriarchal structures. 
Women as carriers of group identity 
The very basic rhetorical and organisational principles of the nation 
are tropes for and expressions of gendered power. They familiarly 
include rhetorical notions of, and socio-political organisation based 
on, a homosocial community of heterosexual men (who protect 
women, children and land from foreign threat); the primary 
identification and allegiance of individual (male) citizens who 
congregate in the public sphere to rally, lobby, and legislate for the 
continued (often near-fictive) sequestering of a private sphere 
where women, children, sexuality and family reside; the genesis of 
the nation state as the (masculine) principle that brings regulatory 
order to the undisciplined and excessive (feminised) masses. 
(Layoun 2001, pp. 14-15) 
Namûs has been described above as a form of symbolic capital which is 
attached to women’s bodies, but King (2008b) also valuably conceptualises 
namûs as a boundary which expresses patrilinear sovereignty. Women’s 
bodies, dress and activities are particularly prone to becoming hostage to 
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ideals of nationhood and identity (Yuval-Davis 1993), especially in time of 
war, charged with the impossible task of simultaneously representing 
cultural authenticity and modernity, and demarcating cultural boundaries 
between groups claiming exclusive identities, carrying the reputation of the 
patriline alongside their ethnic, class and religious identities within an 
increasingly diverse and mobile society. 
This may be particularly the case where identities are threatened, through 
the dynamics of assimilation, repression and resistance. As an example, the 
Arabisation policies of the 1980s encouraged Arab men to marry Kurdish 
women through providing hefty financial inducements (Cobbett 1989, p. 
132), effectively attempting to undermine Kurdish cultural identity through 
taking advantage of the partible nature of women’s identities within 
patrilinear systems.  King (2008b, p. 335) cites an interview with a legal 
professional in 1998, who noted that after the Kurdish Uprising of 1991, the 
peshmerga carried out killings of women on a daily basis, justified by 
accusations of fraternisation with Arab men: 
There was a “black list” of the women who had had sexual relations 
with Ba’ath party men. Some were prostitutes, some operated out of 
fear of the government of Iraq, some were poor, their husbands 
were off fighting in the war — there were many reasons. The 
peshmerga decided to kill one per day. This was their own decision. 
The law does not support it because they were not killing their own 
relatives. 
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This vigilantism —which was apparently directed solely at Kurdish women, 
wherein the sexual behaviour of Arab or Turcomen women was apparently 
considered a matter for their own communities —  was eventually quashed 
by central powers, and the power of life and death restored to the patriline. 
However, it can be seen that women are being treated as emblems of national 
and sub-national identity, wherein sexual contact across ethnic (and other) 
lines is perceived as challenging not just male/familial sovereignty, but the 
nation itself. Within the nationalist struggle, namûs became nationalised.  
As a final example of this intersectional quality to reputation management in 
relation to the definition of ethnocultural and ingroup boundaries, Thornhill  
(1997, pp. 82-92) describes a visit to Qushtapa. In 1983, between five and 
eight thousand men of the Barzani tribe, forced into collective townships in 
that area, were rounded up and ‘disappeared’ by Ba’athist troops, leaving 
thousands of widows and children without male support76, bearing extreme 
poverty along with the pride of their tribal identity. Thornhill interviewed a 
mother, who, in the absence of male kin, took upon herself the role of clearing 
family shame, through killing her 23 year old daughter (a mother of two) 
who had been raped by an unknown man while working in the fields. Murder 
was another task which had devolved to women through the absence of 
males. The interview exposes complicated rationalisations for the act: the 
                                                        
76 There are, according to estimates, some 50,000 Anfal widows in the KRI (Alinia 2013, p. 
38) 
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‘honour’ of the nation, of her disappeared kinsmen, of Islam, and of the 
Barzani tribe.. In 1993, a doctor working in Qushtapa noted that there had 
been over 20 such ‘honour’ killings in recent years. (Laizer 1996 p. 167) 
Women’s bodies and sexualities have become sites of identity and political 
contestation beyond the patriline, towards the nation, and other subgroup 
identities. ‘If established states invoke the family when building their 
identities,’ asks King (2008b, p. 335), ‘how much more must a vulnerable, 
“illegitimate” state do so?’  
As King (2008a, pp. 215-216) observes, returnees to the KRI from Western 
diaspora nations make a point of denigrating ‘Western’ family structures and 
attitudes to sexuality in order to display their ‘Kurdish’ identities as 
uncorrupted by contact with different attitudes. 
Collective and ritualized violence, according to Tilly, are results of boundary 
activation, wherein:  
[v]iolence generally increases and becomes more salient in 
situations of rising uncertainty across the boundary. It increases 
because people respond to threats against weighty social 
arrangements they have built on such boundaries — arrangements 
such as exploitation by others, property rights, in-group marriage 
and power over local government.’ (2003, p. 76) 
As Snyder notes (2000), such factional boundaries become sharpened during 
transitions towards democracy, which encourage the identification of 
individual interests with political collectives, often socioeconomic, ethnic or 
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religious in nature. Women’s bodies are not just resources, but boundaries 
between identity groups: controlling their use is a means of claiming cultural 
exclusivity and asserting the group’s identity. Pluralism, particularly where 
sub-national groups are identified as mediators of political power, adds 
complexity to patrilinear orderings: cross-cutting these with many alternate 
identities, each of which draws boundaries around its exclusivity, both for 
their internal integrity, and as modes of mediating state power. These are 
tensions which are particularly pointed within urbanising settings, where 
members of particularistic identity groups find themselves thrown together 
with others, by economic necessity rather than choice, where there is an 
increased potential for relationships to form across the established 
boundaries of identity. These can challenge exclusive identities and the 
principles of patrilinear sovereignty over women’s sexual and reproductive 
capacities.  
Abu-Lughod (1990, pp. 48-49) found that for Bedouin women,  
sedentarisation led to a far more onerous regime of surveillance upon 
women, where older women lamented the lack of freedom for their 
daughters who complained of boredom due to seclusion, and men more 
frequently levelled accusations of immorality against young wives and 
adolescent girls. This, says Abu-Lughod, relates to a heightened male anxiety 
around the custodianship of women within diverse communities, with a 
greater potential for boundary traversal. 
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Kurdish women’s activism is extremely vibrant. Historically Kurdish societies 
have been less resistant to women assuming political power than their 
Persian and Arab neighbours (Van Bruinessen 2001). As Alinia (2013, p. 49) 
states, women’s rights activism is well-established in the KRI, after being 
occluded for decades by the Kurdish struggle for identity and self-
government. 41% of civil servants in the KRI are women (Mahmoud 2012) 
along with 37% of Kurdish MPs in 2011 (The Kurdish Globe 2011) — in 
marked comparison with the UK with just 22% in 2012. However, as Hardi 
notes (in Neurink, 2014) women parliamentarians selected under the quota 
system may have been chosen for their political and tribal loyalties to the 
existing system rather than their political skills or support for progressive 
policies. Kurdish women participate in feminist debates at a global level; they 
produce academic journals, run shelters and participate across all levels of 
society.  
While Kurdish women are making strides towards equality, gender-based 
violence and female suicide are increasingly identified as the most significant 
issues confronting Kurdish women. Such a pattern has been observed by 
Mitra and Singh (2007) within the Indian state of Kerala, which has the 
highest levels of educational and political attainment by women, yet also 
features year on year increases in gender violence and female suicide. Mitra 
and Singh dub this the ‘Kerala Paradox’: where male power is no longer 
firmly vested in the political and economic realm, they argue, physical 
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dominance becomes a method of last resort for maintaining normative male 
supremacy.  
They are not alone in finding that within conservative cultures, increases in 
women’s autonomy can lead to increases in violence against them (Koenig et 
al. 2003). Where male dominance in the private and public spheres become 
discrepant, women’s accomplishments in the public realm may be 
parallelised by a rise in private violence committed by men and families 
fearful of the affordances of their empowerment, and anxious to retain the 
privileges of control.  
If the movement of the instrumentalisation of women’s bodies is moving 
away from a ‘kinship licence’ based in agrarian practice, in which control of 
marriage and reputation is deployed to legitimise the distribution of 
resources and labour, then it is developing towards identifying women’s 
bodies as emblems of identity, and marriage as one means of accessing 
networks of political power. The next chapter discusses original data upon 
marriage in the Kurdistan region to paint a picture of marriage — and 
‘honour’ — in transition. 
SURVEY ANALYSIS  
 
 
 280 
7. Survey analysis 
In order to establish how far the picture of violence within family dynamics 
painted in the foregoing pages could be applied to a society undergoing 
modernisation, I determined to explore contemporary attitudes and kinship 
structures using quantitative methods. This would provide data which could 
address the lack of knowledge around contemporary Kurdish family 
structure and attitudes, but also to see how far the model developed in phase 
one of this thesis would be supported, through correlating experiences of 
HBV within a family to marriage practices and family structure. 
Sample 
Internet surveys are a cost-effective means of reaching a large population, 
and may be particularly useful in countries like the KRI which have no postal 
system, although their tendency to reflect the opinions of those wealthy 
enough to own personal computers, or those who have access to computers 
through an institution, is a clear limitation for representative sampling.  Since 
a good deal of this distribution was through academic networks this means 
that the working class is hugely underrepresented (making up under 8% of 
students in the KRI, according to Aziz (2011).) There was a high rate of 
failure to complete, which I believe could relate to the unfamiliarity of 
respondents to the online survey format, since I fielded emails and other 
personal communications from respondents who needed clarifications 
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around the nature of online surveys. Also, given the delicate nature of 
research into family life, no questions within the survey were coded as 
essential, meaning that respondents could, and frequently did, skip questions 
which they did not wish to answer. In combination this led to almost half of 
the data being incomplete across all fields. Due to a fair sample size (426 
responses), and the design of the survey which gathered a great deal of data 
very efficiently77, the data gathered were sufficient to address the research 
questions discussed on pages 23-24. 
These were addressed through successive univariate, bivariate and 
multivariate analyses of the sample. 
Sample description and variables 
Gender Age Background Marital status 
Female: 109 
(33.7%) 
15-29: 60 (59%) 
30-39: 21 (20.1%) 
40-54: 20 (19.6%) 
55+: 1 (1%) 
City: 83 (80%) 
Town: 10 (9.6%) 
Collective settlement: 7 (6.7%) 
Village: 2 (1.9%) 
Other: 2 (1.9%) 
Single: 55 (50.5%) 
Married: 30 (27.5%) 
In relationship: 7 (6.4%) 
Divorced: 10 (9.2%) 
Engaged: 5 (4.6%) 
Widowed: 2 (1.8%) 
Male: 214  
(66.3%) 
 
15-29: 102 (50.5%) 
30-39: 81 (40%) 
40-54: 16 (7.9%) 
55+: 3 (1.5%) 
City: 117 (55.2%) 
Town: 57 (27%) 
Collective settlement: 17 (8%) 
Village: 18 (8.5%) 
Other: 3 (1.4%) 
Single: 96 (45.5%) 
Married: 94 (44%) 
In relationship: 15 (7%) 
Divorced: 4 (1.9%) 
Engaged: 5 (2.3%) 
Figure 7.1: Sample description 
In questions relating to age and background, there were around 5% missing 
data across both genders. The sample’s skew towards young, urban males, 
                                                        
77  The survey design involved a format structured by logical operators which presented 
different questions depending on whether the respondent was married, for instance, and 
which looped a set of questions relating to the marriages of siblings appropriate to how 
many siblings were identified in an earlier question. 
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may be considered typical of the demographics of internet users in the 
Middle East (Malin 2010). Women within the sample were predominantly 
from urban backgrounds (χ2 = 16.8, 1 df, p = <0.001), using a recoded 
variable in which towns, collective settlements78 and villages were combined 
into a single non-urban category. 
Siblings 
The respondents had an average of around eight siblings (n = 323, μ = 8.06, 
s.d. = 2.81) suggesting that large families remain common even amongst elite 
families. While the survey only had the capacity to record 10 siblings of 
either gender, only two responses strained at that threshold, since two 
respondents had ten (or possibly more than ten) sisters. The sample of 
siblings had a fairly even gender split, shown in the graph below, with 323 
sisters to 325 brothers, and a fairly even distribution across the family. 
                                                        
78 From 1974, Saddam Hussein bulldozed an unknown number of Kurdish villages in a region 
spreading from Khanaqin to Sinjar (areas surrounding the border of Iran and Turkey), as 
part of his Arabisation project, intended both to establish a tighter grip on Iraq’s natural 
resources, and to eliminate loci of nationalist resistance. This involved the forcible relocation 
of over a quarter of a million former villagers and tribesmen. Collective settlements were 
built to accommodate some of these displaced persons (Human Rights Watch 2004a, p. 8-9). 
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Figure 7.2: Siblings by gender 
Question structure 
Questions related to family structure took the format shown in Figure 7.3. 
Each respondent was asked to indicate the number of married siblings he or 
she had and the questions were looped so that data was recorded separately 
for each sibling, from eldest to youngest. To simplify the survey and to make 
the burden of questions less complicated for respondents, whether the 
marriage was underage was only requested of individuals in arranged or 
forced marriages; only respondents who indicated that they (or a sibling) had 
chosen their spouse freely was asked about parental approval of spousal 
choice (to establish whether or not parents generally accepted their 
children’s choices) and only those respondents or siblings who had had an 
arranged marriage were asked the identity of the arrangers,  
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Figure 7.3: Questions for each married respondent, and their married siblings 
 
 
These were followed with a bank of attitudinal questions which can be found 
in the Appendix on page G. Of these attitudinal questions, two were 
particularly pertinent to the aims of the study: one which asked for the 
respondent’s attitude to HBV, and one which asked if there had been any 
experience of HBV within the family. These were the main dependent 
variables which I have analysed and will be explored in greater depth at the 
bivariate and multivariate stages of analysis.  
The following sections will each focus initially upon data around family 
structure and marriage forms, and then follow with analysis of the key 
dependent variables, using increasingly complex analytical strategies. 
Univariate analyses 
Univariate analyses look at single variables in isolation. They are used to gain 
information about the data and the sample. This section will provide the first 
level of analysis into the data, provide basic information about the responses 
to the questions which were asked, and to give a broad view of the raw data. 
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Marriage and family 
Respondent only questions: Brideprice and remarriage 
Questions solely asked of respondents revealed that there were no instances 
of brideprice within the sample. This question was not asked of respondents 
regarding the marriages of their siblings, since it was likely to be unknown to 
the respondent, given the delicacy of marriage prestations. Of 83 responses 
to the question regarding marital prestations, 41 (49%) reported no gifts or 
money taking place to realise their marriage, and 34 (41%) stated that the 
only gifts or contributions were for the couple themselves, six (7%) reported 
reciprocal exchanges between families, and the remainder (1%) were 
unaware if there had been any exchange of marital prestations. This means 
that there was no evidence of brideprice as it has been described in this 
thesis (on pages 170 to 201) so this category was not available for further 
analysis.  
This may suggest that the tradition is becoming outmoded for this group of 
respondents, who are likely to be middle class and express their status 
through their education and employment status rather than their ability to 
muster cash or jewellery, or that respondents were reluctant to identify 
brideprice occurring within their marital arrangements because it has 
negative associations within this population. 
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Of all respondents, only five (1%) had married more than once, and in all 
cases their first marriage ended with divorce, suggesting a very low rate of 
divorce and remarriage as suggested in the literature. 
Arrangement and consent 
Since marriage practises are key to the foregoing argument it was important 
to gather information on levels of consent to marriage, a subject upon which 
there is little data. Respondents were asked to indicate the levels of consent 
involved in each marriage — that is, their own, and those of their siblings — 
with four given options: 
1. Forced: I/my brother/my sister was forced to marry against 
my/his/her will; 
2. Fully arranged: The marriage was entirely arranged by the family; 
3. Mediated: The marriage was arranged jointly by me/my brother/my 
sister and the family working together; 
4. Free choice: I/my brother/my sister married entirely by my/his/her 
own choice. 
 
Combined data from both respondents and siblings — totalling 781 
marriages — is shown in Figure 7.4.  
The largest set of marriages within this sample (i.e. respondents and their 
siblings) were described as freely chosen; only a very small minority were 
described as forced. However, a slight majority of marriages were not free 
choice, but involved some degree of intervention. 
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Figure 7.4: Autonomy in marriage choices 
Age at marriage arrangement 
Forty-three (11%) of the 405 forced, semi-arranged and fully-arranged 
marriages within the sample were arranged when the spouses were minors, 
of whom 22 were male and 21 female. This does not necessarily mean that 
these parties were actually married as minors; the marriage may well have 
been arranged at some point before adulthood, but conducted later on in the 
life of the individual. These were reported by 18 respondents, representing 
just over 4% of the sample as a whole, suggesting that a very small minority 
of families repeatedly arrange marriage for under-18s rather than it being 
distributed across the sample.  
Format of marriage 
Over 80% (n=599) of marriages within the sample were exogamous while 
16% (n=108) of marriages were between cousins, and 5% (n=34) took the 
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direct exchange format. No incidents of elopement or abduction were 
recorded, so this category is again unavailable for analysis. Given that direct 
exchange marriages were primarily associated with non-urban respondents 
(χ2 = 4, 1df, p = 0.042), and that the sample is predominantly urban in origin, 
this hints at a higher prevalence for Kurds living in rural areas, as suggested 
in the foregoing section on direct exchange marriage. Cousin marriage was 
also reported, but at a lower level than has been recorded in South/Central 
Iraq (Al-Ani 2010); again, this is likely to be higher across the general 
population of the KRI than within this sample, who being predominantly 
middle-class, are more likely to identify class-based isogamy than endogamy 
as a productive strategy to maintain status. 
Approval of choice marriages 
Questions were asked to establish whether individuals’ choice marriages 
(whether those of the respondents themselves or of their siblings) were 
accepted by their families and the families of their spouses, to gain an 
impression of the acceptability of marital choices in which relatives did not 
intervene.  
As Table 7.1 shows families appear to have neutral or positive reactions to 
the marriage choices of their own children: 
Response Very negative Negative  Neutral Positive Very positive Total 
From own family 16  
(4.6%) 
46  
(13.2%) 
141 
(40.4%) 
59  
(16.9%) 
87  
(24.9%) 
349  
(100%) 
From spouses’ family 6  
(2.3%) 
17  
(6.6%) 
107  
(41.3%) 
53  
(20.5%) 
76  
(29.3%) 
259  
(100%) 
Table 7.1: Families’ responses to marital choices 
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From the opposite direction, these opinions were mirrored by questions 
asking for the respondent’s opinion upon the spouses’ families’ acceptance of 
their new member, although it should be noted that this line of questioning 
asks the respondent to speculate about something which is outside his or her 
direct experience.  
Post-marital residence 
While Kurdish families are clearly patrilineal and patricentric (King 2008b; 
King and Stone 2010), at least in official terms, it is unclear whether the 
predominant household pattern is nuclear as Donovan suggests (1990), or 
patrilocally extended, given that a survey of 148 Kurdish women in Istanbul 
revealed that over 68% had lived with their mothers-in-law, particularly in 
the early years of marriage (Karahan 1995). It should be noted that even the 
existence of a predominance of nuclear families does not preclude the 
extended family as the ‘ideal’ form, since nuclear families may become 
extended later in the household lifecycle and may be influenced by 
demographic factors. Aziz’s (2011, p. 111) survey of university students in 
the KRI found that nearly 60% were living in households of 5-7 members, 
and around 24% were larger, suggesting that the extended family remains a 
common ordering of the household. Certainly, the family remains 
overwhelmingly male-dominated, with fathers making all important 
decisions in 80% of households (Aziz 2011, p. 115). 
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It may be too simplistic, however, to view marital residence simply on the 
basis of the location of the household without extending attention to other 
indicators of proximity. If a couple split away from a patrilocal extended 
family household only to relocate next door, or on the same street, or — after 
the fashion of Egyptian peasants, to occupy a separate apartment within the 
husband’s father’s house — the influence of the extended family may prevail 
(Lee and Stone 1980, p. 321), even if the wife is now able to take command of 
her own private domestic realm without interference from any in-laws. In 
such a circumstance, the new household may no longer be technically 
considered virilocal or patrilocal, but should be considered patrifocal, in the 
sense that Tanner (1979) and Young and Wilmott (1962) describe daughters 
who live neolocally, but in proximity to their mother’s houses, as matrifocal. 
I asked respondents to indicate where they, and their siblings, lived after 
marriage: whether with their spouse’s family, near to their spouse’s family, 
near their own family, with their own family, or in a new household which 
was not close to either family. Patrilocality means that post-marital residence 
was in the house of the father (for the husband), or the father-in-law (for the 
wife). Patrifocality indicates that although post-marital residence was not 
with the father/father-in-law, the marital residence was close to the agnatic 
household; matrifocality and matrilocality describe the converse situation — 
residence with or proximate to the bride’s mother. 
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Figure 7.5: Post-marital residence patterns 
Of 769 marriages of respondents and their siblings, matricentric family forms 
are the least popular, with patrilocality remarkably strong within the sample. 
It should be noted that the question asked where the couple lived ‘after the 
wedding’, and for many of these, either patrilocality or matrilocality may 
have been a temporary arrangement while locating neolocal accommodation.  
The attitudinal questions (see also Appendix D page G) provide an insight 
into respondents’ views about these different locations for starting their 
married life. A majority (76% of respondents) strongly agreed that it was 
preferable for a couple to start their married life in their own home. From 
cross-tabulation, it can be seen that some 55% of married respondents are, 
or were, living in family arrangements which they personally considered sub-
optimal (χ2 = 4, 5 df, p = 0.535). There may be a strong trend towards 
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traditional patricentric families across the sample,  but this is does not 
necessarily seem to be the arrangement which respondents individuals  
identify as the best —and this may be a source of intergenerational  conflict. 
Persons involved in marriage arrangement 
I asked respondents to identify the actors who were involved for each forced, 
arranged and mediated form of marriage.  
The survey allowed respondents to select as many options as appropriate, in 
recognition of the fact that marriage arrangement is often a collaborative 
affair, and as Figure 7.6 shows, a wide variety of marriage arrangers were 
identified79. This tends to dispel the idea that marriage arrangement is the 
role of the family patriarch, especially given that female relatives are 
frequently involved in marriage arrangement. Rather than the pattern 
advanced by Rubin where men are considered ‘exchange partners’ and 
women the subjects of exchange (1975, p. 174), it seems here that marriage 
arrangement is an activity in which the whole family can participate. 
There were 134 responses to this question. While the largest group of 60 
respondents (45%) identified a single marriage arranger operating in the 
family, 12 (9%) identified more than five. 
                                                        
79 The diagram omits the category ‘not known’ which tends to represent women’s marriages 
in particular. This will be discussed below. 
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Figure 7.6: Pie chart of marriage arrangers 
Attitudes 
The sample showed strongly negative attitudes to marriage arrangement and 
to traditional forms of marriage in particular. There was a general, if 
somewhat inconsistent, support for power-sharing in relationships and an 
approval for women’s work outside the home within the sample. However, 
virginity remained a salient aspect of women’s role for almost all 
respondents80.  
Around a quarter of the sample expressed some level of approval of HBV. A 
similar amount reported experiences of HBV within their own families, which 
                                                        
80 Full responses to these questions are given in the Appendix (p. G). 
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rose to a third if non-committal responses were were disregarded. 
Interestingly, questions around the topic of ‘honour’ raised the most 
uncertainty. Questions relating to whether HBV had occurred in the 
respondent’s own family, and whether a failure to restore ‘honour’ would 
lead to social exclusion had disproportionate non-responses, either as no 
answer at all (representing 14% of the responses to the question as to 
whether HBV had occurred in the respondent’s own family, compared to 5% 
for most others), or a non-committal neutral response.  
Prompt Agree  
strongly 
Agree No  
opinion 
Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
Disputes about namûs have 
led to violence in my own 
family 
10.9% 
(n=21) 
17.3% 
(n=33) 
13.6% 
(n=26) 
25% 
(n=44) 
35% 
(n=67) 
100% 
(n=191) 
Violence may sometimes be 
justified if a person has 
brought shame to their family 
5.6% 
(n=12) 
20.7% 
(n=44) 
12.7% 
(n=27) 
24.9% 
(n=53) 
36.2% 
(n=77) 
100% 
(n=213) 
Table 7.2: Responses to key dependent variables 
The ratio of HBV approvers at around 25% of the sample is in tune with 
Taysi’s (2009) findings in the Sulaymaniyah region that 30% of respondents 
felt violence against ‘dishonourable’ behaviour was justified on at least some 
occasions suggesting that there is a persistent level of approval for this form 
of violence. 
Bivariate analyses 
Bivariate analyses are used to establish whether, and to what extent, two 
variables are related. The aim of this section is to identify and explain 
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significant differences according to gender, to levels of consent to marriage, 
and attitudes and experiences of HBV. 
Marriage and family 
Marriage Consent Variable 
Given that familial influence over marriage is an important aspect of 
individual freedoms and at the core of the ‘exchange of women’ model 
identified as foundational to the concept of ‘honour’, I created a variable 
designed to give an indication of the levels of consent to marriage which were 
most typical for each family. For the creation of this variable, forced and fully-
arranged marriages were recoded as 1, demarcating low consent, given 
Alinia’s (2013, p. 109) observation that some Kurdish women in fully-
arranged marriages appeared to assume that parents had an absolute right to 
arrange marriage which they could not challenge, making discrimination 
between these two forms difficult. Marriages which were arranged in 
collaboration were recoded as 2, representing mediated consent, and free 
choice marriages as 3. These were totalled for all respondents and their 
siblings, and then divided by the total number of all marriages reported by 
each respondent, creating a variable with values between 1 and 3, to give a 
sense of the general level of family involvement in the marriages of the 
respondent and her or his siblings. Due to the diffuse nature of the data on 
marriage, occurring across the categories of siblings and respondents, 
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combined scores were developed for marriages involving men (i.e., 
respondents’ brothers and male respondents), and marriages involving 
women (i.e., respondents’ sisters and female respondents.) 
Gender and autonomy 
A dependent t-test81 using versions of the marriage consent variable which 
were separated by gender, used a matched pair analysis to compare levels of 
autonomy in marriage for male respondents and respondents’ brothers 
against female respondents and respondents’ sisters. 
Marriage Consent ?̅? N s.d. Error Sig 
Female 2.11 144 0.65 0.054 cor= 0.232 
p=0.005 Male 2.32 144 0.60 0.050 
Table 7.3: Dependent t-test of marital autonomy by gender 
This indicated that women were significantly more likely to have had a 
greater level of family intervention in their marriage than men, where the 
mean value locates most female marriages more closely to the model of 
mediated consent than males.  
For males, the higher mean indicates a significantly greater likelihood of 
being permitted to make a free choice. The higher the consent level within 
arranged forms of marriage, the more likely it was that it coexisted with free 
choice marriage within the family: for example, just 7.8% of families in which 
a marriage had been coerced upon one sibling, allowed another a free hand in 
                                                        
81 The dependent t-test was selected given the nature of the dummy variable – the Marriage 
Consent Variable - described on page 290. 
 SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 297 
their choices (χ2 = 4.8, 1 df, p = 0.029). This can be compared with 26.3% of 
families, in which marriage arranged without consultation co-occurred with 
free marriage (χ2 = 17.5, 1 df, p = <0.000), and 49.7% in which marriages 
were arranged through collaboration (χ2 = 26.2, 1 df, p = <0.000).  
It appears then, that levels of consent to marriage may not be identical across 
siblings within the same family, but they are grouped, with each individual 
family having greater or lesser tendencies towards allowing autonomy or 
maintaining control over the marriages of young people. Just as marriages 
under the age of 18 were clustered within certain families, so are low consent 
forms of marriage. 
Autonomy and attitudes 
Comparison of attitudinal data with the family-wide marital autonomy 
variables proved to show interesting correlations using ANOVA (Appendix E, 
page M). Findings indicated that individuals from families which tended 
towards greater intervention in the marriages of female relatives were more 
likely to believe that virginity was essential for women, that women’s roles 
were as housewives and mothers, and to support the institution of 
brideprice, amongst other patriarchal attitudes. Low marital autonomy, then, 
appears to correlate with traditional gender roles, and this does indeed 
suggest that there is some linkage between adherence to the expectations of 
traditional femininity and marriage arrangement. 
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There was a near-significant correlation (p = 0.057) with the belief that 
violence could be acceptable against a person who had caused shame to the 
family and lower levels of marital autonomy, suggesting there is also a 
connection between families which exert control over women’s marital 
choices and the approval of HBV.  
One significant finding was that respondents from families in which the 
marriages of men and boys had higher levels of intervention were more likely 
to agree that young people were under pressure to marry from their families, 
whereas there was no such finding in relation to the female marital 
autonomy scale. This suggests that lower levels of male autonomy in 
marriage are more likely to be resented as a parental infringement upon 
individual liberties, whereas lower levels of female autonomy are more likely 
to be accepted as an aspect of the status quo. 
Of forced marriages, over 85% of these took place in families in which the 
parents were responsible for marriage arrangement (χ2 = 66, 1df, p = <0.001) 
whereas for fully-arranged marriages, this was less than 50%, suggesting that 
parental involvement in marriage is associated with lower levels of 
expressed consent and, by corollary, that marriages arranged by more distant 
relatives feature more consultation.  
This was tested using ANOVAs upon a filtered dataset, from which free choice 
marriages were temporarily removed from the analysis to provide a fair 
comparison of arrangers. Whereas parental involvement in marriage 
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arrangement significantly impacted upon the Marriage Consent Variable for 
male respondents and respondents’ brothers – reducing it from 2.25 to 2.2 (F 
= 2.04, df = 16, p = 0.014), there was little impact upon the Marriage Consent 
Variable for female respondents and respondents’ sisters which remained 
largely unchanged (F = 1.1, df = 14, p = 0.378). It appears then, that for males, 
closer kinship relationships between the arrangee and arranger correlate 
with decreased personal autonomy for the arrangee. This is less visible for 
females, since they tend to be found in lower consent forms of marriage 
across the sample. 
The data was then tested to see if the number of marriage arrangers 
operating within a family influenced marital autonomy. 
 
Figure 7.7: Mean of marriage arrangers in the family by marriage consent level 
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A comparison of the means of the numbers of marriage arrangers across the 
family as a whole gives the impression that the greater the number of 
individuals who were involved in marriage arrangement within that family, 
the higher the likelihood of marriages within that family being forced, as 
shown in Figure 7.7.  
ANOVAs indicated that all relationships between marriage type and the 
number of arrangers were highly significant, for forced marriage (f=14.4, df = 
11, p=<0.001), fully arranged marriage (f=11.1, df = 11, p=<0.001), mediated 
marriage (f=29.7, df = 11, p=<0.001) and free choice marriage (f=3.2, df = 11, 
p=<0.001). 
The fully arranged and mediated forms are very close in value. However, it 
should be noted that each mediated marriage could be considered to involve 
an additional marriage arranger — this being the arrangee/spouse him/ 
herself.  
The count of marriage arrangers across a family also has a highly significant 
correlation, correlating with a lower value within the marriage autonomy 
variable (f=5.3, df = 23, p=<0.001).  
So, both parental involvement in marriage arrangement and a higher number 
of arrangers may be correlated with lower levels of individual autonomy in 
marriage. The more collaborative marriage arrangement is within the family, 
the more it appears to exclude the arrangee, suggesting these are families in 
 SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 301 
which the interests of the collective are very much considered to outweigh 
those of the individual, since the more persons who are invested within 
marriage arrangements in a family, the more likely it is that a family member 
will be coerced into marriage. Also it shows that although parents may not be 
the predominant marriage arrangers, as shown in Figure 7.6, where they do 
intervene, they are more likely to override the wishes of the younger 
generation. 
Marriage arrangers and gender 
Figure 7.8 shows the identity of marriage arrangers by the gender of the 
arrangee. For each gender category, percentages have been derived to 
compensate for the unequal numbers of female and male respondents for 
which marriage arrangers were identified within the survey82. 
                                                        
82 Arrangers were identified as being involved in the marriages of 161 female 
respondents/respondents’ sisters and 299 male respondents/respondents’ brothers. 
SURVEY ANALYSIS  
 
 
 302 
 
Figure 7.8: Marriage arrangers by gender of arrangee 
Most strikingly, respondents were significantly likely to say that they did not 
know who had arranged their sisters’ marriages (χ2 = 25, 1df, p = <0.001). 
Since there was no significant difference between male and female 
respondents responding that they did not know who arranged their sisters’ 
marriages (χ2 = 2, 5df, p = 0.571), it seems likely that generally, marriage 
arrangements for women are more discreet, and thus they are less likely to 
be discussed within the family meaning that respondents were not able to 
respond to this question. This, along with the smaller sample size for 
women’s marriages means that it is harder to generalise from these results 
than it is for the marriages of men. 
Mothers were significantly more likely to arrange marriages for sons rather 
than daughters (χ2 = 10, 1df, p = 0.001); sisters were near-significantly more 
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likely to arrange marriage for their brothers than for their sisters (χ2 = 3, 1df, 
p = 0.06).  
It was found that where mothers arranged marriages for their sons, 80% of 
these marriages occurred within families with patricentric orderings (χ2 = 12, 
1df, p = <0.001), meaning that the bride the mother had selected would 
reside with, or close to, her own residence, suggesting that the dynamics of 
household politics described above, where a mother-in-law wishes to 
influence the choice of her daughter-in-law as a domestic co-labourer, may 
still apply within some households. To some degree, there may be similar 
dynamics with sisters who expect to remain in the paternal household, but it 
may also be the case that sisters are likely to socialise with women of the 
appropriate age to make suitable matches for their brothers. 
Women were more likely to have involved an ‘other relative’ (χ2 = 4, 1df, p = 
0.04) This may reflect a greater tendency for women to use the extended 
family for marital networking, possibly because they may be less likely to be 
involved in workplace and other friendship networks. It could also related to 
the fact that women appear to be under a higher expectation to have 
arranged marriages than men were, and that therefore they may be more 
motivated to find persons within the family to validate their choices; or also 
of a recognition that due to androcentric orderings of the family, and the 
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difficulties of divorce for women, marriage may be perceived as more of a 
risk by women, and therefore they prefer to consult more widely.  
It is interesting to observe that ‘other relatives’, such as cousins, nieces, 
nephews and so forth, and friends are more likely to be from the same 
generation as the arrangee than the family roles provided in the survey, 
which would suggest a greater attunement to contemporary values around 
marriage within a modernising economy than the parental generation, who 
may have opinions on what makes a suitable spouse which the younger 
generation find outdated. This would allow women to fulfil the social 
expectation of having an arranged marriage but with a greater level of 
confidence in the choices made by an age-matched peer. 
Birth order 
Birth order has some effects upon marriage autonomy for brothers, but not 
for sisters as shown in Figure 6.9. For respondents’ sisters, the proportion of 
marriage by free choice remained under 40% regardless of their position in 
their birth order for the first four siblings83. However, respondents’ brothers 
were increasingly likely to have been able to make their own choices the later 
they came in the birth order, with 16 (80%) of brothers who came fourth in 
the birth order taking a free choice marriage.  
                                                        
83 Only the first four siblings were analysed due to the natural decay in sample size, which 
meant that although there were 197 marriages for first siblings, there were only 19 for the 
fourth. 
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While the eldest brother of the family seemed to be under the same 
constraints as the eldest sister, younger brothers were accorded increasing 
autonomy than their elders, whilst younger sisters were not. 
 
Figure 7.9: Gender, birth order and percentage of free choice marriage 
For males, this appears to correlate with a declining requirement for 
traditional forms of marriage, with both cousin marriage and direct exchange 
marriages (‘traditional’ forms) being much more common for males earlier in 
the birth order, as shown in Figure 7.10. 
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Figure 7.10: Gender, birth order and percentage of traditional marriage 
It appears as if there is a clear strategy to marriage arrangement for males: 
lower levels of free choice for elder brothers indicate responsibilities to build 
social capital through marriages which build obligations within groups, 
which pressures weigh less upon younger brothers, who are able to assume 
greater latitude in their choices.  On the other hand, women’s marriage 
arrangement has little relationship to birth order. This suggests that while 
eldest sons have a heightened responsibility to enter into marriages with 
strategic value, for daughters, this responsibility remains constant 
throughout the life of the family. 
Marriage formats 
Direct exchange forms of marriage were significantly associated with a non-
urban background (χ2 = 4.0, 1df, p = 0.042) whereas exogamous marriage 
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was near-significantly associated with an urban environment (χ2 = 3.5, 1df, p 
= 0.052), with no clear pattern behind the occurrence of cousin marriage.  
As Figure 7.11 below shows, cousin and direct exchange forms of marriage 
revealed themselves to be largely separate phenomena, with only four 
families having conducted both forms, whereas the crossover between cousin 
or direct exchange marriages with exogamy was much larger.  
This suggests that different micro-cultures have developed largely separate 
strategies around marriage; as suggested earlier, direct exchange marriage 
may be more likely to be associated with an agricultural, non-tribal lifestyle 
in villages, whereas cousin marriage is more likely for people influenced by 
pastoral/ tribal modes of life. 
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Figure 7.11: Intersection of different forms of marriage (including both respondents and siblings) 
Marriages by direct exchange or cousin marriage were strongly and 
significantly found in families in which arranged marriage were practised (χ² 
= 82.5, df = 1, p = <0.001). Few people then, choose marriage with their 
cousins or by direct exchange upon their own initiative. There was also a 
strikingly high prevalence of marriages arranged while the arrangee was a 
minor within ‘traditional’ forms of marriage. Of the marriages arranged 
before the arrangee reached the age of 18, 66.7% of these marriages was 
with a cousin, or in a direct exchange form, against just 15.9% of those 
married as adults, marking a strongly significant difference (χ² = 30, df = 1, p 
= <0.001). Early marriage arrangement appears to have a strong correlation 
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with endogamous forms of marriage: the types of marriages which serve to 
solidify reciprocal relationships within patrilines and between local families 
may be the outcome of long-term, multigenerational relationships in which 
reciprocal marriages may be considered an aspect of maintaining long-term 
alliances, even before the potential spouses are born.  
Attitudes and experiences 
Variables 
The responses to the key prompts shown in Table 7.2 were used to create 
binary variables which will be referred to as HBV Experience and HBV 
Approval, where over a quarter in each category were positive results (made 
from combining strongly agree and agree), which rose to closer to a third 
when neutral and missing responses were removed.  
There were no significant findings in relation to the correlation of approval of 
HBV, nor of whether or not HBV had been experienced within their families. 
However, it is important not to treat these variables as paired: whether or 
not a person approves of HBV is a directly accessible personal opinion. 
Whether or not HBV has been experienced within a family is a fact which may 
or may not be known, and a positive response may describe varying 
situations. Given that Kurdish families are large, and that modernisation has 
been rapid, it is very likely that respondents have branches of the family in 
very different conditions, and with very different attitudes, from their own: 
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for instance, an urban professional reporting an experience of HBV could be 
recalling the fate of a great-aunt passed down through family legend, which 
may have little to do with his current circumstances and family structure. 
These variables should not, therefore, be treated as equivalent; it should be 
understood that there is likely to be far lesser potential for 
representativeness and reliability intrinsic to the variable which relates to 
the experience of HBV within a family in comparison with the individual’s 
own approval of HBV. 
Gendered attitudes 
 
Figure 7.12: Key gendered differences in attitudes 
 
Each bar in Figure 7.12 shows the percentage agreeing/strongly agreeing 
with each proposition, with neutral and missing responses discarded. 
Women were less likely to agree that couples should not have relationships 
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before marriage(χ² =4.2, df=1, p = 0.029); they were less likely to agree that 
women’s primary roles were as housewives and mothers (χ² =6.8, df=1, p = 
0.006), that women should be virgins before marriage (χ² =7.4, df=1, p = 
0.006), that men should be breadwinners (χ² =5.6, df=1, p = 0.013), that 
husbands should take charge of their family (χ² =13.6, df=1, p = <0.0001), and 
that young people had too much freedom (χ² =3.4, df=1, p = 0.046), that 
namûs is the basis of a moral society (χ² =4.1, df=1, p = 0.032), and that 
brideprice is a mark of respect (χ² =3.3, df=1, p = 0.048). It should be noted 
here, that as women in the sample are more likely to have urban origins, this 
may also reflect this as well as their gender. 
Approval of HBV 
There were several marked differences between those who approved of HBV 
and the rest of the sample, where HBV approval appeared as part of a 
constellation of conservative and gender-complementarian attitudes. These 
can be seen in Appendix E (p. G). Some of the most significant findings are 
illustrated below, where the percentage of agree strongly/agree responses 
has been shown for those who expressed approval of HBV, against non-
approvers. 
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Figure 7.13: Variables correlating with approval for HBV 
The understanding of ‘honour’ as relating to the control of women in Kurdish 
society was cross-tabulated against its sibling variable, in which the 
respondent was given the option to express personal dissent. A majority 
(75.3%) of those who agreed that ‘honour’ connoted the control of women in 
Kurdish society also agreed with the statement that ‘honour’ should not have 
that meaning. For this group, the subject of ‘honour’ is very distinct from the 
unquestioned acceptance identified amongst HBV perpetrators by Alinia 
(2013, p. 63) but shows a movement towards the more nuanced 
understandings suggested by Taysi (2009) and Fischer-Tahir (2009).  
This suggests a normative system in transition, undergoing generational 
change. 
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Experience of HBV 
 
Figure 7.14: Variables correlating with experience of HBV 
The  most significant findings were that respondents from families where 
HBV had been recorded were more likely to agree that parents arranged 
marriage in their own self-interest (χ² = 8.6, df = 1, p = 0.006); that families 
who failed to restore ‘honour’ faced exclusion within their own communities 
(χ² = 5.5, df = 1, p = 0.006); that marriage is a business arrangement between 
two families (χ² = 8, df = 1, p = 0.009) and that young people faced pressure 
around marriage (χ² = 5, df=1, p = 0.021). They were also significantly more 
likely to report a non-urban background (χ² = 5, df = 1, p=0.02). 
In combination, these differences present a view of marriage which is related 
to the exegesis in this thesis: marriage is a business arrangement where the 
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benefits accrue to the family rather than the arrangee, in which arrangees are 
under pressure from their parents, within a wider atmosphere of community 
pressure to conform to the dictates of ‘honour’. 
They were also more likely to disagree that direct exchange marriage forms 
were a source of social problems (χ² = 7.8, df =1, p = 0.012). This might be 
related to the fact that they as non-urban dwellers, they were less likely to 
have negative preconceptions around a form of marriage which has been 
stigmatised as a rural practise. A full table of results is provided in the 
Appendix (page J). However, differences in the attitudes and demographics of 
those who had experienced HBV in their families and those who had not were 
not as numerous as those between HBV approvers and non-approvers. 
It is also notable that there was little intersection between those who 
approved of HBV, and those who reported experiencing it within their 
families (χ² = 0.2, df = 1, p = 0.522)84. It is possible that the relationship 
between individual approval and the experience of HBV within the family 
may be comparatively weak. There may be a need to look beyond the 
phallocentric attitudes displayed by HBV Approvers, and to situate the actual 
occurrence of such crimes within a wider context which I will return to at the 
multivariate stage of analysis. 
                                                        
84 Given that these two questions were ones which received a disproportionate rate of non-
responses, it should also be noted that may be a significant relationship concealed by the 
reticence of those who did not respond to these questions: of the 36 respondents who did 
not provide a response on the topic of whether HBV had caused problems within their own 
family, 24 also did not choose to indicate their attitude to HBV. 
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Structurally, there were interesting findings particular to the experiences of 
HBV shown in Figure 7.15. 
 
Figure 7.15: Percentage of respondents reporting HBV within their families, against the range of expressions of consent 
to marriage 
It was within families which did not feature the consultative ‘mediated 
consent’ method of marriage arrangement that HBV was most likely to be 
experienced (χ²=3.3, df=1, p = 0.049). This finding suggests that this form, 
which requires the highest levels of concord between parents and children, is 
the least likely to instigate conflicts between generations which erupt into 
violence.  
This gives weight to the position that HBV is related to intergenerational 
struggles around marriage choice and autonomy. 
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Multivariate analyses 
Multivariate analyses help to uncover relationships between several 
variables and thus help to provide a more nuanced account of the factors 
related to attitudes and experiences of HBV. These two dependent variables 
were examined using the technique of binary logistic regression, where each 
dependent variable was coded as a binary. 
Each dependent variable was analysed using an iterative process to develop 
the most robust model through a process of elimination, including full cross-
checks for multicollinearity. In each case, the model which was developed for 
one dependent variable was tested against the other to contrast the 
predictive strength of each model across both conditions. 
Measures 
Dependent variables: The same variables were used in this phase of analysis 
as in the bivariate phase as described on page 306, i.e., responses to the 
questions around approval and experience of HBV were collapsed (1=Agree 
and Strongly Agree, 0=Disagree and Strongly Disagree) to create a 
dichotomous variable, suitable for use in a logistic regression equation. 
Missing data and non-committal responses were recoded leaving the HBV 
Approval variable with 186 responses, and HBV Experience with 165.  
Independent variables: Attitudes were measured using 5-point Likert scales: 
however, it was necessary to recode these in order to ameliorate the effects 
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of missing data and to make the findings more easily interpretable. First, all 
non-responses and neutral responses were recoded to 0. Then the remaining 
responses were re-coded on a scale of 1-4 (where 1 means the respondent 
agrees strongly, 2 that the respondent agrees, and so forth) to allow them to 
be used as scale variables. Thus, a positive coefficient in the model may be 
interpreted as increasing the likelihood of either approving of HBV, or 
belonging to a family in which HBV has been experienced. 
Approval of HBV 
Binary logistic regression 
There were 186 cases included in this regression, in which 56 individuals had 
expressed a personal acceptance for violence, justified using the language of 
‘honour’.  Variables were added into the regression in an iterative method in 
order to build the strongest possible model within the limitations of the 
sample. 
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Variables Approval of HBV Experience of HBV 
 Sig Impact
85
 ExpB Sig Impact ExpB 
Women should be virgins before marriage 0.001 140% 2.4 0.627 0% 1 
Brideprice is a mark of respect for a bride 
and her family 
0.001 90% 1.9 0.356 -20% 0.8* 
In our society, honour comes from 
controlling all the women in a family 
0.003 70% 1.7 0.037 30% 1.3 
A husband should take charge of his family 0.027 60% 1.6 0.861 0% 1* 
Husbands and wives should share their 
responsibilities without either of them 
taking overall control 
0.001 -50% 0.5* 0.120 -30% 0.7* 
Nagelkerke R
2
  0.52 0.08 
Table 7.4: Binary logistic regression for dependent variables, focussing on HBV Approval 
* Negative effects: e.g., persons approving of HBV tended to disagree with the principle of power sharing in 
marriage. 
Findings located HBV as an aspect of a patriarchal model of gender relations, 
with a particular emphasis upon virginity: beliefs that women should be 
virgins before marriage more than doubled the likelihood of approving of 
HBV. An interesting and unexpected finding was that approval of brideprice 
was, after attitudes to female virginity, one of the most important aspects in 
the model. This, then, tends to support the feminist positions against 
brideprice noted above and suggests an area in need of greater attention.  
According to the Nagelkerke R2 value, over 50% of the approval for HBV can 
be linked with a constellation of attitudes towards women, gender and family 
roles which could be considered phallocentric. This is a very robust finding 
for the social sciences, showing strong interrelations between attitudes 
towards virginity, male dominance, male custodianship of women and the 
acceptability of brideprice. 
                                                        
85 This was calculated using the formula [percent=(1-(SUM(ExpB)/1))*-1]. See Long (1997), 
p. 228.  It indicates the impact of each independent variable within the model in percentage 
terms. 
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The model proved very weak for predicting HBV Experience however, with 
only one of the attitudinal variables retaining significance in the model, 
several reversals, and a very poor R2 value, which explained less than 8% of 
the variance in the model. Moreover, two of the five variables have negative 
effects, whereas they are positive in the model for HBV Approval. While those 
who approve of HBV tend support the institution of brideprice and male 
dominance within the family, those who have reported HBV tend to take the 
opposite position. 
The fact that it is possible to create an extremely robust model for predicting 
the HBV Approval which is next-to-useless in predicting HBV Experience 
shows a marked discrepancy, strongly suggesting that the attitudes which 
support HBV and the circumstances which give it rise may be rather distinct 
which underlines the lack of correlation between the HBV Approval and HBV 
Experience variables mentioned above. 
Experience of HBV 
I carried out a similar process for attitudinal and other factors which could be 
predictive of the experience of HBV. This model had a sample size of 165, 
where 54 had given positive reports of HBV in the family.  
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Variables Experience of HBV Approval of HBV 
 Sig Impact ExpB Sig Impact ExpB 
Parents know best and don’t need to consult 
before arranging marriages 
0.038 70% 1.7 0.012 90% 1.9 
Cousin marriages cause problems 0.025 40% 1.4 0.557 10% 1.1 
In our society, honour comes from 
controlling all the women in a family 
0.048 30% 1.3 <0.001 90% 1.9 
Couples should not have any relationship 
before marriage 
0.014 -40% 0.6 0.46 -10% 0.9 
Non-urban background 0.023 -60% 0.4 0.65 -50% 0.5 
Nagelkerke R
2
  0.22 0.24 
Table 7.5: Binary logistic regression for dependent variables, focussing upon HBV Experience 
The attitudes found amongst those who had knowledge of HBV within their 
families had a very different quality from those which predicted approval 
shown above: rather than the patriarchal attitudes towards gender roles, 
which were predominant in the model which predicted approval of HBV, 
these tended instead to refer to the issues of marriage and family structure, 
where an acceptance of parental authority to arrange marriages is the 
strongest indicator of experiencing HBV within the family. The constellation 
of values here is less related to a gendered view of the conjugal than in the 
model above, but to power relations within the family. 
It is noteworthy that this model, although the strongest for predicting HBV 
Experience within the available data, was actually better at predicting HBV 
Approval than its actual purpose, despite the fact that most variables were 
not significant within the model when applied to HBV Approval. Those 
variables which were significant against both dependent variables, i.e., 
respect for parental marriage arrangement, and the belief that ‘honour’ is 
located in the control of women, tend to support the position that there may 
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be interactions between the principle of marriage arrangement and the 
location of namûs, as a form of symbolic capital in the control of women. 
Partly, the failure of the same models to provide similar responses across 
both dependent variables may be related to the distancing effect which 
increases the potential for unexplained measurement errors in the HBV 
Experience variable. Another aspect might be that attitudes are actually 
rather poor predictors of HBV experience: that rather than attitudes, there 
may be structural aspects in play. The attitudes which provided the best fit to 
HBV Experience — negative experiences of cousin marriage, the acceptance 
of low consent forms of marriage, and the restrictions upon male/female 
socialisation — might be more indicative of dynamics around marriage as it 
relates to the interests of the wider family. If so, this would tend to support 
the theories outlined in this thesis which locate the situations under which 
HBV may arise in kinship structure. 
Patterns of marriage amongst the urban middle class who formed this 
sample, in which free choice was predominant, may be very different from 
their suburban and rural contemporaries. In order to assess the relationship 
between HBV experience between families in which marriages were 
arranged and those in which it was not, I performed a binary logistic 
regression on a filtered dataset, which only included respondent data where 
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they had reported one of the three forms of arranged marriage occurring 
within their family, thus reducing the sample size to 184 respondents.  
This allowed for the comparison of the different forms of marriage, such as a 
comparison between cousin marriage and direct exchange marriage. If the 
dataset had not been filtered, the presence of freely chosen marriages would 
tend to confound the comparison of one form of marriage with another, given 
that the data shows that overwhelming majority of marriages which take 
either one of these forms are arranged. In correlations it was found that 
within families where marriages were arranged, those which featured cousin 
marriage were the most likely to have reported incidences of HBV (χ²= 4.2, df 
= 1, p = 0.035), whereas there was no such correlation in cases of direct 
exchange (χ²= 0.5, df = 1, p = 0.364) or exogamous marriage (χ²= 1.1, df = 1, p 
= 0.227).  
Due to the requirement for casewise deletion for logistic regression, many 
cases were excluded, resulting in n=88, this model was not able to accept 
many factors due to the statistical rule of thumb that requires 30 cases per 
independent variable; and indeed, few factors proved to be significant within 
the model. 
 Variables Experience of HBV Approval of HBV 
 Sig Impact ExpB Sig Impact ExpB 
Cousin marriage within the family 0.041 150% 2.5 0.362 50% 1.5 
Non-urban background 0.031 -60% 0.4 0.192 -40% 0.6 
Nagelkerke R
2
  0.11 0.03 
Table 7.6: Binary logistic regression for HBV dependent variables, within families which arrange marriage 
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Cousin marriage appears to be a clear risk factor for HBV Experience, where 
the existence of cousin marriage within a family in which marriage is 
arranged increases the likelihood of HBV being experienced within that 
family by 2.5 times, more than doubling the chances of violence being 
reported in the family. Direct exchange marriage (analysis not presented) 
showed no significant relationship with experiences of HBV, although it 
should be recalled that families which had used direct exchange marriage 
strategies were a very small subset of the population as a whole.  
To gain more insight into the relationship between HBV experience, cousin 
marriage and consent, I prepared a multi-layered crosstabulation which 
demonstrated an intersection between low consent to marriage, cousin 
marriage and the experience of HBV. Although this lacks power in its positive 
interpretation, it can read to indicate that in families in which a high level of 
consent to marriage is expected, this does not correlate to the experience of 
HBV. 
 Experience of HBV   
 No Yes Total P-Value
86
 
High consent 
 Other marriage 63 (81%) 31 (89%) 94 (83%) 0.136 
 Cousin marriage 15 (19%) 4 (11%) 19 (17%) 
 Total 78 (100%) 35 (100%) 113 (100%) 
Low consent 
 Other marriage 24 (73%) 8 (42%) 32 (62%) 0.03 
 Cousin marriage 9 (27%) 11 (58%) 20 (38%) 
 Total 33 (100%) 19 (100%) 52 (100%) 
Table 7.7: Multilayered crosstabulation - HBV Experience, marriage consent level and cousin marriage 
                                                        
86 Probability calculated using Fisher’s Exact Test due to small cell sizes 
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Summary and discussion 
 By a small margin, more marriages within the sample were arranged 
than freely chosen. A wide range of individuals participate in marriage 
arrangement; 
 Cousin marriage and direct exchange marriages are rare within this 
sample and have characteristic profiles; 
 There are wide differences between families in attitudes to marital 
consent and arrangement, with tendencies for certain families to 
adopt low consent forms, whereas others tend towards higher consent 
forms; 
 Families remain patricentric, despite the wishes of a younger 
generation; 
 Approval of HBV is correlated with patriarchal gender roles, 
particuarly around virginity; 
 Experience of HBV is correlated with acceptance of parental authority, 
and is less firmly rooted in other attitudes than approval; it may tend 
to have more structural than attitudinal elements —such as with 
cousin marriage — which require further exploration. 
 
While there are some findings of low consent marriage and child marriage 
within a minority of the sample, these appear to be clustered within 
particular families rather than spread across the sample as a whole. This 
suggests that for this sample, these practices are those of specific families 
which are atypical. This indicates the diversity of Kurdish society and the 
extent to which the sample have adopted urban habits and attitudes. 
Both experience and approval are important aspects of the phenomenon of 
‘honour’: while explorations of the experience of HBV has the greatest 
potential to model risk or posit causal explanations of how HBV arises, the 
understanding of HBV approval is important for understanding the social 
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acceptibility of violence. Whether or not a person approves of HBV may 
influence her or his approval of perpetrators, support for violence reduction 
programmes and legislation on violence and so forth. Moreover, given that I 
earlier identified community pressures as a distinctive feature of HBV in 
which a crime may be a response to public pressure rather than the wishes of 
the perpetrators, and that 43.3% of respondents generally, and 66.7% of 
those in families in which HBV had been reported,  agreed that families who 
did not clear ‘honour’ were excluded from society, the attitudes of the general 
public are an important element to be considered in the continuation of this 
form of violence. Findings here are in line with other research in the region 
which indicate that a large minority support HBV in principle, and that those 
that do share conservative attitudes to gender roles, such as the requirement 
for virginity, and the maintenance of traditional gendered divisions of labour. 
However, it is clear that there are marked differences between attitudes 
towards HBV and the structural situations in which it occurs: with cousin 
marriage emerging as a particularly strong predictor, which insinuates that 
the experience of HBV is more closely related to aspects of how marriage 
organises family relations than simply to enculturated attitudes. So while 
attitudes towards HBV can be considered to have a basis in culture, the 
experiences of HBV may be more closely related to family structure and 
marriage arrangement, which tends to support the model advanced in the 
theoretical phase of this thesis which argued for a material, rather than 
SURVEY ANALYSIS  
 
 
 326 
culturally-based understanding of HBV. There appears, then, to be an 
association between HBV, which was defined as agnatically-perpetrated 
violence in the supplementary work that underpins this thesis (Payton, 
2014), and the agnatic structure of the family as shown through cousin 
marriage. 
It should be stressed that it is less the fact of cousin marriage that is 
associated with violence, so much as it is the expectation of control over 
marital choice within those families invested in this form. Where families are 
large, cousin marriage is considered acceptable, and socialisation is often 
kinship-oriented, an individual is likely to interact with many cousins, 
increasing the possibility that she or he might voluntarily select a partner 
from amongst their number. Where coercion is absent, there is no observed 
increase in the risk of HBV.  
The mere fact of cousin marriage is not to be understood as causal on a 
simple level, given its broad and cross-cultural appearance. Instead I take the 
presence of cousin marriage as an indication of the prioritisation of agnation 
within families which serves a number of aims, including a wish to maintain 
property within the family and to consolidate ties of loyalty and filiation 
within a family, patriline or tribe.  
PPC marriage is the most agnatic of forms of marriage: by its very nature, it 
insists upon the retention of women within the patriline. All forms of cousin 
marriage create complex and delicate webs between individuals and 
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patrilines, and can cause massive disruptions if any of the interactions within 
a kingroup are perceived as a source for insult. 
It is not the choice of an individual to marry within a specific group that leads 
to the directive to subject women to discipline from their families, both in 
terms of surveillance and, and emotional and physical violence: it is the 
coercion implicit in the general requirement to marry in the interests of the 
collective, however this interest is identified and where it clashes with the 
wishes of the individual. This may involve other subnational groups besides 
those of kinship which instrumentalise various endogamies as a method of 
maintaining exclusive identities, which are used to mediate and contain 
access to power and resources, such as ethnic, linguistic and religious 
identity groups. It may be that similar relations between coercion, violence 
and endogamy can be found within other systems of organisation as well as 
patrilinearity. 
This provides one indication for the peculiar contrast found between the 
approval for HBV and reported experiences: approval of HBV may be an 
aspect of values related to gender-roles, whereas the experience of HBV is 
linked more closely with particular organisations of the family.  
The way in which attitudes to ‘honour’ appear to be distinct from the 
experience suggests a point of transition; of changing and clashing 
understandings where the understandings of ‘honour’ are becoming 
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distanced from past experiences of violence which was attributed to 
‘honourable’ motivations. This was suggested earlier in this thesis through 
the contrasting understandings of namûs discussed in Chapter 3 (pp 92-3) 
within the context of the increasing nuclearisation of marriage which is 
becoming amatonormative, which meant that for middle class respondents, 
the understandings of namûs were complex and nuanced, the subject for 
discussion and re-interpretation within an environment where ideas of 
companionate marriage had become more prevalent, in contrast to 
imprisoned perpetrators of HBV for whom namûs and şeref remained 
inflexible, self-evident categories.  
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8. Conclusion 
Strategies for eradicating VAW87 must be based on 
the recognition that it is rooted in a universal 
patriarchal gender regime, comprised of alternative 
patriarchies that may complement or contradict one 
another at any point in history. Therefore, in the final 
analysis, eliminating …honour crimes…requires 
ending patriarchy. This is not going to happen 
tomorrow but what…is happening is the lessening 
of the patriarchal nature of societies as patriarchal 
privileges are challenged, weakened and ruptured.  
(Ertürk 2009, p. 67) 
[I]t is quite illusory to believe that symbolic violence 
can be overcome with the weapons of consciousness 
and will alone… This is seen, in particular, in the case 
of relations built on kinship and all relations built on 
that model, in which these durable inclinations of the 
socialized body are expressed and experienced in the 
logic of feeling…and duty, which are often merged 
in the experience of respect or devotion and may live 
on long after the disappearance of their social 
conditions of production. 
(Bourdieu 2006, p. 341) 
 
  
                                                        
87 i.e violence against women 
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The delineation of ‘honour’ in the foregoing pages is complex, locating the 
development of a normative/metanormative system within particular 
ecological niches, particular structurations of kinship and particular 
understandings of gender. I have argued that the norms and metanorms 
around female sexual expression which make up the symbolic capital of 
‘honour’ have been generated within these frameworks. There is, then, no 
single ‘culture of honour’, but distinctive beliefs and practices which have 
been interactively generated according to similar logics, to address similar 
challenges.  
To consider HBV merely in cultural terms discounts the heterogeneity within 
each society wherein it occurs. No subgroup can be considered bearers of 
culture, even if some subgroups cling to cultural discourses to counter 
potentially disruptive changes to domestic hierarchies. The survey data 
collected for this thesis indicates that phenomena like early marriage, low 
consent forms of marriage, traditional forms such as direct exchange and 
cousin marriage are more likely to relate to particular, and in some cases 
distinct, microcultures than to be a facet of some abstract and homogeneous 
‘Kurdish culture.’ While this study was limited in its sample, it is telling that 
those surveyed — the urban, educated middle class, who would be 
considered the most likely to have embraced modernity — provided such 
strong, if complex, indications of the understanding of namûs as being closely 
interrelated with ideas about marriage and gender. It is notable that PPC, the 
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marriage form most indicative of strongly agnatic principles of kinship 
structure had the strongest association with experiences of HBV, which 
survivors emically defined by agnatic perpetration (Payton 2014). 
Moreover, taking a purely cultural approach is to ignore the potential for a 
deeper aetiology, based in the materiality of a system of social organisation 
which operates through filiation and marriage. ‘Honour’, then, in the sense of 
the agnatic custodianship of female reputation, is not the result of a 
masculine will to power, nor of any distinctive culture, nor the operations of 
a misogynist cabal; it is a terminology used for those qualities which are 
considered valuable, even essential, to the interactions of patricentric 
communities which are politically and economically organised by kinship, 
and in which women’s marriages become inter/intrafamilial transactions in 
social capital — the structures of classical patriarchy, understood as a 
kinship relationship built upon inequalities of age and gender. The 
identification of female sexuality as a point of collective vulnerability, to be 
subjected to surveillance and, in some cases, violent correction, is a 
consistent epiphenomenon of family structures whose most salient aim is to 
maintain and improve the status and security of the patriline within a 
patricentric ordering.  These are all aspects of a form of the family which 
developed according to the needs of agrarian and pastoral societies in 
antiquity, which are particularly visible in those beset by conflicts and 
difficulties in achieving subsistence, such as in the intrinsic ecological, 
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economic, social and political vulnerabilities of the lives of pastoralists and 
agriculturalists, and in times of social strife and upheaval. While aspects of 
culture and religion may have originated under the same conditions, and to a 
degree underwrite, and sometimes challenge, the values of these systems of 
power, this should be taken as a reflection of a common and co-constitutive 
point of origin. In current times, while the anxieties around patrilinear 
identity and property may be thought to be decreasing in an era of 
detribalisation and proletarianisation, kinship remains a significant means of 
access to power through state systems, and therefore informs national and 
sub-national identity groups’ self-conceptions. The control of women’s 
behaviour remains salient due to vested interests in the control of filiation. 
The responses to the research questions posed in this thesis are indicated in 
Table 8.1. 
Research questions Responses 
Theoretical phase  
Can family ‘honour’ be described as relating 
to particular geographies and organisations of 
the family rather than specific cultures or 
religions?  
In Chapter 3, I argue that ‘honour’ is a method 
of social organisation within populations which 
lack security and suffer from shortages of 
resources, which I particularly associate with 
pastoral and agrarian lifestyles. I suggest that 
these lifestyles tend towards organisation by 
kinship, which is used to express relations of 
labour and property, which makes the control 
and deployment of marriage a strategic 
consideration for the family. 
How is ‘honour’ understood and expressed 
within domestic gender relations? 
In Chapter 4, I suggest that the patrilinear 
household reinforces inequalities of age and 
gender which subordinates young women in 
particular. I discuss the role of virginity as an 
expression of women’s sexual subjectification 
and as a method of restricting women from 
divorce and remarriage where this has the 
potential to disrupt the orderings of kinship.   
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How do various traditional forms of marriage 
express relationships within and between 
families; and how does this impact upon the 
‘honour’ of women and families? 
In Chapter 6, I examine several pre-modern 
marriage forms and tease out the complex 
relationships within and between families 
established in these forms of marriage. This 
tended to show the operations of marital 
exchanges within  
How have traditional forms and 
understandings of marriage altered over the 
KRI’s recent history of political and economic 
changes? 
In Chapter 7, I discuss how proletarianisation 
tends to decrease the role of kinship in 
organising labour and access to resources, 
which means that marriage becomes less 
significant to the collective, as class-based 
hierarchies replace those based on lineage. 
However, where societies remain a 
neopatrimonial orientation kinship relations 
remain valuable for channelling state 
resources. Furthermore, democratisation 
process can lead to a balkanisation of 
identities, which are then maintained through 
controlling out-marriage. 
Empirical phase  
What are the structures of marriage and 
kinship within the sample? 
a. How many marriages within the 
sample were arranged, and who was 
involved in their arrangement? 
b. How common are the ‘traditional’ 
forms of marriage — i.e., those 
between cousins, direct exchange 
and elopements — and what are 
their characteristics?  
c. What can be determined from the 
differing levels of consent to 
marriage arrangement? 
In this particular sample, marriage and kinship 
was in a transitional state: 
a. Slightly more marriages were 
arranged than were free choice, 
although high-consent forms of 
marriage were predominant overall; a 
wide variety of persons were involved 
in marriage arrangement: marriage 
arrangement is not necessarily the 
preserve of the family patriarch; 
b. Traditional forms of marriage are rare 
and tend to be associated with 
marriage arrangement and a higher 
likelihood of early marriage; 
c. Lower consent to marriage correlates 
with traditional gender roles. 
Do these familial structures correlate with an 
individual’s likelihood to approve of HBV? 
The approval of HBV correlates with various 
patriarchal attitudes to gender rather than a 
distinct family structure. 
Are there common factors within families in 
which HBV has been experienced? 
Families in which HBV has been experienced 
tend towards respect for parental marriage 
arrangement, non-urban origins and higher 
levels of cousin marriage than others. 
Table 8-1: Responses to research questions 
Suggestions for further quantitative research 
The contrasting findings regarding the experience of HBV and the attitudes 
that support it suggests that it would be worth conducting further research 
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into the experience of HBV, which could involve taking a sample with more 
direct experiences of HBV, such as survivors of violence. With this kind of 
sample, the analysis would be less hampered by the intrinsic distance of an 
experience of HBV within the wider family, and the respondents’ own 
attitudes and situation which could be contrasted with the data discussed 
above to establish if these structural differences would appear more stark 
with a variable that was able to capture experiences of HBV more directly, 
such as a sample based on HBV survivors, possibly through an NGO in the 
KRI.  
Other suggestions might also explore brideprice in more detail: given that 
respect for the principle of brideprice almost doubled the likelihood of 
approval for HBV in the binary logistic regression shown in Figure 7.4. The 
absence of reported brideprice payments in the sample means that any 
relationships between these phenomena cannot be explored.  
More broadly, this approach could be used to research factors underlying 
collective and agnatic crimes across Eurasia, and gather contrast data from 
other groupings. It would particularly be interesting to research kinship 
forms and HBV in India, to contrast the effects of tribalisim with caste, to 
establish what are the mechanisms and interests involved in marriage 
arrangement, and how dowry payments fit into this. Another avenue would 
be research into patterns of kinship change and violence within the family 
across Eurasia, where it may be interesting to discern patterns of change 
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which lead to the cessation or decline of agnatically perpetrated violence 
using longitudinal data. 
Theoretical implications 
It is a core contention of this thesis that the differing kinship and marriage 
structures of Central Eurasia have led to this particular form of violence; but 
these kinship and marriage structures are currently subjected to enormous 
restructurations, particularly amongst the young, urban, middle-class 
individuals that made up this sample. If the ‘culture of honour’ can be 
considered to originate in the attitudes and gender ideologies generated 
within the kinship license, which is becoming a less significant means of 
organising society than it was in previous eras, then it could be argued that 
namûs, as a form of symbolic capital, may also be undergoing a 
contemporaneous change in connotation (see also pp. 93-4). While the 
definition of HBV used in this thesis was developed through empirical 
research involving a case-file study of those who had experienced such 
crimes (Payton 2014), it is not to be expected that this definition is one which 
will remain stable through a period of social, political and economic changes. 
As the opinions of supporters of HBV show, the  concept of namûs still serves 
as a mark of female compliance to patriarchal norms, but increasingly reflects 
a compliance which to a more individuated understanding of marital and 
kinship relations occuring in a post-agrarian economy. Namûs appears to be 
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developing into a representation of subordinacy to the will of the husband, 
within an individualised gender order, rather than to the will of the patriline 
in a collectivised gender order, of which the expectation of cousin marriage is 
but one aspect. The conceptulisation of namûs may thus be in a process of 
losing its mooring in conformity to the power structures of the classically 
patriarchal agnatic family, to become reattributed to conformity to male 
dominance within conjugal families: in which process it would lose much of 
the behavioural differences between HBV and the far more globally common 
patterns of intimate partner violence. This may mark the distinction 
identified by Tapper (1991) and Meeker (1976), between societies in which 
the discourse of ‘honour’ permits/demands agnatic violence, and those in 
which it permits spousal violence (referred to as Model A and B by Tapper 
(1991, pp. 16-17)) noting that Meeker identifies that Model A is to be 
associated with societies with high levels of cousin marriage. The tendency of 
modernisation may not, then, work towards the erosion of the restrictions of 
namûs, but the redirction of their custodianship to a husband rather than an 
agnatic collective as observed by Weiss in Pakistan (1994). 
Sirman (2004) tracks a similar change in household organisation in Turkey, a 
society which, with some exceptions, (which would include the Kurdish 
population), has not been primarily ordered by kinship since the Ottoman 
Empire. Under both the Ottoman and Turkish nation states, she suggests, 
kinship relations of dependency and interdependency, control and 
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dominance, withered, and become supplanted by andocentric households, 
based on women’s supposedly voluntary submission to an individual man. 
Gendered inequalities which are individuated and conjugal eclipsed those 
which based in collectivity and patrilinear kinship.  
What we may be seeing then, within this sample of young, educated and 
urban people, who could be considered to have the greatest stake in 
modernity and its values is a process of transition from one form of 
understanding ‘honour’ to another — moving the cultural directive for the 
male dominance/female submission from being an aspect of the reputation of 
the patriline to that of the partner. 
The entire schema of honour and shame, namûs and şeref, is a site of 
contestation between feminists and nationalists, between progressives and 
conservatives and between differing strands within all these categories. Even 
at the level of understanding, it seems impossible to situate HBV as part of 
Kurdish culture in the broadest sense, but as the micro-culture of certain 
families with certain distinct forms and expectations of marriage. 
The conceptualisation of HBV I have presented also provides indications of 
productive routes for further exploration, such as: the interrelation of 
exclusive identities such as tribal, ethnic and religious affiliations and the 
control of female sexuality as representing the ‘borders’ of these subgroups, 
as described by King (2008b); changing patterns and understandings  of 
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marriage and gender in societies undergoing industrialisation; differences in 
modes of survival in relation to attitudes to female autonomy; and perhaps 
most interestingly, whether the theorisation developed in this thesis in 
relationship to the KRI holds out in considerations of other regions and 
groupings within Eurasia, and across history.  
Implications for reducing violence 
My first personal encounters with individuals who had experiences of the 
constructs of ‘honour’ over a decade ago challenged my preconceptions, and 
this thesis represents a grappling with understanding. The dynamics of 
‘particularity and universalism’ which came from encountering a value 
system which felt simultaneously familiar and ‘foreign’, which I now 
understand as an aspect of commonalities across Eurasian civilisations. The 
greatest obstacle to my understanding of ‘honour’ was no epochal cultural 
clash, but turned out to be a tendency to disremember the differences 
between my own experience of the small, individualistic, diffusive and 
discontinuous kinship structures of Northern Europe with the more 
integrated collectivist family groupings of Southern Eurasia.  
The problem which I identified as the most challenging when I first 
confronted the system of ‘honour’ as described to me by Kurdish friends was 
that of its cost to individuals. It appeared to me that the various pressures of 
the ‘honour’ system caused insecurity and anxiety to young women, who 
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lived with an awkward consciousness of the need to maintain appearances 
and imposed various restrictions upon their activities. On the other hand I 
have also encountered some of their male counterparts who were by no 
means cold-blooded enforcers of patriarchy but often felt ambivalent about 
the power they held over female relatives, and anxious about their 
responsibility to uphold the public reputation of the family. Since crimes 
which come under the heading of HBV are often horrendous in nature, it is no 
easy thing to feel sympathy for the perpetrator; yet it is highly unlikely that 
people could brutalise and kill their relatives without being traumatised by 
the experience, nor that they could do so simply under a perceived 
requirement for cultural conformity. 
As a system it seems too onerous in its demands, both on men and on women, 
to be accounted for through shared norms alone. This insight has been the 
incentive for over a decade spent in trying to find an explanation for ‘honour’ 
that I found personally satisfactory. Rather than seeing individuals as being 
caught in a false dichotomy between ‘Eastern’ cultural restrictions, versus the 
supposed potentialities of ‘Western’ freedom, I sought to situate these 
tensions within deeper webs of interaction, to see how ‘honour’ worked 
within its own context. I have, over the years, encountered women who have 
been victimised in such traumatic ways, in harrowing betrayals of all the 
principles of loyalty, trust and care that we normally associate with family 
life. I remain staggered by the heroic endurance of HBV survivors and awed 
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by the commitment of anti-HBV activists. If this research can be used to help 
reduce the harms of this system to all involved, then that would be the most 
productive result of the work involved. 
At the outset of this thesis, I deployed Harris’ (2001) terminology of 
infrastructure, structure and superstructure in order to conceptualise my 
approach to describing the aetiology of HBV. I now return to this terminology 
in order to gesture towards avenues for reducing violence against women 
and increasing female autonomy and wellbeing. 
At an infrastructural level, the agrarian ways of life which initially supported 
patrilinear orderings of society and rigid control over resources and labour 
through filiation are in decline, due to the economic transformation of the 
region into an industrialised society in which the state is a major employer, 
and where a younger generation predominantly has very different attitudes 
to marriage and sexuality than that of their parents. However, this does not 
mean that economic modernity is a panacea, and all that is needed is for 
inevitable historical processes to reach their fruition: Boserup (1970), most 
notably, has noted the enormous problems with assumptions that 
modernity’s effects on women are necessarily benign. As Haghighat (2013) 
points out, the capital-intensive petrochemical-based industrialisation of the 
Gulf States have had minimal effects upon women’s employment or status, 
but instead has increased the employment (and in many cases, exploitation) 
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of migrant labourers while women’s roles remain domestic, and restricted by 
the dictates of ‘honour’.  
Positive change for women and girls cannot be achieved through an inert 
reliance upon historical processes. 
Stimulating cultural changes 
This research follows Taysi (2009) in showing a middle ground of 
respondents who identify ‘honour’ in terms of the control of women, and as a 
widely-shared societal principle — but as one which they differentiate from 
their own views.  A 34 year-old Civil Servant from Sulaymaniyah City, for 
instance, provides a delicate criticism of the local conception of ‘honour’: 
There is no unanimous definition to honour; it changes from one 
culture to another. For example, in a closed society like mine it is 
directly and merely related to women and sexuality, but maybe in 
another culture honesty is considered honour. (in Taysi 2009, p. 20) 
Individuals may, then, be rather less committed to ‘honour’ as individuals 
than they believe themselves to be as a collective. However, given that 
‘honour’ — in all its forms — is a method of creating systems of 
accountability, this can lead to an overconformity to misperceived norms 
bred from pluralistic ignorance (Miller and Prentice 1994). This could create 
a phenomenon of conservative lag, a societal ‘Abilene paradox’. This is a 
particularly significant factor in the management of public identities. This is a 
particularly relevant consideration given that HBV has been identified as a 
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response to community pressures. Just as feminists have identified that 
rapists benefit from a ‘rape culture’ which normalises male sexual aggression, 
perpetrators of HBV may benefit from an ‘honour culture’ which normalises 
male/agnatic ‘disciplinary’ violence. Confronting ‘honour culture’ and ‘rape 
culture’ through exposing the structural violence and false assumptions that 
underpin them, may reduce the popular acceptability of these forms of 
violence against women. 
In this sense, awareness raising around women’s human rights and the public 
condemnation of violence against women, such as is demonstrated by 
women’s organisations like Zhiyan88 (Bahaddin 2012) can lead to questioning 
of how deeply rooted such attitudes are, and to vital shifts in mentalities. 
Encouraging secular and progressive clerical voices to unite in the 
condemnation of violence against women, both real and symbolic, should 
work towards a paradigm shift as to what, exactly, ‘honourable’ behaviour 
connotes. Such an approach is in tune with Appiah’s (2010) suggestion for a 
discursive shift around ‘honour’ which would attempt to render ‘honour’ 
crimes themselves a source of shame rather than redemption, flipping the 
current discourse to one which locates high social status in enabling, rather 
than restricting, the autonomy of female relatives. Appiah is correct to 
identify that it is neither practicable nor desirable to challenge the broader 
concept of ‘honour’ or reputation as an aspect of human interactions since 
                                                        
88 Zhiyan [Life] is a confederacy of women’s NGOs calling for an end to HBV in the KRI.  
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this is one of the ethical foundations of human interaction. According to 
evolutionary scientists, normative ethics has three main bases: kinship 
relationships, reciprocity and reputation (Van Vugt et al. 2007; Gintis et al. 
2008; Sperber and Baumard 2012). Recorded crime rates for the Middle East 
are apparently stable and low (Serajzadeh 2001-2), and while these may well 
have significant lacunae, particularly in terms of violence against women, 
these normative mechanisms may also be responsible for promoting a high 
level of social order outside the home.  The issue underpinning HBV is not so 
much the mechanisms by which this particular system of ethics operates, but 
its basis in inequitable gender/age relations within the family, the ‘exchange 
of women’ dynamic and in beliefs around femininity, which can be criticised 
— and potentially dismantled.   
To create effective new connotations around ‘honour’ which are not based in 
exploitative relations, there would be a need for several institutions with 
diverse interests and views around ‘honour’ to consolidate around a single 
sentiment. This includes a need to avoid mixed messages ranging from laws 
which posit ‘honour’ as mitigatory in many states, inconsistent sentencing of 
perpetrators, and victim-blaming — an almost universal facet of violence 
against women in all its forms, from domestic violence (Gracia and Herrero 
2006) to rape (Suarez and Gadalla 2010). There is a disturbing tendency 
across Middle Eastern states, for instance, to use women’s prisons as reserve 
accommodation when shelter spaces are not available, and to imprison 
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women for consensual sex in both commercial and non-commercial forms. 
Clearly, it may be more practicable to provide such dubious ‘protection’ 
measures to the victim rather than neutralising the threat of collective 
violence, but it does so at the cost of the victim’s liberty, and sends a message 
that the victim is considered a guilty party; that female sexual expression is 
liable to retaliation by the state.  
However, the idea that it is possible to change the consensus around what 
‘honour’ connotes assumes that there is a singular ‘honour’ culture, rather 
than a plurality of sub-national groupings — tribes, ethnic groups, 
confessions, communities — which each have interests embedded in 
particular kinds of reputation management. While education has shown to 
have positive impacts on young people’s opinions on ‘honour’ in Western 
settings (Cihangar 2013), this may not be the case where its values are more 
deeply embedded into the social structure. The Jordanian women’s 
movement was one of the first to address ‘honour’ killings, and has tirelessly 
campaigned for legal and social reform, with strong support from the royal 
family (Husseini 2009): however, recent research shows that 46.1 % of 
Jordanian boys, and 22.1% of Jordanian girls, continue to consider this form 
of violence justifiable (Eisner and Ghuneim 2013). 
This approach clearly has a basis in the tendency for discussions of HBV to 
take on ‘cultural’ or scriptural determinist ideations which I outlined in my 
introduction, which is based in the assumption that perpetrators are merely 
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enacting their ‘culture’ or religion and that this, therefore, can be changed 
discursively, through reinterpreting religion and ‘culture’ in ways which are 
more positive to women. Certainly, the questioning of public attitudes 
towards violence against women is a positive development, but as a sole 
basis for action it fails to address any potential strategic and self-interested 
aspects in maintaining the patterns of kinship and gender which give it rise. 
As Mojab observes (2004b, p. 3), attempts to change mentalities are the 
reduction of a sociological phenomenon into a problem of psychology, 
representing attempts to correct ‘a “wrong”, uninformed, uneducated or 
deviationist male attitude’, which fatally depoliticises patriarchy as a system 
of gender/generational power: the common manoeuvre of blaming the 
individual for societal ills. 
The KRI has seen a remarkable attenuation in FGM (predominantly 
clitidorectomy) since the release of the documentary ‘A Handful of Ash’ and 
the criminalisation of FGM in the KRI in 2011 (Khalil 2013), showing that 
attitudes to violence against women can indeed change rapidly due to 
debates within the public sphere. However, only a comparatively small 
number of people materially profited from this practise: the elderly rural 
women and traditional midwives who conducted mutilations on young girls 
can hardly be considered an influential power-bloc. The preservation of FGM 
as a tradition was also ranged against discourses that claimed female sexual 
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pleasure as a necessary aspect of marriage —for men89. The ideology of 
‘honour’, on the other hand, distributes privilege and power to a wide variety 
of actors within each family and underpins the gender order of the society as 
a whole, which may tend to make it far more resilient to discursive shifts 
than FGM.  
A semiotic, superstructural shift, which attempts to change the symbolism of 
namûs to reconfigure the nature of  symbolic capital it denotes, appears to be 
an incomplete means of transformation, as long this as symbolism is 
generated within, and is valuable to, perduring patrilinear orderings of the 
family. 
Enabling structural changes 
When violence against women is framed as a matter of “tradition,” a 
distinction is established between, on the one hand, traditions—
which are seen to be native, timeless, and unchanging—and on the 
other, institutions—which appear as contemporary and timely. 
(Koğacıoğlu 2004, p. 120) 
Cultural and psychological arguments around violence against women, 
suggests Koğacıoğlu, may be deployed to divert attention from failures of the 
                                                        
89 In a critical reading of Fazil Hemet’s (2006) ‘Family Guidance’, a government-approved 
Kurdish-language marriage manual which has reached its 3rd Edition, Fischer-Tahir’s (2009) 
exposes the sexism underlying the self-consciously ‘modern’ model of conjugality it presents. 
She quotes a revealing passage on page 331 in which Hemet dispenses advice to women (p. 
145): ‘It is important to know that modern progressive men want to bring their wives to 
orgasm and bring them pleasure…Therefore, try to free yourself of frigidity, of fear and 
shame, and of the shackles and barriers caused by social, psychological, ideological and 
physical problems.’ This places an asymmetric onus upon women to condition their sexual 
responses in order to provide more gratification to men. Hemet’s vociferous opposition to 
FGM could also be considered in this light. 
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state and other actors to address gendered inequalities: to place the 
offenders once more as mere followers of ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, beyond its 
remit — and its responsibility. This then, obscures the ways in which the 
state has a degree of complicity: through failing to provide adequate support 
and protection measures and through continuing in the ideation of a 
particular family form as superior to others. Restrictive gender roles are 
underwritten within law and policy, through assumptions around male 
headship in families or the channelling of resources and benefits through 
males, or through labour markets which have limited female participation: 
these are amongst several means in which the patriarchal family is 
considered normative.  
States which remain imbricated within neopatrimonial modes of 
organisation may be particularly poorly placed to challenge the nature of 
oppressive gender relations within the family, given the various embedded 
interests in maintaining the status quo, from appeasing conservative 
constituencies, to retaining well-established processes of social advancement 
and privilege. In order to erode the instrumentalisation of marriage, and the 
commodification of women’s bodies for collective benefits and ingroup 
identity maintenance, there is a need to reduce inequalities of privilege and 
power, and to begin a process of ‘boundary deactivation’, towards ending 
internal segregations of gender, ethnicity, confession and identity. Rydgren 
and Sofi (2011) suggest the fostering of intercommunity links in order to 
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bridge troubled relationships between various ethnic groups in Kurdish 
regions, and this policy could also reduce the risk of violence erupting where 
young people seek partners from outside their group.  
These moves — challenging neopatrimonial rule and building 
intercommunity linkages — are often accomplished by a healthy civil society, 
able to take counter-hegemonic positions, provide checks on state power and 
build alliances across groups. Indeed, a strong women’s movement has been 
cross-culturally found to be the best method of reducing violence against 
women (Weldon 2002).  
A distinctively Kurdish civil society emerged in the aftermath of the Gulf War 
(Natali 2005, p. 64), which has included the ascension of several women’s 
organisations (Mohammed 2009; al-Ali and Pratt 2011). Ideally, civil society 
organisations scrutinise the operations of the state, stimulate political 
participation, develop leadership and articulate minority interests. Hyden 
(1997) notes, however, that such organisations need to be internally 
democratic, non-hierarchical, accountable, non-exclusive and autonomous in 
order to maximise their impact. Civil society needs to model democracy 
internally as well as enabling the democratic process externally. The creation 
of even more cliques, coteries and cabals proliferates rather than challenges 
neopatrimonial orders. Neopatrimonial states are particularly likely to retard 
the development of civil society associations. In neopatrimonial states, Tripp 
finds (2001) that women’s activism may be channelled into ‘patronage 
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machines’ — ancillary women’s wings, leagues and associations tied to the 
pre-existing loci of power, inhibited from providing deep structural criticisms 
of the state through a need to maintain funding and political support. In the 
KRI, 43% of the civil society organisations surveyed by the National 
Democratic Institute (2011) were state-funded (p. 8); 57% were partnered 
by political parties (p. 5) which may be beneficial for their financial security, 
and for a certain level of access to power-brokers, but which may 
compromise neutrality, and tend towards proposing solutions which do not 
disrupt the status quo. Qadir (2007) identifies Iraqi Kurdish civil society as 
being ‘under the yoke’ of the ruling powers.  
Hyden states that in order to maintain the counter-hegemonic quality of civil 
society within neopatrimonial states, organisations may need to be funded 
externally to the existing structures of power rather than being locked into 
existing patterns of patronage. This can be a particularly fraught issue when 
related to funding from Euro-American organisations, given anxieties around 
‘Westernisation’, and the potential for funding to be tied to neo-colonial and 
Orientalist agendas and goals. Organisations in receipt of ‘Western’ funding 
may be accused of bearing a ‘Westernising’ agenda even when this is far from 
reality. For women’s organisations, the absence of neutral funding sources 
leads to the fraught choice between a neopatrimonial Scylla and a neo-
colonial Charybdis, and yet, these organisations represent the best hope for 
reducing violence against women.  
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While, as Alinia (2013) indicates, the policing of HBV in the KRG has 
developed enormously over the past decades, there is an apparent tendency 
to gloss over the collective nature of  perpetration which I identified 
elsewhere (2014). Neither Alinia’s nor Onal’s (2008) studies of perpetrators 
indicate the punishment of all members of a conspiracy, but rather of 
individuals. Where prosecution of the perpetrators occurs, it appears to end 
with the individual who pulled the trigger, while the remainder of 
perpetrators escape justice. Glazer and Abu Ras (1994) note that of three 
brothers seemingly responsible for a murder in Israel, only one was 
imprisoned, with strong indications that he had been selected to ‘take the fall’ 
from amongst their number and that he had been financially compensated for 
his sacrifice. A thorough-going attack upon a collective crime should not be 
limited to the actions of a single member; it may be, in fact, the more liminal 
members of the group who are more likely to be deterred from collaboration 
by the opportunity cost of negative repercussions. 
Bourdieu suggests relations built around kinship may survive long beyond 
the expiry of their utility value, particularly when this hysteresis maintains 
pre-existing hierarchies of power: familial relationships are ambiguous, and 
loaded with emotion — where ‘affection and brutality coexist in conflict and 
unity,’ (Mojab 2002a, p. 61). If, as argued, the nature of power hierarchies 
within a family is related to the form that the family takes, then it is policies 
towards the family that must be scrutinised. 
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Policies towards the family are paradoxical in all states: on one hand, the 
family is considered ‘natural’, or at least pre-political, and hence exempt from 
scrutiny, but on the other, the kinds of families which can be formed are often 
tightly regulated and subject to numerous interventions which tend to favour 
an ‘ideal’ family form over others — tending towards patrilinear, patricentric, 
amatonormative, gender-complementarian and heterosexist models, which 
are considered ‘authentic’. Other formations are considered heterodox at 
best; and at worst, deviant, antisocial and counter to public morality.  
While kinship relations are a perennial human institution, there is no single 
natural form of the family. The family has proven itself to be a ‘masterpiece of 
nature’ (to use a term from Santayana), precisely because, not despite, of its 
incredible diversity — from the ‘walking marriages’ of the Na, in which 
fatherhood is not a recognised status (Hua 2008), to the multiple paters of 
the Canela (Greene and Crocker 1994). The family is resilient, then, because it 
is flexible and adaptable, capable of taking on various forms: concerns about 
the ‘breakdown of the family’ frequently have more relationship to the 
disruption of pre-existing domestic hierarchies than to any realistic 
apprehensions about the collapse of the primordial mode of social 
organisation. They reflect the vested interests of the existing structure, and 
the extent to which its predominance renders other forms of the family 
unthinkable (Joseph 1996).  
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There is then, far more to the system of ‘honour’ to be challenged than its 
tendency to result in violence: one aspect of this is its enmeshment with the 
lack of respect for the human right of individual consent to marriage under 
Article 16(b) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The assumption 
that parents hold hereditary, alienable rights over the bodies of their children 
by default must be challenged robustly. This should not, of course, prohibit 
parents from becoming involved in the intimate lives of their offspring, nor 
should youngsters be prevented from accessing parental intervention and 
advice if they so choose. It does, however, call for an adequate and overt 
expression of consensuality and an environment in which the bodily 
sovereignty of women and young people can be asserted. Action against 
‘honour’ crimes and actions to curb forced and early marriages must be 
considered part of the same project, forming a broader movement towards 
the recognition of the free expression of consensual adult sexuality as an 
aspect of bodily sovereignty, fundamental to human rights — and towards an 
of a concept of human rights which are borne by the individual rather than 
embedded within kinship or other sub-national groupings. 
‘Family law,’ says Charrad (2001, p. 5), ‘raises questions that are at the 
intersection of kinship and state.’ Personal status laws have typically been 
used to prioritise certain family groupings over others, and the personal 
status laws of the Middle East have been particularly criticised for shoring up 
male power within families (Anwar 2009). Can it be any accident that Tunisia 
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and Morocco show the least support for HBV in the MENA region (Pew 
Research Center 2013, p. 190), and also boast the most ‘woman-friendly’ 
personal status laws (Charrad 2012)?  The Moroccan family code, for 
instance, has been identified as enabling the development of matrifocal, 
rather than patriarchal family orderings (Hosseini 2000, p. 160). Tunisian 
women hold more power in the family than Egyptian women do, which Yount 
and Agree (2004) associate with their status in family law. The lower support 
for HBV in the former Soviet bloc in central Eurasia (Pew Research Center 
2013, p. 190) may also reflect the historic Russification of personal status 
laws (Kane and Gorbenko 2011).  
A family law system which allows for the proliferation of family forms rather 
than prioritising a patricentric ‘ideal’ may thus allow for greater flexibility in 
family formation and structure, so that the patricentric family is merely one 
option, rather than a default against which others are negatively compared. 
As Ertürk (2009) has suggested, there are emerging faultlines within the 
edifice of ‘classical’ patriarchy which can be ruptured; but these are faultlines 
which are deeply embedded into the ordering of society itself, from the most 
intimate level of the household to the seats of government, emanating across 
history, from ancient folktales to the expressions of modern law. To change 
this will take the passion, determination and courage to transform society 
itself, and to harness and direct those social transformations which are 
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already in progress. This needs to be tempered with resistance to the 
tendencies of the globalisation of the capitalist family to replace the 
subordination of women and girls by their agnates with the subordination of 
wives by their husbands. Conjugality has its own hazards: earlier I noted that 
although Israeli Arab women were far more likely to be murdered by an 
agnate than Jewish women, there was little difference in the actual rate of 
women murdered. The conjugal household ultimately proved to be just as 
deadly to women as the agnatic regime (Landau et al. 1974). Phallocentric 
conjugality may present a very different structure of the family than one 
which is predicated upon agnation, but is ultimately an ‘alternative 
patriarchy’, as Ertürk describes it, rather than a solution to male dominance.  
Ending HBV and violence against women requires challenges not merely to 
the typical inequalities of gender and generation within the household forms 
of classical patriarchy, but to all interlocking systems of dominance from the 
state to the household and beyond — towards a radical reimagining of the 
family and marriage, and towards the autonomy of children within families. 
‘Ending patriarchal domination of children, by men or women,’ says hooks 
(2000, p. 77), ‘is the only way to make the family a place where children can 
be safe, where they can be free, where they can know love.’  
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Of woman torn (excerpt) 
nora 
decapitated 
by her father on her forbidden 
honeymoon he paraded 
her head through 
cairo to prove his 
manhood this is 1997 
 
and i can only hope 
you had a special song a 
poem memorized a secret 
that made you smile 
 
this is a love 
poem cause i love 
you now woman 
who lived tried to 
love in this world of 
machetes and sin 
i smell your ashes 
of zaatar and almonds 
under my skin 
i carry your bones  
Suheir Hammad (1973-)  
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 APPENDICES 
 
 
 A 
10. Appendices 
A: Map of Kurdish regions in Iraq 
 
Figure 10.1: Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
Hewlêr is the Kurdish name for the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 
but this work uses the Arabic name Arbil. Also I have spelled Silémanî as 
Sulaymaniyah, and Ranye as Rania, Helebce as Halabja, Rewanduz as 
Rowanduz and Dihok as Duhok. 
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 B 
B: Kinship diagrammes 
 
NOTE:  
This diagram represents official kinship relations: it should not be 
assumed that this means that there are no relationships between 
unshaded individuals: in fact, within patrilinear societies, a person might 
have warmer relationships with blood relations who are not reckoned as 
Figure 10.2: Descent patterns 
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official kin, because these relationships may be less tense due to a lack of 
co-inheritance and other shared responsibilities. 
 
Figure 10.3: Segmentary agnation 
This diagram shows a rather unnaturally tidy pattern in which the two sons 
of the founding ancestor split into segments, focussing upon the first segment 
where each man in turn produced two male heirs and then died. In the first 
family, unity was preserved, whereas in the second scenario, there was a split 
in each generation where the family divided, with potential for fission in the 
youngest generation. It can be seen that the first is the most effective way of 
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maintaining a male labour/military force, but also we can readily understand 
how disputes between brothers can fragment this unity. 
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C: Map sources 
Country Documentary evidence
a
 Pew  
>30%
b
 
Casework
c
 Sources 
Afghanistan Yes (Danish Immigration Service 2012) Yes Yes 3 
Bangladesh - Yes - 1 
Egypt Yes (Khafagy 2005) Yes Yes 3 
Jordan Yes (Human Rights Watch 2004) Yes - 2 
India Yes (Refugee Documentation Centre (Ireland) 
2012) 
 - 1 
Iran Yes (Landinfo 2009a) - Yes 2 
Iraq Yes (Landinfo 2009b) Yes Yes 3 
Israel Yes (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 
2010a) 
- Yes 2 
Jordan Yes (Faqir 2001; Human Rights Watch 2004; Abu 
Hassan and Welchman 2005) 
Yes - 2 
Lebanon Yes (Baydoun 2011) Yes - 2 
Libya -  - Yes 1 
Pakistan Yes (Amnesty International 1999) Yes Yes 3 
Palestine Yes (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2004; Touma-Sliman 
2005) 
Yes Yes 3 
Saudi Arabia - - Yes 1 
Syria Yes (Danish Immigration Service 2007) - - 3 
Turkey Yes (Kardam 2005) No Yes 2 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Yes (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 
2010b) 
- Yes 2 
Yemen Yes (Sisters Arab Forum for Human Rights 2005) - - 1 
Table 10.1: Sources of data used to develop kinship/HBV map 
a) In this category I was looking for report in which HBV was a title issue 
authored or commissioned by the UN, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, or in Country of Origin reports or enquiries to assess 
asylum claims through the Refworld resource. Local NGO materials 
and academic articles have also been included where the report was 
substantial and included statistics. 
b) This refers to the approval rating for ‘honour’ killings in the Pew 
Forum report (Pew Research Center 2013, p. 190) as expressed by 
combining those who agreed that ‘honour’ killings of women were 
‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ necessary. Countries with a combined approval 
rating of over 30% have been included, as a reasonable midpoint 
where the maximum approval rating by this calculation was 60% (for 
Iraq). 
c) This category refers to the country of origin named by a client seeking 
help for HBV from the NGO, IKWRO as described in Payton (2014b), or 
the country of origin of a client requiring expert witness statements 
from the author on the basis of a fear of HBV. This was done to ‘round 
out’ information, particularly where there is an absence of evidence 
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due to societies with restrictions upon civil society and NGO activities, 
and omission from the Pew study. However, this represents a very low 
sample threshold.  
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D: Statistical analysis of 
questionnaire data 
1. Univariate responses to attitudinal questions 
Prompt Agree  
strongly 
Agree No  
opinion 
Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
In our society, honour comes 
from controlling all the women 
in a family 
 
17.3% 
(n=39) 
  
4.3% 
(n=55) 
 
7% 
(n=16) 
 
23% 
(n=52) 
 
28.3% 
(n=64) 
 
100% 
(n=218) 
Honour should not be related to 
the control of women 
42.8% 
(n=84) 
35.2% 
(n=69) 
 10.7% 
(n=21) 
 5.6% 
(n=11) 
5.6% 
(n=11) 
100% 
(n=196) 
Where honour has been 
compromised, a family which 
does not respond will be 
excluded from the community 
until some action has been 
taken* 
  
19% 
(n=36) 
  
24.3% 
(n=46) 
 
21.7% 
(n=41) 
 
21.7% 
(n=41) 
 
13.2% 
(n=25) 
 
100% 
(n=189) 
Namûs is the basis of a moral 
society 
16.8% 
(n=36) 
29.9% 
(n=64) 
17.8% 
(n=38) 
16.4% 
(n=35) 
19.2% 
(n=41) 
100% 
(n=214 
Disputes about namûs have led 
to violence in my own family** 
10.9% 
(n=21) 
17.3% 
(n=33) 
13.6% 
(n=26) 
25% 
(n=44) 
35% 
(n=67) 
100% 
(n=191) 
Violence may sometimes be 
justified if a person has brought 
shame to their family 
5.6% 
(n=12) 
20.7% 
(n=44) 
12.7% 
(n=27) 
24.9% 
(n=53) 
36.2% 
(n=77) 
100% 
(n=213) 
Violence within the family is 
never justified 
 60.9% 
(n=131) 
 6.5% 
(n=57) 
5.1% 
(n=11) 
4.7% 
(n=10) 
2.8% 
(n=6) 
100% 
(n=215) 
Whether and who to marry 
should be the choice of the 
individual, not the family 
 49% 
(n=105) 
 41% 
(n=88) 
 3.7% 
(n=8) 
 4.2% 
(n=9) 
 2.3% 
(n=5) 
100% 
(n=215) 
Arranged marriages are a 
valuable tradition 
 9.5% 
(n=21) 
7.2% 
(n=16) 
 6.8% 
(n=15) 
 23.9% 
(n=53) 
52.7% 
(n=117) 
100% 
(n=222) 
Parents arrange marriage in 
their own interests rather than 
that of their children 
6.8% 
(n=15) 
14.9% 
(n=33) 
 6.3% 
(n=14) 
45% 
(n=100) 
27% 
(n=60) 
100% 
(n=222) 
Families make better choices 
when they arrange marriages 
than individuals would do on 
their own behalf 
1.8% 
(n=4) 
8.7% 
(n=19) 
12.8% 
(n=28) 
58.3% 
(n=127) 
18.3% 
(n=40) 
100% 
(n=218) 
Arranged marriages have no 
place in a modern society 
35.5% 
(n=76) 
26.2% 
(n=56) 
10.3% 
(n=22) 
18.7% 
(n=40) 
9.3% 
(n=20) 
100% 
(n=214) 
Couples should have the chance 
to get to know each other before 
72% 
(n=162) 
24.4% 
(n=55) 
1.8% 
(n=4) 
0.4% 
(n=1) 
1.3% 
(n=3) 
100% 
(n=225) 
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Prompt Agree  
strongly 
Agree No  
opinion 
Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
marriage 
Couples should not have any 
kind of relationship before 
marriage 
8.8% 
(n=20) 
10.6% 
(n=24) 
6.2% 
(n=14) 
33.2% 
(n=75) 
41.2% 
(n=93) 
100% 
(n=226) 
Whether and who to marry 
should be the choice of the 
individual, not the family 
 49% 
(n=105) 
 41% 
(n=88) 
 3.7% 
(n=8) 
 4.2% 
(n=9) 
 2.3% 
(n=5) 
100% 
(n=215) 
Arranged marriages are a 
valuable tradition 
 9.5% 
(n=21) 
7.2% 
(n=16) 
 6.8% 
(n=15) 
 23.9% 
(n=53) 
52.7% 
(n=117) 
100% 
(n=222) 
Parents arrange marriage in 
their own interests rather than 
that of their children 
6.8% 
(n=15) 
14.9% 
(n=33) 
 6.3% 
(n=14) 
45% 
(n=100) 
27% 
(n=60) 
100% 
(n=222) 
Families make better choices 
when they arrange marriages 
than individuals would do on 
their own behalf 
1.8% 
(n=4) 
8.7% 
(n=19) 
12.8% 
(n=28) 
58.3% 
(n=127) 
18.3% 
(n=40) 
100% 
(n=218) 
Arranged marriages have no 
place in a modern society 
35.5% 
(n=76) 
26.2% 
(n=56) 
10.3% 
(n=22) 
18.7% 
(n=40) 
9.3% 
(n=20) 
100% 
(n=214) 
Couples should have the chance 
to get to know each other before 
marriage 
72% 
(n=162) 
24.4% 
(n=55) 
1.8% 
(n=4) 
0.4% 
(n=1) 
1.3% 
(n=3) 
100% 
(n=225) 
Couples should not have any 
kind of relationship before 
marriage 
8.8% 
(n=20) 
10.6% 
(n=24) 
6.2% 
(n=14) 
33.2% 
(n=75) 
41.2% 
(n=93) 
100% 
(n=226) 
Marriages between cousins are 
the best and safest kind 
 1.4% 
(n=3) 
 2.3% 
(n=5) 
 7.9% 
(n=17) 
 36.7% 
(n=79) 
 51.6% 
(n=111) 
100% 
(n=215) 
Marriages between cousins can 
cause problems between the 
couple 
25.1% 
(n=52) 
42% 
(n=87) 
 14% 
(n=29) 
15% 
(n=31) 
3.9% 
(n=8) 
100% 
(n=207) 
Jin be jine is a practical way of 
managing marriage in a 
community 
66% 
(n=2) 
0.5% 
(n=1) 
5.5% 
(n=12) 
12.3% 
(n=27) 
80.1% 
(n=177) 
100% 
(n=219) 
Jin be jine marriages cause social 
problems 
66% 
(n=142) 
26% 
(n=53) 
5.1% 
(n=11) 
2.3% 
(n=5) 
2.3% 
(n=5) 
100% 
(n=216) 
Brideprice demeans women by 
treating them like property 
45% 
(n=98) 
11.5% 
(n=25) 
8.3% 
(n=18) 
10.1% 
(n=22) 
25% 
(n=54) 
100% 
(n=217) 
Brideprice is a mark of respect 
for a bride and her family 
8.9% 
(n=19) 
16.4% 
(n=35) 
8.9% 
(n=19) 
26.8% 
(n=57) 
39% 
(n=83) 
100% 
(n=213) 
Marriage is a business 
arrangement between two 
families rather than a 
relationship between two 
people 
3.3% 
(n=7) 
1.9% 
(n=4) 
5.2% 
(n=11) 
19.8% 
(n=42) 
69.8% 
(n=148) 
100% 
(n=212) 
It is better for a couple to start 
their life together In their own 
home, if this is possible  
76% 
(n=162) 
19.7% 
(n=42) 
0.9% 
(n=2) 
1.9% 
(n=4) 
1.4% 
(n=3) 
100% 
(n=213) 
Young people are under a lot of 
pressure from their parents 
10.5% 
(n=24) 
23.7% 
(n=54) 
6.14% 
(n=14) 
32.5% 
(n=74) 
27.2% 
(n=62) 
100% 
(n=228) 
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Prompt Agree  
strongly 
Agree No  
opinion 
Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
Total 
when it comes to marriage 
Young people have too much 
freedom these days 
11% 
(n=24) 
43.3% 
(n=94) 
8.3% 
(n=18) 
30.9% 
(n=67) 
6.5% 
(n=14) 
100% 
(n=217) 
Young people elope because 
their families are too controlling 
11.7% 
(n=25) 
25.4% 
(n=54) 
15% 
(n=32) 
31.5% 
(n=67) 
16.4% 
(n=35) 
100% 
(n=213) 
Couples who elope are 
thoughtless and selfish 
15% 
(n=32) 
27.7% 
(n=59) 
25.8% 
(n=55) 
23.9% 
(n=51) 
7.5% 
(n=16) 
100% 
(n=213) 
Parents know what is best for 
their children and do not need to 
get their permission when 
arranging marriage 
2.3% 
(n=5) 
2.3% 
(n=5) 
0.9% 
(n=2) 
36% 
(n=77) 
58.4% 
(n=125) 
100% 
(n=214) 
Parents should consult with 
young people before they 
arrange a marriage 
67.3% 
(n=148) 
28.2% 
(n=62) 
2.3% 
(n=5) 
0.5% 
(n=1) 
1.8% 
(n=4) 
100% 
(n=220) 
A husband should take charge of 
his family 
9.6% 
(n=21) 
32% 
(n=70) 
 6.8% 
(n=15) 
39% 
(n=85) 
12.4% 
(n=27) 
100% 
(n=218) 
Men’s most important role is 
providing financial support to 
their families 
6.3% 
(n=14) 
21.6% 
(n=48) 
6.8% 
(n=15) 
44.6% 
(n=99) 
20.7% 
(n=46) 
100% 
(n=222) 
Women’s most important roles 
is as mothers and housewives 
7% 
(n=16) 
11.4% 
(n=26) 
5.2% 
(n=12) 
38% 
(n=87) 
38.4% 
(n=88) 
100% 
(n=229) 
Women should be able to work 
outside the home if they wish to 
do so 
54.7% 
(n=116) 
34.9% 
(n=74) 
 4.7% 
(n=10) 
3.3% 
(n=7) 
 2.4% 
(n=5) 
100% 
(n=212) 
Husbands and wives should 
share their responsibilities 
without either of them taking 
overall control 
 57.8% 
(n=126) 
 34% 
(n=74) 
 2.8% 
(n=6) 
 3.7% 
(n=8) 
1.8% 
(n=4) 
100% 
(n=218) 
Women should be virgins before 
marriage 
 53% 
(n=121) 
17.1% 
(n=39) 
 10% 
(n=23) 
10% 
(n=23) 
9.6% 
(n=22) 
100% 
(n=228) 
It should not be necessary for 
women to be virgins before they 
are married 
10.3% 
(n=22) 
 8.9% 
(n=19) 
 9.4% 
(n=20) 
22.5% 
(n=48) 
48.4% 
(n=104) 
100% 
(n=213) 
Table 10.2: Univariate responses to attitudinal questions 
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3. Bivariate analysis of approval for HBV 
For the purposes of this analysis, the category ‘HBV approvers’ was made by 
combining respondents who agreed or agreed strongly with the statement 
‘Violence may sometimes be justified if a person has brought shame to their 
family’. Correlations with a p-value < 0.05 are shown below. 
 Non-approval Approval P-Value 
A husband should take charge of his family 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
46.2% (n=78) 
53.8% (n=91) 
 
92% (n=46) 
8% (n=4) 
 
χ
2 
= 60.056 
p = <0.001 
Namûs is the basis of a moral society 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
53.6% (n=81) 
46.4% (n=70) 
 
85.1% (n=40) 
14.9% (n=7) 
 
χ
2 
= 27.167 
p = <0.001 
Women’s most important roles are as mothers 
and housewives  
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
17.3% (n=30) 
82.7% (n=173) 
 
 
40% (n=20) 
60% (n=30) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 25.19 
p = <0.001 
Couples should not have any kind of 
relationship before marriage 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
20.5% (n=35) 
79.5% (n=136) 
 
 
43.4% (n=23) 
56.6% (n=30) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 24.804 
p = <0.001 
In our society, honour comes from controlling 
all the women in a family 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
45.6% (n=77) 
54.4% (n=92) 
 
 
71.7% (n=38) 
28.3% (n=15) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 21.266 
p = <0.001 
Women should be virgins before marriage 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
76% (n=127) 
24% (n=40) 
 
96.3% (n=52) 
3.7% (n=2) 
 
χ
2 
= 17.963 
p = <0.001 
Young people have too much freedom these 
days 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
55.1% (n=92) 
44.9% (n=75) 
 
77.4% (n=41) 
22.6% (n=12) 
 
χ
2 
= 15.562 
p = <0.001 
Brideprice is a mark of respect for a bride and 
her family 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
26.1% (n=43) 
73.9% (n=122) 
 
 
45.3% (n=24) 
54.7% (n=29) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 14.973 
p = <0.001 
It should not be necessary for women to be 
virgins before they are married 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
23% (n=37) 
77% (n=124) 
 
 
5.6% (n=3) 
94.4% (n=51) 
 
 
χ2 = 13.940 
p = <0.001 
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 Non-approval Approval P-Value 
Families make better choices when they 
arrange marriages than individuals would do 
on their own behalf 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
 
12.3% (n=20) 
87.7% (n=142) 
 
 
 
27.7% (n=13) 
72.3% (n=34) 
 
 
 
χ
2 
= 14.348 
p = <0.001 
Where honour has been compromised, a 
family which does not respond will be excluded 
from the community until some action has 
been taken 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
 
 
53% (n=70) 
47% (n=62) 
 
 
 
 
71.4% (n=30) 
28.6% (n=12) 
 
 
 
 
χ
2 
= 8.371 
p = 0.004 
Age 
0-29 
30 and over 
 
55.2% (n=95) 
44.8% (n=77) 
 
70.9% (n=39) 
29.1% (n=16) 
 
χ
2 
= 8.036 
p = 0.005 
Men’s most important role is providing 
financial support to their families  
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
27.9% (n=48) 
72.1% (n=124) 
 
 
42.3% (n=22) 
57.7% (n=30) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 7.683 
p = 0.006 
Couples who elope are thoughtless and selfish 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
56.5% (n=74) 
43.5% (n=57) 
 
72.5% (n=29) 
27.5% (n=11) 
 
χ
2 
= 6.006 
p = 0.014 
Arranged marriages have no place in a modern 
society 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
69.3% (n=113) 
30.7% (n=50) 
 
57.7% (n=30) 
42.3% (n=22) 
 
χ
2 
= 4.859 
p = 0.027 
Background 
 Urban 
 Non-urban 
 
65% (n=119) 
35% (n=64) 
 
53.6% (n=30) 
46.4% (n=26) 
 
χ
2 
= 4.657 
p = 0.031 
Arranged marriage is a valuable tradition 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
17.5% (n=29) 
82.5% (n=137) 
 
27.7% (n=13) 
72.3% (n=34) 
 
χ
2 
= 4.721 
p = 0.03 
Young people are under a lot of pressure from 
their parents when it comes to marriage 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
33.5% (n=57) 
66.5% (n=113) 
 
 
44.2% (n=23) 
55.8% (n=29) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 3.849 
p = 0.05 
Table 10.3: Bivariate analysis of approval for HBV 
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4. Bivariate analysis of the experience of HBV  
 No HBV 
experience 
HBV 
experience 
P-Value 
Families make better choices when they 
arrange marriages than individuals would do 
on their own behalf 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
 
1.8% (n=1) 
98.2% (n=107) 
 
 
 
13% (n=7) 
87% (n=47) 
 
 
 
χ
2 
= 8.572 
p = 0.006 
Where honour has been compromised, a 
family which does not respond will be excluded 
from the community until some action has 
been taken 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
 
 
44.4% (n=36) 
55.6% (n=45) 
 
 
 
 
66.7% (n=28) 
33.3% (n=14) 
 
 
 
 
χ
2 
= 5.472 
p = 0.006 
Marriage is a business arrangement between 
two families rather than a relationship 
between two people 
Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
 
2.8% (n=3) 
97.2% (n=103) 
 
 
 
15.2% (n=7) 
84.8% (n=39) 
 
 
 
χ
2 
= 8.009 
p = 0.009 
Jin be jine marriages cause social problems 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
99.1% (n=106) 
0.9% (n=1) 
 
89.8% (n=44) 
10.2% (n=5) 
 
χ
2 
= 7.809 
p = 0.012 
Background 
Urban 
Non-urban 
 
72.5% (n=79) 
27.5% (n=30) 
 
54.7% (n=29) 
45.3% (n=24) 
 
χ
2 
= 5.062 
p = 0.02 
Young people are under a lot of pressure from 
their parents when it comes to marriage 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
28.5% (n=30) 
71.4% (n=75) 
 
 
46.9% (n=23) 
53.1% (n=36) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 4.993 
p = 0.021 
In our society, ‘honour’ comes from controlling 
all the women in a family 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
38.8% (38) 
61.2% (60) 
 
 
53.8% (28) 
46.2 (24) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 3.132 
p = 0.055 
Parents arrange marriage in their own interests 
rather than that of their children
 Agree/Agree strongly 
Disagree/Disagree strongly 
 
 
18.1% (19) 
81.9% (86) 
 
 
31.2% (15) 
68.8% (33) 
 
 
χ
2 
= 3.298 
p = 0.056 
Table 10.4: Bivariate analysis of HBV experience 
Results in the bottom two rows of the table do not meet the 0.05 standard of significance, yet have been reported 
due to their near-significance and interest value. 
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5. ANOVA analysis of attitudinal data against 
marriage consent  
 MCV
90
 (Male) MCV (Female) 
 ?̅? s.d. Variance ?̅? s.d. Variance 
Women should be virgins before 
marriage 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
2.3035 
2.3949 
 
 
0.61527 
0.58518 
 
 
f=0.579 
p=0.448 
 
 
2.0605 
2.4488 
 
 
0.65287 
0.53838 
 
 
f=10.520 
p=0.001 
Couples should not have any kind 
of relationship before marriage 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
2.2750 
2.3673 
 
 
0.62788 
0.60469 
 
 
f=0.556 
p=0.457 
 
 
1.8910 
2.2549 
 
 
0.66586 
0.63399 
 
 
f=9.138 
p=0.003 
It should not be necessary for 
women to be virgins before they 
are married 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
2.4596 
2.3171 
 
 
0.62833 
0.59784 
 
 
f=1.181 
p=0.279 
 
 
2.4524 
2.0794 
 
 
0.64467 
0.62476 
 
 
f=8.552 
p=0.004 
Women’s role is as housewives 
and mothers 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
2.3253 
2.3348 
 
 
0.68865 
0.59330 
 
 
f=0.006 
p=0.936 
 
 
1.8700 
2.2352 
 
 
0.70278 
0.63925 
 
 
f=7.688 
p=0.006 
Brideprice is a mark of respect for 
a bride and her family 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
2.3207 
2.3878 
 
 
0.52462 
0.60721 
 
 
f=0.330 
p=0.567 
 
 
1.9222 
2.2391 
 
 
0.64886 
0.63688 
 
 
f=7.005 
p=0.009 
Honour should not be related to 
the control of women 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
2.3848 
2.2805 
 
 
0.61857 
0.45570 
 
 
f=0.722 
p=0.397 
 
 
2.2111 
1.8597 
 
 
0.66035 
0.67391 
 
 
f=5.414 
p=0.021 
Young people are under a lot of 
pressure from their parents when 
it comes to marriage 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
 
2.1953 
2.4190 
 
 
 
0.65697 
0.56647 
 
 
 
f=4.947 
p=0.028 
 
 
 
2.0890 
2.2371 
 
 
 
0.65668 
0.64487 
 
 
 
f=2.009 
p=0.158 
Background 
 Urban 
 Non-urban 
 
2.3055 
2.3167 
 
0.64882 
0.58915 
 
f=0.015 
p =0.904 
 
2.2262 
2.0176 
 
0.63190 
0.67875 
 
f=4.488 
p=0.035 
Families make better choices 
when they arrange marriages 
than individuals would do on 
their own behalf 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
 
 
2.1979 
2.3916 
 
 
 
 
0.63016 
0.61635 
 
 
 
 
f=1.386 
p=0.241 
 
 
 
 
1.8854 
2.2404 
 
 
 
 
0.79517 
0.63498 
 
 
 
 
f=4.173 
p=0.043 
                                                        
90 MCV stands for the Marriage Consent Variable as described on page 306 
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 N 
 MCV
90
 (Male) MCV (Female) 
 ?̅? s.d. Variance ?̅? s.d. Variance 
Namûs is the basis of a moral 
society 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
2.2617 
2.4678 
 
0.61790 
0.55394 
 
f=3.854 
p=0.052 
 
2.1188 
2.2706 
 
0.64006 
0.67074 
 
f=1.725 
p=0.191 
Violence may sometimes be 
justified if a person has brought 
shame to their family 
 Agree/Agree strongly 
 Disagree/disagree strongly 
 
 
 
2.2521 
2.3848 
 
 
 
0.62229 
0.60183 
 
 
 
f=1.335 
p=0.250 
 
 
 
2.0319 
2.2565 
 
 
 
0.69642 
0.62564 
 
 
 
f=3.687 
p=0.057 
Table 10.5: ANOVA analysis of attitudinal data against marriage consent 
Results in the bottom two rows of the table do not meet the 0.05 standard of significance, yet have been reported due to 
their near-significance and interest value. 
 
